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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of the "divided self' is a staple of college literature
courses, psychiatry, and daily conversation. But it is not a concept
that the judiciary readily acknowledges. However divided you
may be, you may not, in general, sue yourself.1 Ambivalence does
not create a justiciable controversy, even if you are your own
worst enemy.
That a lawsuit, by definition, requires at least two parties has
always been clear to common law courts. Federal courts have
1. See, e.g., South Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Amador Medean Gold Mining Co.,
145 U.S. 300 (1892). In Amadar Medean, the majority control of the plaintiff and defendant
corporations had come into the hands of the same group of people by the time the case
reached the Supreme Court. The Court therefore refused to consider the merits, but
reversed and remanded for further proceedings to protect the interests of the minority
stockholders. Id. at 301-02.
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found the same principle in the Constitution's case-or-controversy
requirement.2 The talismanic "a person cannot sue herself" col-
lapses, however, when the "person" is the United States govern-
ment. In practice, different parts of the government often end
up on opposing sides of the same lawsuit. Although a caption as
frank as United States v. United States is uncommon, courts have
rarely hesitated to hear intragovernmental disputes. The United
States has sued the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for
approving railroad rates charged to the federal government 4 and
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for setting long
distance telephone rates that were too high.5 The Department of
Justice (DOJ) has challenged mergers and rate agreements that
other federal agencies explicitly approved and defended in court.6
The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) is in constant
litigation with other agencies over labor practices.7 The Secretary
of the Interior has sued the Federal Power Commission (FPC)
for licensing a dam,8 and the Secretary of Commerce has gone
after the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for not
preparing an environmental impact statement.9 The Secretary of
2. U.S. CONST. art. 111, S 2, cl. 1.
3. 417 F. Supp. 851 (D.D.C. 1976) (three-judge district court), affld sub nom. National
Classification Comm. v. United States, 430 U.S. 961 (1977) (Department of Defense (DOD)
challenge to Interstate Commerce Commission order increasing the cost of transporting
automobiles by truck).
4. United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949); see also Ford Motor Co. v. ICC, 714 F.2d
1157, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (DOD's petition for review of the ICC's refusal to award
reparations for alleged overcharges by "market dominant" railroads).
5. See United States v. FCC, 707 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
6. E.g., United States v. Marine Bancorp., Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974) (challenge to bank
merger approved by Comptroller of the Currency); United States v. ICC, 396 U.S. 491
(1970) (challenge to ICC approval of railroad mergers); United States v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 694 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (challenge to Federal Maritime Commission approval
of rate-fixing agreement among ocean carriers); United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (challenge to FCC order allowing Comsat/IBM joint venture to construct
communications satellites; FTC filed an amicus brief); United States v. Civil Aeronautics
Bd., 511 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (challenge to Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) approval
of airlines' capacity reduction agreements).
7. E.g., Fort Stewart Schools v. FLRA, 110 S. Ct. 2043 (1990); Department of the
Treasury v. FLRA, 110 S. Ct. 1623 (1990); FLRA v. Aberdeen Proving Ground, 485 U.S.
409 (1988) (per curiam); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89
(1983); United States Dep't of the Interior v. FLRA, 887 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1989);
Department of the Navy v. FLRA, 815 F.2d 797 (lst Cir. 1987).
8. See Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); United States es rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345
U.S. 153 (1953); see also Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. FERC, 692 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1983)
(dispute among the Secretary of the Interior, FERC, and several bands of Mission Indians
over the licensing of hydroelectric facilities on Indian land), afJ'd in part and rev'd in
part sub nom Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S.
765 (1984).
9. See Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. FERC, 746 F.2d
466 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985).
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Agriculture has sued both the Administrator of the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) for suspending the registration of
pesticides for certain uses10 and the ICC for approving special
rates for the unloading of fruits and vegetables." In fact, the
Supreme Court has never dismissed an action as nonjusticiable
because it could be characterized as United States v. United
States. 2 Almost as consistently, the lower courts have upheld
their power to decide disputes between parts of the government.13
Given the judiciary's receptiveness to intragovernmental law-
suits, the more important bar to such litigation has come from
DOJ. Because DOJ controls most agency litigation, 4 it is able to
keep numerous potential interagency suits from reaching the
10. See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 925 (1977); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
11. See Secretary of Agric. v. United States, 347 U.S. 645 (1954); see also Secretary of
Agric. v. ICC, 551 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (challenge to the ICC's decision not to grant
general refund upon cancellation of tariff under which railroads charged shippers for in-
transit grain inspections).
12. The one possible exception of which I am aware is Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.)
409 (1792). This decision is best known as the Court's earliest statement that judicial
decisions must be final and unreviewable. It is also notable because five of the six Justices
(while riding Circuit, not together as the Supreme Court) had refused to implement what
they deemed an unconstitutional statute, in a sense exercising the power of judicial
review usually dated to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), more than a
decade later. But the case also involved a question about proper parties.
The original parties in the Supreme Court were Attorney General Randolph and the
Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania. Randolph sought a writ of mandamus
directing the Court to proceed on applications filed with it for veterans' benefits. Without
a statement of reasons, and apparently evenly divided, the circuit court refused to allow
the Attorney General to proceed ex officio. Randolph then painlessly produced a client,
Hayburn, and the Supreme Court allowed him to proceed on the merits. Before it became
Hayburn's case, Hayburn's Case was thus the government litigating with itself. The
Court's insistence that the Attorney General represent a private client is more readily
understood as a decision about standing than one about the justiciability of intragovern-
mental litigation.
13. The two cases usually cited as holding that the government cannot sue itself are
Defense Supplies Corp. v. United States Lines, 148 F.2d 311 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 746 (1945), and United States v. An Easement and Right of Way, 204 F. Supp. 837
(E.D. Tenn. 1962). I am aware of only three other decisions dismissing an intragovern-
mental action as nonjusticiable. See Employees Welfare Comm. v. Daws, 599 F.2d 1375
(5th Cir. 1979); Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Hines, 273 F. 774 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
257 U.S. 643 (1921); Juliano v. Federal Asset Disposition Ass'n, 736 F. Supp. 348 (D.D.C.
1990). In at least two cases, district courts hesitated about, but managed to avoid, having
the government on both sides. See Quaker State Corp. v. United States Coast Guard, 681
F. Supp. 280, 286 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (apparently assuming that the Coast Guard could not
sue the Forest Service); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1079-81 0).
Colo. 1985) (refusing to join the Army as a defendant in an action brought by the United
States for costs of cleanup of hazardous waste for which the Army was allegedly partially
responsible).
14. See 28 U.S.C. S 516, 518, 519 (1988).
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courts. Especially in recent years, the limits on intragovernmental
litigation have been defined less by the judiciary's closing the
courtroom door than by DOJ's refusal to knock on it. Although
courts have heard all of the intragovernmental suits presented
to them, then, the potential class of such suits is far larger than
the number of cases actually litigated.
Two powerful arguments counsel against intragovernmental
litigation. First, the United States is a single entity, yet article
II's case-or-controversy requirement forbids one person from
being both plaintiff and defendant. 15 Second, judicial resolution
of disputes between, agencies may trench on the President's
authority, if not obligation, to resolve such disputes as Chief
Executive. 6 This separation of powers concern is underlined by
the Framers' adoption of a unitary executive, with a single,
accountable head-a structure that seems inconsistent with al-
lowing agencies to turn to courts to settle their disputes. These
arguments are linked. First, the more unified and hierarchical
the executive branch appears under article II, the less likely an
article IH case or controversy can exist within it. Second, lodg-
ing the executive power in the President could be "a textual
commitment" of decisionmaking authority to a branch other than
the judiciary.17
15. See P. BATOR, P. MismuN, D. SnAPimo, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1318 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER]; Environmental Compliance by Federal Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 668, 675 (1987) [hereinafter Federal Environmental Compliance Hearing] (mem-
orandum from John Harmon, Ass't Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Michael J.
Egan, Assoc. Att'y Gen. (June 23, 1978)) (allowing EPA to sue another agency would
violate the established principle that "no man can create a justiciable controversy against
himself").
16. E.g., Memorandum of Disapproval for the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1988,
24 WEEiLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 1377 (Oct. 26, 1988) [hereinafter Memorandum] (explaining
pocket veto, because of constitutional objections, of legislation that would have authorized
special counsel within the Merit Systems Protection Board to sue other federal agencies
for retaliation against whistleblowers). The memorandum succinctly states the basic
argument:
The litigation of intra-Executive branch disputes conflicts with the consti-
tutional grant of the Executive power to the President, which includes the
authority to supervise and resolve disputes between his subordinates. In
addition, permitting the Executive branch to litigate against itself conflicts
with constitutional limitations on the exercise of the judicial power of the
United States to actual cases or controversies between parties with con-
cretely adverse interests.
Id. at 1378.
17. This phrase is usually found in political question cases. Prominent in the standard
8971991]
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The shortest answer to this problem is a functional one: if an
intragovernmental dispute has actually reached the courts, that
very fact indicates that there is concrete adversity sufficient to
satisfy article III and that the President is not in fact in control
and capable of resolving the dispute, thus belying the unitary
executive notion. As a statement of the practical realities of
intragovernmental litigation, this is a compelling argument for
justiciability. It is, however, a practical rather than a theoretical
or systemic response. If parts of the government are not supposed
to square off in court, then courts should not endorse and par-
ticipate in the derailment of the constitutionally appropriate
functioning of the government. Although the very existence of
the litigation is revealing, intragovernmental suits cannot be self-
justifying.
This Article attempts to define which intragovernmental dis-
putes are justiciable, focusing particularly on litigation between
agencies. 18 It begins by dismissing the simple answers: Part I
rejects application of the no-person-can-sue-herself idea to the
federal government; Part II rejects any easy reliance on the
unitary executive theory. Both the executive branch and the
government as a whole are too divided and replete with compet-
ing interests for either of these slogans to create a per se bar
to intragovernmental litigation.
Indeed, once one has abandoned these not very meaningful
formal constraints, intragovernmental litigation does not appear
so peculiar. Part III examines the statutory background and sets
out some general considerations in favor of intragovernmental
litigation. Part IV then analyzes the requirements for justiciable
interagency litigation. Interagency lawsuits can be divided into
litany of political questions are those involving a "textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962). The issue of the justiciability of interagency litigation is the flip-side of
the normal political question inquiry. Under the political question doctrine, the issue, the
"question," is what matters; the particular parties are irrelevant. Here, the identity of
the parties (the pun is intentional) is all that counts. Interagency litigation generally
raises issues that would be clearly justiciable, the furthest things from "political ques-
tions," if only a different plaintiff had brought the suit. Some overlap may exist-that
is, intragovernmental litigation over a political question, for example, Goldwater v. Carter,
444 U.S. 996, 1002-06 (1979) (plurality opinion)-but the two types of litigation are entirely
distinct.
18. Intragovernmental litigation falls into three categories of increasing proximity of
the parties: litigation between the branches, litigation between executive agencies, and
litigation between parts of a single agency. I argue that the first is generally justiciable,
the second is sometimes justiciable, and the third is rarely justiciable. Part II.C discusses
interbranch litigation; Part VI considers intra-agency litigation.
[Vol. 32:893
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various subcategories. One might plausibly distinguish those in-
volving at least one independent agency from those involving
only executive agencies; those with only governmental parties
from those in which private parties are also present; or those in
which the agencies have separate representation from those in
which DOJ represents all parties. Each of these factors may be
relevant to justiciability. The most useful categorization, how-
ever, depends upon the governmental roles that the litigants fill.
There are critical differences among (1) disputes in which one
agency, like a private party, is subject to the regulatory authority
of the other; (2) disputes over turf; and (3) disputes arising out
of a disagreement over regulatory policy, when both agencies
are acting in their regulatory capacities.
A justiciable controversy clearly exists if one of the govern-
mental parties appears as a regulator and the other as a member
of the regulated community, as in the case of compliance litigation
by one agency against another. Disputes between two regulators
within the government-for example, a Department of Energy
(DOE) challenge to an Occupational Health and Safety Adminis-
tration (OSHA) regulation that does not apply to DOE, but which
DOE considers bad policy-pose a harder question. Although the
divergent interests and agendas of separate agencies suggest
that these qualify as article III controversies, courts should not
resolve interagency disputes that arise out of disagreements over
policy. Although the term "unitary executive" is a misnomer, the
Constitution does require unitary execution of the laws. The
executive branch must at some point adopt a regulatory bottom
line; that is its constitutionally assigned task.
This approach would preclude judicial resolution of many dis-
putes that courts have in fact entertained. On the other hand, it
would permit litigation of interagency compliance disputes that
in recent years have not made it to the courts because of concerns
over justiciability. The two primary examples are the proposed
special counsel to litigate against agencies alleged to have retal-
iated unlawfully against whistleblowers 19 and EPA suits against
federal facilities for failure to comply with pollution statutes.2
19. See supra note 16; infra note 99.
20. See supra note 15; infra note 99. Through somewhat different reasoning, one
commentator has reached the same conclusion with regard to the justiciability of EPA
enforcement actions against federal facilities. Steinberg, Can EPA Sue Other Federal
Agen.es?, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 317 (1990).
1991]
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II. INTRAGOVERNMENTAL CASES AND CONTROVERSIES
A person cannot sue herself.2' This principle rests on our basic
assumptions about what a lawsuit is. For a judge, it is in the
nature of things that a lawsuit requires two adverse parties.
Some courts and commentators have concluded that intragovern-
mental litigation is nonjusticiable because the United States is
"one person."2 This contention is uselessly conclusory.
A. The Requirement of Adverse Parties
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the judicial
power to cases and controversies. 2s Courts and commentators
have spilled a good deal of ink trying to define these essentially
contentless terms.24 To say that courts can decide only cases or
controversies raises the question of what these are. The standard
judicial response is tautological: cases and controversies are the
things that courts decide.25 Looking outside article III to deter-
mine what things courts decide leads to two possible sources.
The first is tradition,26 which is not much of a restraint given its
uncertainty and malleability.2 The common law model does little
21. United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, 431 (1949) (referring to "the established principle
that a person cannot create a justiciable controversy against himself"). The Lawyers
Cooperative Publishing Company offers the following statement of the common law rule:
"Without adversary parties before it, a court is without jurisdiction to render a judgment,
and it therefore follows that one person cannot be both plaintiff and defendant in the
same action." 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parties S 6 (1987).
22. E.g., Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Hines, 273 F. 774 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 257
U.S. 643 (1921); United States v. An Easement and Right of Way, 204 F. Supp. 837 (E.D.
Tenn. 1962); United States v. ICC, 78 F. Supp. 580 (D.D.C. 1948), rev'd, 337 U.S. 426
(1949); 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 188 n.11 (1982); FederalEnvironmental Compliance Hearing,
supra note 15; J. RADCLIFFE, THE CASE-OR-CONTROVERSY PRovIsION 58 (1978).
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, S 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to ... Cases .. . [and]
Controversies .... ).
24. For a thorough examination of the difficulty of this task and the continuing failure
of courts and commentators to meet it, see Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV.
227, 230-58 (1990).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696 (1974) ("In the constitutional
sense, controversy means more than disagreement and conflict; rather it means the kind
of controversy courts traditionally resolve.").
26. See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 340 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (endorsing
the "ultimate circularity" of the case or controversy requirement, which has "virtually
no meaning except by reference to ... tradition").
27. Professor Winter thus criticizes the standing doctrine first because of its historical
basis (specifically, that it defers too much to a private rights model that grows from
continual reference to common law adjudication and the premise of self-interested parties)
and second because it rests on incorrect history. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and
1991] UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES
more than suggest a need for adverse parties. The second source
of illumination as to the nature of cases and controversies is the
remainder of the Constitution. Courts can settle disputes only
when doing so is consistent with their role in the overall consti-
tutional structure.P Such limits are not actually part of the case-
or-controversy requirement except in that courts have chosen to
say, redundantly, that certain disputes rendered nonjusticiable
by other parts of the Constitution are also not cases or contro-
versies.P These are actually external rather than internal limits
on the authority of the courts,3 We should be honest about what
we read into this sparse text.
We can say at least that federal courts, like common law
courts, require actual adverse parties.31 The clearest, though not
the only,3 2 example of a lack of adversity is a case in which one
person sues herself.P Adversity would seem to require at least
two people.s
the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1988). It is undisputed that
contemporary readings of the case-or-controversy clause have never been exactly congru-
ent with historical practice. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95-96 (1968); Brilmayer, The
Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93
HARv. L, REv. 297, 303-04 (1979). Indeed, the Court has at times seemed to reject the
historical approach altogether, or at least to view pedigree as a necessary but not
sufficient condition for a case or controversy. See Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1982).
28. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 94-95.
29. In a tradition whose rhetoric (as opposed to, at times, its practice) was less
preoccupied with judicial restraint, the case-or-controversy requirement might have done
more to shape separation of powers principles rather than being merely the repository
of separation of powers ideas drawn from other parts of the Constitution. Then we would
be referring to "the c~se or controversy authority" rather than "the case or controversy
requirement:' Cf. Bandes, supra note 24, at 259 (noting and criticizing the view of "article
I solely as a limitation on the courts," and not as an exhortation to perform certain
tasks"L
30. For a brief discussion of the difference between internal (for example, is this
commerce?) and external limits (for example, is this protected first amendment activity?)
on Congress' power, see G. STONE, L. SEmMAN, C. SUNSTEIN, & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw 126 (1986).
31. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943); Muskrat v. United States, 219
U.S. 346 (1911).
32. Adversity is lacking if the parties have come to agree on the proper result during
the litigation, e.g., Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47, 47-48 (1971);
League of Women Voters v. FCC, 489 F. Supp. 517, 520 (C.D. Cal. 1980), if one person
controls both parties, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943); South Spring
Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Amador Medean Gold Mining Co., 145 U.S. 300 (1892), or if the
suit is collusive, as in cases in which the parties attempt to obtain a judgment that will
benefit both as against a third party, e.g., Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251 (1850)
(brothers-in-law" seeking to quiet title as against a third party).
33. See supra note 21.
34. Professor Jaffe was thus precise, not redundant, in stating that the case-or-
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Members of other professions might quarrel with the lawyer's
confidence that adversity cannot exist within one person. Yet
plainly I cannot sue myself for being consistently late to work
and so getting myself fired. Even though very real adversity
may exist, a judicial proceeding can provide it neither effective
expressions' nor an adequate remedy; monetary relief would be
meaningless and injunctive relief unworkable and unenforceable.
My being of two minds does not place two parties before the
court; two entire bodies are necessary. The bar on litigation by
one person against herself is thus a (meta)physical necessity when
the person is an individual human being.ee
controversy provision requires "the presence before the court of two or more adverse
parties." L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 99 (1965) (emphasis
added).
35. A number of practical difficulties immediately arise. Would I hire two lawyers? If
I did not, could the court designate a lawyer, whom I would be obliged to pay, to
represent me as a defendant? If I called myself to the stand, would I be deemed a hostile
witness for purposes of defining the scope of appropriate direct examination?
36. In a suit with multiple plaintiffs and/or defendants, among whom one person appears
on both sides, the dual representation problem disappears and meaningful relief is possible.
Under the traditional rule, however, the whole suit would still be nonjusticiable. See
Faulkner v. Faulkner, 73 Mo. 327, 339-40 (1880). This result has been attributed to the
common law rule that the court can grant only a single monetary judgment which is
enforceable against any defendant and satisfied by payment to any plaintiff. Note, Judicial
Resolution of Administrative Disputes Between Federal Agencies, 62 HARv. L. REV. 1050,
1055 (1949) (citing 1 A. SCOTT, TRUSTS S 99.1 (1939)). The judgment would be meaningless
if satisfied by a single person paying it to herself. Modern flexibility with regard to
remedies avoids this problem without having to declare the entire litigation nonjusticiable.
See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir.) (minority shareholder plaintiffs
in derivative action must recover in their own right because payment to corporation
would mean that defendants would share in the judgment), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (court's authority to grant relief to fewer than all parties).
A lawsuit between a single person and herself is also meaningful if she appears in
different capacities. See Wylly v. McCarl, 2 F.2d 897 (D. Mass. 1924), affd, 5 F.2d 964
(1st Cir. 1925); Haberly v. Haberly, 27 Cal. App. 139, 149 P. 53 (1915); Cooper v. Nelson,
38 Iowa 440 (1874). In Wylly, Judge Lowell milked the "comic opera" incongruities of the
case's posture for all they were worth. The suit was
brought by a disbursing officer directed to himself to prevent himself from
deducting from his own salary a sum which he had been ordered by the
Comptroller General so to deduct, so that he may be ordered to command
himself to pay himself the amount which he himself considers to be due
himself.
Wylly, 2 F.2d at 897. Nonetheless, he had no difficulty concluding that this was a justiciable
controversy. See also American State Sav. Bank v. American State Sav. Bank, 288 Mich.
78, 284 N.W. 652 (1939) (represented by separate counsel, bank in capacity as trustee
sued itself in capacity as bank). But see Swoope v. Swoope, 173 Ala. 157, 55 So. 418 (1911)
(next friend of infant ward cannot sue himself as administrator and guardian); Redevel-
opment Agency v. City of Berkeley, 80 Cal. App. 3d 158, 143 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1978) (city
council, acting in the capacity of the city's redevelopment agency, cannot sue itself);
Barber v. Barber, 32 R.I. 266, 79 A. 482 (1911) (town treasurer cannot sue himself officially
on a claim against the town).
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A different explanation is required when the person is a group
or a corporation. Such organizations have component parts that
are fully capable of appearing on both sides of a lawsuit. These
parts often submit their disputes to an arbiter, usually their
superior in the corporate hierarchy. Nothing inherent in their
disputes makes judicial resolution peculiar or inappropriate.
Nonetheless, the black letter rule is that a corporation, for
example, cannot sue itself3 7 The explanation must be found in
the purposes underlying the adversity requirement.
The purposes usually identified are instrumental rather than
normative.s Adversity-that is, a clash of interests combined
with desires for different results-is supposed to ensure effective
advocacy and full presentation of all relevant information.,* Its
actual success in doing so is dubious. Like much of what courts
have read into the case-or-controversy requirement with similar
aims-the bar on advisory opinions, the ripeness and mootness
doctrines, the requirement of an injury in fact caused by the
challenged conduct and redressable by a ruling for the plaintiff-
adversity is the roughest sort of proxy.40
Clearly, adversity is not a sufficient condition for effective
advocacy; lawyers fail for many reasons independent of what is
at stake for their clients. Nor is adversity a necessary condition
for effective advocacy. At most, its absence might raise a question
about the thoroughness with which the parties will litigate. If
both sides seek the same result, we have every reason to doubt
how well one party will present its case. If our only concern was
the quality of judicial decisionmaking, however, it would be
37. See South Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Amador Medean Gold Mining Co., 145
U.S. 300, 301-02 (1892); Boller v. National Mediation Bd., 647 F. Supp. 1060, 1062 (S.D.
Tex. 1986); Dofflemyer v. W.F. Hall Printing Co., 558 F. Supp. 372, 382 (). Del. 1983).
38. See E. CHEmERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 39-40 (1989); Bandes, supra note 24, at
261, 290.
39. E.g., J. RADcLE, supra note 22, at 47-48. The Supreme Court frequently refers
to "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); see,
e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 697
(1974).
40. All justiciability requirements are justified in part as a guarantee of concrete
adverseness and therefore of effective advocacy. They can be extremely imprecise
indicators. It is not hard to find cases in which a direct examination of a party's actual
commitment and capacity to litigate would suggest the opposite conclusion as to standing
than the court reaches through its indirect safeguards. The usual comparison is between
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973),
and Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). E.g., Chayes, The Supren w Court 1981
Term: Foreword" Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REv. 4, 24-26
(1982).
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sufficient to examine actual disagreement directly. Instead, the
case law requires that a constitutional case or controversy grow
out of what one might term "situational adversity."41 For example,
the Court requires advocacy organizations to identify and sue on
behalf of a member who has suffered a constitutionally sufficient
injury, even if the litigation is over matters central to the
organization's mission. Finding a member who will lend her name,
though nothing else, to the lawsuit does absolutely nothing to
further strenuous advocacy. 42 Numerous suits in which there can
be no doubt about the quality of the advocacy present no case
or controversy because they lack divergence between the parties
other than their sincere disagreement. 3
Normative considerations, therefore, must also be at work. In
part, the adversity requirement reflects a belief in a limited
judicial role, restricting judicial involvement to circumstances
that require resolution by an outsider. Parties not actually in
conflict have no need for external resolution. Indeed, courts often
refuse to settle disputes unless their involvement is "necessary,"
thus serving the goal of judicial economy and the view that
courts are decisionmakers of last resort.44 In addition, the re-
quirement of situational adversity reflects a belief that those
with common interests should settle their own disputes. Adver-
sity both arises out of and requires divergent interests.45
41. Professor Tushnet argues that because courts should be deciding cases on the
merits, standing doctrine should "be stripped to the barebones ...[requiring only] real
adversity between plaintiff and defendant, and a plaintiff capable of generating a reason-
ably good, 'concrete' record for decision." Tushnet, The Sociology of Article IU: A Response
to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1706 (1980) (footnote omitted). Whether
he means "real adversity" as something more than sincere and committed disagreement
is unclear.
42. Chayes, supra note 40, at 24.
43. "The presence of a disagreement, however sharp and acrimonious it may be, is
insufficient by itself to meet Art. Irs requirements." Diamond, 476 U.S. at 62.
44. E.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967); 4 K. DAvIs, ADIKN-
ISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE S 24:19, at 286 (2d ed. 1983).
Strictly speaking, judicial resolution is never necessary. The world might not work as
well, but it would not come to an end without a system of courts. First, other referees
are available. Second, even if they were not, disputes would ultimately end through
compromise, inducement, trickery, surrender, or attrition. When courts speak of the
necessity of judicial resolution, they mean that no one internal to the dispute can dictate
a resolution and that the parties must therefore turn to a stranger to the conflict, such
as a court.
45. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937). Scholars with a
communitarian bent have criticized the Court's standing jurisprudence for being so firmly
centered on self-interest and so intolerant of jus tertii. E.g., Tushnet, supra note 41, at
1708-21; Winter, supra note 27, at 1481-91. The refusal to hear litigation between persons
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Several factors explain the refusal of courts to hear intracor-
porate lawsuits. First, because the same authority governs nom-
inally different parties, one party may not present its side
effectively. A court also may reasonably suspect that the litiga-
tion is collusive and serves some ulterior motive, such as obtain-
ing a precedent that will stand both sides in good stead against
third parties. Moreover, a court's participation is at best unnec-
essary in that the corporation's chief executive officer can dictate
a resolution.46 In this sense, the officer's authority renders cor-
porate subordinates one person; these subordinates are not ad-
verse because their dispute does not require an outside arbiter.47
Finally, intracorporate disputants share more than a boss; they
also share a single interest. Like an individual, the law deems
the corporation to have only one goal, namely, its own welfare.
In fact, the nonjusticiability rule overlooks enormous divergences
within a large corporation over turf, allocation of resources, and
the corporation's best interests. The rule can do so because of
the corporation's artificiality. Because the corporation is an in-
vented creature of contract and statute, we can give it any
characteristics we choose.4 In effect, the law makes it a condition
of adopting the corporate form that the corporation cannot sue
with shared interests could be seen as a counterexample, an instance in which the Court
respects a community sufficiently to stay out of its affairs and insist that it resolve its
disputes internally. In cases in which courts have been explicit about such a rationale,
however, their restraint has done little to further these concerns and perhaps has done
more harm than good. For example, intrafamilial tort immunities are said to rest on
respect for the family unit and the need to preserve domestic harmony. Yet it is difficult
to take this rationale seriously. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 902-03 (5th ed. 1984). On the steady decline
but not yet complete abandonment of intrafamilial tort immunities, see generally Anno-
tation, Liability of Parent for Injury to Unemancipated Child Caused by Parents' Negli-
gence-Modern Cases, 6 A.LR.4TH 1066 (1981); Annotation, Modem Status of Interspousal
Tort Immunity in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Actions, 92 A.L.R.3D 901 (1979)
[hereinafter Annotation, Modern Status].
46. This view depends upon a managerial theory of corporations that some view as
obsolete. See generally Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives
from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1474-82 (1989) (describing competing theories of the
firm). Under the "new economic theory of the firm," id. at 1471, with its emphasis on
the contractual relations of the corporation's components rather than the firm's hierar-
chical structure, intracorporate litigation might make perfect sense. After all, if the firm
"is contract," id. at 1480, then at times it "is breach" and therefore might "be adjudica-
tion:' The theory's proponents, however, would probably view intracorporate litigation
as an unlikely and inappropriate instance of excessive transaction costs.
47. One way of articulating the question addressed by this Article is whether the
President is part of or external to the agencies.
48. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
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itself. In defining what a corporation is, we define its parts to
be inherently nonadverse because a corporation can and ought
to resolve its disputes internally and because its parts all share
the same ultimate interest.49 We could define their relations
otherwise-in which case precious little intracorporate litigation
still might result-but in either case, the corporation's ability to
sue itself is ultimately a function of corporate law and the
corporation's charter.
In considering the justiciability of intragovernmental suits, the
Constitution serves as the law and charter. The question is
whether the Constitution creates a governmental scheme pos-
sessing any of the three unities that preclude article III adversity:
unity of desired outcome, unity of interest, and unity of control.
First, and least controversially, does concrete adversity exist
within the government? Second, should courts treat the govern-
ment is having the same unity of purpose, goals, and interests
that they deem an individual or a corporation to have? Third,
does the government, or part of it, have a firm, single hand on
the tiller?
B. The Federal Government as One Person
Given this understanding of adversity, the usual bar on liti-
gation by one person against herself does not apply to the federal
government. Monolithic though the United States can appear, to
deem it one person as a litigant is absurdly formalistic.
To begin with, what is "the United States" for these purposes?
Are the fifty states one legal person? The fact that together
they are the United States does not mean the states cannot sue
each other because in doing so they would be suing themselves.
Article III, of course, expressly puts cases between two or more
states within the judicial power;50 this provision would be mean-
49. Historically, common law courts did exactly the same thing with another fictional
person: the marital unit. See generally Annotation, Modern Status, supra note 45. In part,
courts based the conception of husband and wife as one person, unable to sue one another,
on the general refusal to acknowledge a married ivoman as a legal person. With the
passage of Married Women's Property Acts, this rationale disappeared. Yet in many
states, interspousal immunity was or is maintained long after married women were
recognized as legal persons in other respects. The rationale, such as it is, rests on
concerns over marital harmony and the threat of collusion. Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d
352 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980). These three rationales-a general doctrine
about legal status, belief in the possibility or importance of resolving disputes internally,
and fear of collusion-underlie both interspousal immunity and the principle that a
corporation cannot sue itself.
50. U.S. CONST. art. II, S 2, cl. 1.
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ingless if there could be no such case. Even without this broad
hint, however, forbidding interstate litigation by resort to the a-
person-cannot-sue-herself shibboleth would be ludicrous. The states
have independent interests and representation; they have fierce,
self-interested disagreements; and they do not answer to the
same authority-or to the extent they do, litigation' in the federal
courts is the means of submitting their disputes to that authority.
The bizarreness of forbidding interstate litigation on the theory
that the states are parts of one person cautions against overcon-
ceptualizing the idea of a person in this context.
Consider, then, merely the United States government as one
person. The idea of a unitary federal government, its parts joined
by "one indissoluble bond of unity and amity,"'r5 is an attractive
one. The Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Providence
Journal Co. 52 recently illustrated just how attractive it is. In that
case, the Court refused to allow the Solicitor General to relinquish
his role as lawyer for the United States even though the gov-
ernmental interest concerned the judicial rather than the exec-
utive branch. Operating from a conception of a unified government,
the Court rejected as "startling" the suggestion that "there is
more than one 'United States' that may appear before this Court."' '
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the holding in Providence
Journal is unobjectionable. The Court's image of a unified federal
government, however, is unrealistic.
First, the idea of the United States as a single litigant is
extraordinarily abstract. After all, the government is composed
of millions of actual persons who are frequently at odds with one
another. The government's wide range of interests, enforcement
responsibilities, benefits programs, landholdings, and activities
also means that it is constantly in court. The United States is
51. THE FFDERALise' No. 47, at 304 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (quoting the New
Hampshire Constitution).
52. 485 U.S. 693 (1988). The case arose out of a suit against DOJ and the Providence
Journal to enjoin dissemination of information about the plaintiffs contained in Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) files. Id. at 695. When the newspaper violated a temporary
restraining order, the judge appointed a special prosecutor to bring criminal contempt
charges. Id. at 696-97. The district court found the newspaper in criminal contempt; the
court of appeals reversed; and the special prosecutor successfully petitioned for certiorari.
Id. at 697-98. The Supreme Court held that under 28 U.S.C. S 518(a), which gives the
Attorney General and the Solicitor General exclusive authority to "conduct and argue
suits and appeals in the Supreme Court... in which the United States is interested,"
only the Solicitor General can represent the United States before the Court. Id. at 707.
The Court thus dismissed the petition for certiorari it had previously granted. Id. at 707-
08.
53. I& at 701.
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like no other litigant; it is a party to more than a third of all
litigation in the federal courts. It would be extraordinary, then,
if the government avoided ever facing itself on opposite sides of
a lawsuit.
Second, when the United States appears on more than one
side of a lawsuit, the assumptions about control, collusion, and
effective advocacy that underlie the adverse parties requirement
may be utterly implausible. If a dispute between component parts
of the federal government actually reaches a court, a court has
little or no reason to be concerned about collusion. Relations
between the three branches, and to a lesser extent within each
branch, are adversarial, often by design. Litigation between them,
therefore, is likely to involve fiercely held, self-interested posi-
tions taken by separate individuals who represent different in-
terests. DOJ usually represents the governmenty which can raise
a significant practical obstacle to intragovernmental litigation.
DOJ representation is in no way a theoretical objection to intra-
governmental suits, however, and Congress can easily cure the
conflict by giving parts of the government the authority to
represent themselves. 5 Moreover, the practical and logical obsta-
cles to hearing one individual on both sides, and to awarding
relief both to and against an actual person, are absent when the
person is the government. Parts of the government frequently
do submit disputes to arbiters, such as the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB)w or the Attorney General.5 Courts face no
obstacles in determining a winner and fashioning a meaningful
remedy in fights between two parts of the government. Injunctive
relief redresses the victor's injury and alters the status quo.
Monetary relief looks somewhat peculiar, perhaps pointless, for
it involves merely shifting funds from one government account
54. 28 U.S.C. SS 516, 518, 519 (1988).
55. Congress has granted independent litigating authority to the Senate, 2 U.S.C. S
288 (1988), and to many agencies, usually the independent commissions, in specific
circumstances, e.g., 12 U.S.C. S 1828(c)(7)(D) (1988) (Comptroller of the Currency, Federal
Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.); 15 U.S.C. S 56(a)(1)42) (1988) (Federal
Trade Commission); 28 U.S.C. S 2323 (ICC); id. S 2348 (1988) (Federal Communications
Commission, Federal Maritime Commission, Nuclear Regulatory Commission); 29 U.S.C.
S 663 (1988) (Solicitor General of Department of Labor in OSHA actions); 33 U.S.C. S 1366
(1988) (EPA under Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. S 7413 (1988) (EPA under Clean Air Act);
49 U.S.C. S 11702 (1988) (ICC).
56. For example, under Executive Order 12,088, OMB is to resolve conflicts between
EPA and other agencies over compliance with pollution control standards. Exec. Order
No. 12,088, 3 C.F.R. 243 (1979).
57. Executive Order 12,146 requires executive agencies to submit legal disputes to the
Attorney General. Exec. Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409 (1980).
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to another. Yet as a practical matter monetary relief is also
meaningful. The federal budget is not one big pot. Each agency
has its own budget, strenuously sought and jealously guarded.
Agency personnel are hardly indifferent to monetary judgments
merely because the money goes from and to the federal treas-
ury.e In addition, even if the agency is financially unconcerned
by the penalty, the fine is not just a monetary sanction. It
symbolizes a determination that the agency has seriously mis-
behaved-a determination that will hurt the agency in its deal-
ings with Congress, the President, and the public.59 Indeed, fine
or no fine, such a judicial determination will matter to both
parties; a declaratory judgment is itself meaningful relief.
Finally, in many respects the government litigates under dif-
ferent rules than private parties.P For example, it enjoys uniquely
58. Witness the pitched battle over EPA's effort to fine the Department of Energy for
environmental noncompliance at its Fernald, Ohio nuclear facility. See 21 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 2223 (Apr. 12, 1991). See generally Axine, Bonine, Barnett, Oates, & Skillman,
Stones for David's Sling: Civil Penalties in Citizen Suits Against Polluting Federal Facil-
ities, 2 J. ENvTL. L. LIT. 1, 41-44 (1987) (making agencies pay fines to the United States
for violations of environmental laws would enhance compliance). At least one court has
assessed civil penalties, payable to the United States Treasury, against a federal agency
under the Clean Water Act. Sierra Club v. Interior Dep't, 80 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1841
(). Colo. 1990); see also Ohio v. Energy Dep't, 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1448, 1453-54
(6th Cir. 1990) (state can sue federal government under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act for civil penalties payable to United States Treasury). But see id. at 1458
n.4 (Guy, J., dissenting) (objecting that such a payment would be illogical).
In Juliano v. Federal Asset Disposition Association, 736 F. Supp. 348 (D.D.C. 1990), the
court stated broadly that a case or controversy does not exist when the government
seeks to recover a money judgment from itself. See id. at 351-53. This unusual case was
a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. S 3729 (1988), which creates a
cause of action for private citizens to bring suit on behalf of the United States against
any entity that knowingly submits a fraudulent claim to the government. The alleged
defrauder here was itself a government-owned corporation, the Federal Asset Disposition
Association. The court dismissed the case because any judgment would both come from
and go to the federal treasury (except for the significant cut that the qui tam plaintiff
would receive for bringing the suit). Whether the holding was statutory or constitutional
is unclear. Compare Juliano, 736 F. Supp. at 351 (government's argument that no case
or controversy existed "proper") with id. at 352-53 ("nothing in the Act" allows this
action, which would be an unprecedented "expansion of the Act"). At any rate, the result
makes perfect sense under either view, particularly because (1) the action would have
done nothing to further the statutory goals, but simply made the qui tam plaintiff
wealthy, and (2) in a suit that purported to be by and against the United States, no
governmental parties were actually in disagreement. Nothing in Juliano is inconsistent
with the proposition that having to pay a fine to the federal treasury can have the same
deterrent and other salutary effects for a transgressing federal agency that it has for
private entities.
59. Cf. Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Private Distinctions
Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1469-70 (1982) (noting similar benefits that would flow
from criminal prosecutions by DOJ against federal entities).
60. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 141 (1983).
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loose standards of issue preclusion."1 These different rules reflect
important practical differences between the government and pri-
vate litigants. The courts should not and do not blindly treat the
federal government like any other individual litigant.
The case-or-controversy provision should be read in light of its
underlying purposes, without overconceptual gameplaying about
what counts and what does not. The rule that one person cannot
be both plaintiff and defendant poses a risk of the emptiest sort
of formalism.62 Courts may easily misapply the rule if they lose
sight of the fact that it is primarily a shorthand description for
brass-tacks considerations about adversity and the need for ju-
dicial resolution. Invoking the no-person-may-sue-herself rule
abandons analysis in favor of a slogan. That slogan collapses
entirely when the person is as abstract, compartmentalized, and
full of competing interests as the United States government.
C. Litigation Between the Branches
Litigation between the branches clearly illustrates the possi-
bility of justiciable controversies within the government and the
impossibility of deeming the government "one person." How
courts should handle interbranch litigation is potentially a highly
complex problem, but to keep it simple, consider this narrow
question: Does the mere fact that both litigants are part of the
United States government in itself preclude interbranch litiga-
tion? Clearly it does not.
Courts regularly permit interbranch litigation.6 For example,
the Supreme Court repeatedly has allowed Congress to defend
61. United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1984); United States v.
Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159-64 (1984).
62. Few would deny, for example, that form triumphed over substance in Globe &
Rutgers Fire Insurance Co. v. Hines, 273 F. 774 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 643 (1921),
an admiralty action arising out of a collision between vessels owned by two different
railroads. At the time of the collision, the United States, by presidential order, had taken
over all the railroads in the country. Id. at 776. The plaintiff was one railroad's insurance
company; the named defendant was the former federal official who had been Director
General of the railroads at the time of the collision. Id. at 775. The court dismissed the
action because the two railroads were actually the same person (namely, the United
States), and the insurance companies were subrogated to the rights of the insureds. Id.
at 776-77, 784. Thus, even though (1) no governmental party existed because the railroads
had returned to private hands; (2) the actual adversity was profound because the insurance
companies were doing the litigating and fighting over money; and (3) there was no way
that the nominal single party, the United States government, could have resolved the
dispute without resort to the courts, the court determined that the suit was nonjusticiable
because the United States was suing itself.
63. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In that case, DOJ
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statutes that the executive branch, along with the private party
to which the executive is nominally opposed, argues are uncon-
stitutional.6 In INS v. Chadha,65 for example, in which the named
adversaries agreed that the legislative veto was unconstitutional,
the Court specifically pointed to Congress' formal intervention
as rendering "concrete adverseness . ..beyond doubt."' '
The judicial and executive branches also litigate against each
other. A contempt ruling against a government official is in
essence an action by the judiciary against another branch. Like-
wise, an executive branch request for a writ of mandamus issued
to a judge is interbranch litigation.67 We might similarly char-
acterize the famous case of Evans v. Gore.68 In Evans, a federal
judge successfully challenged the income tax under article III's
diminution-in-salary clause. 9 Although the judge sued as an in-
dividual, his legal argument was that his official position gave
him immunity and the two other branches could not act against
a member of the judiciary in this way.
Even DOJ, which denies the justiciability of many intragov-
ernmental disputes, seems to accept litigation between the
sued AT&T to enjoin it from complying with a congressional subpoena. The House of
Representatives authorized the chairperson of the subcommittee that had issued the
subpoena to intervene on its behalf. The district court issued the injunction, AT&T did
not appeal, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia permitted the con-
gressman to appeal. See also Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787
F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1986) (Senate, House, and disappointed bidder for government contract
sued Army, represented by DOJ, and the successful bidder), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918
(1988); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(per curiam) (FTC sued Senate and House over constitutionality of legislative veto), aFid
mem, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
64. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS,
392 U.S. 206 (1968); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
65. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
66. Id. at 939. The companion cases that ensured Chadh's justiciability were thus
United States Senate v. IVS and United States House of Representatives v. INS. See id. at
919.
The federal courts have also properly heard disputes between the branches of other
governments. See, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Eleventh Legislature, 536
F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1976) (governor sued legislature over validity of its override of his line
item veto).
67. E.g., In re NLRB, 304 U.S. 486 (1938) (NLRB sought, and the Supreme Court issued,
a writ of mandamus to the court of appeals that had improperly assumed jurisdiction of
a dispute still before the Board). Executive agency petitions for writs of mandamus to a
court are common. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 858 F.2d 534 (9th
Cir. 1988); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 717 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1983); of.
Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (refusing to hear Attorney General's petition
for mandamus to the circuit court); supra note 12 (discussing Hayburn's Case).
68. 253 U.S. 245 (1920).
69. U.S. CONsT. art. I, S 1 ("Judges ... shall ...receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.").
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branches. In 1982, for example, it sued the House, seeking a
declaratory judgment as to -the scope of Congress' subpoena
power in the face of asserted executive privilege. 70 This suit
exemplified an interbranch battle in its rawest form. The plaintiff
presumably considered the case justiciable. Similarly, DOJ's po-
sition in the cases brought by members of Congress challenging
the President's use of the pocket veto has been that Congress
as a body can bring such a suit, although individual members
cannot.71 This view was also implicit in the Department's position
in Providence Journal.72 In Providence Journal, the Solicitor Gen-
eral's emphasis was entirely on his role as the representative of
the President; the statutes granting the Attorney General control
over litigation "appl[y] to cases in which the United States is
'interested' by virtue of the constitutional and statutory respon-
sibilities of the Executive Branch." 73 Although the Solicitor Ge-
neral's argument was still a step away from saying that the
branches can litigate against each other, it did clearly mean that
they should not be litigating with each other. The diversity of
interests thought to justify that position could equalli support
the existence of a justiciable controversy.
In light of the article III concerns of unity of interest, shared
control, and adversity, interbranch litigation clearly can present
a case or controversy. Although the different branches are part
of the same government, they function independently. By defi-
nition, they have different bosses. The essential separation of
powers idea is that they are coequal branches sharing the top
rung. The authority the branches have in common is the law;
thus, it is constitutionally appropriate for them to submit their
legal disputes to the branch that says what the law is.74 In
70. United States V. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983). The
Civil Division sought a declaration that EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch was within
her rights in refusing to provide subpoenaed documents to a House subcommittee. Without
addressing the parties' arguments regarding the existence of an article I controversy,
the court dismissed on the ground that the legality of Gorsuch's action was more
appropriately tested in the context of a contempt proceeding. See id. at 152:53.
71. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 28-29 & 29 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot, 479
U.S. 361 (1987); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
72. United States v. Providence Jourhal Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988); see supra note 52.
73. Id. at 716 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae at 13).
74. Dean Choper argues that courts should never settle fights over the respective
authorities of the political branches. See generally J. CHOPR, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 260-379 (1980). This proposal, however, is not constitutionally
based. Rather, Choper advocates judgemade rules akin to the prudential limits on
[Vol. 32:893
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addition, situations clearly will arise in which the branches are
adverse by any standard-for example, the executive branch's
assertion of a privilege against Congress. 75 Indeed, the basic
Madisonian theory of the separation of powers is that the branches
are to have "opposite and rival interests," with "[a]mbition . . .
made to counteract ambition."76
This does not mean that such litigation contains no article III
difficulties or that litigation is the most appropriate way to
resolve interbranch disputes. In some circumstances, the Consti-
tution may require the unhappy branch to take a nonjudicial
route. For example, if Congress disagrees with an OSHA regu-
lation, it probably cannot bring a judicial challenge arguing that
the regulation is inconsistent with the authorizing statute; rather,
it must correct the agency error legislatively 8 I suggest only,
standing. As a matter of constitutional authority, he does not seem to dispute the courts'
ability to hear cases between two parts of the federal government. E.g., id. at 334
(notwithstanding existence of "a genuine case or controversy," court should abstain).
Furthermore, Dean Choper's position is both broader and narrower than the United
States v. United States problem. On the one hand, it is the issue of respective authority
that is important to Choper. He would forbid such suits even if, as is usually the case,
the branches themselves are not the two litigants. E.g., id. at 330-32. Conversely, Choper
might allow interbranch litigation over issues other than the branches' constitutional
duties and powers. For example, Choper's proposal presents no necessary bar to a Clean
Air Act enforcement action by the executive against Congress to enjoin excessive
emissions from the Capitol power plant. Indeed, Choper might endorse such litigation.
His basic argument is that the branches can and should protect themselves without resort
to the courts to define the scope of their powers. E.g., id. at 275. One way they can do
so is by suing each other over other issues. But see id. at 263 (determination of the
branches' respective powers "to be remitted to the interplay of the national political
process") (emphasis added).
On the other hand, Choper's position poses no obstacle to intrabranch litigation. That
is what poses the hard justiciability problem. See infra Part IV.
75. See United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983).
76. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). One of the
combatants aptly describes relations between Congress and the Executive as "the Two
Hundred Year War." Brand, Battle Among the Branches: The Two Hundred Year War, 65
N.C.L. REv. 901 (1987).
These realities were reflected in Congress' establishment of the Office of Senate Legal
Counsel in 1978 to "intervene or appear as amicus curiae in the name of the Senate...
in any legal action . . . in which the powers and responsibilities of Congress under the
Constitution ... are placed in issue." 2 U.S.C. S 288e(a) (1988). The underlying rationale
for creation of the office was that an inherent conflict of interest arose when DOJ
represented Congress, because it "is a part of the executive branch and its first and
foremost responsibility is to represent the interests of the President .and the executive
branch." S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11-12 (1977).
77. The standing doctrine provides the most obvious but not necessarily the only
doctrinal peg for a finding of nonjusticiability.
78. In holding the legislative veto unconstitutional, for example, the Court seemed to
assume, without discussion, that new legislation is Congress' only remedy for administra-
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in line with almost all available authority,79 that article III creates
no obstacle to a lawsuit between two branches merely because
they are both part of the federal government.
III. INTERAGENCY LITIGATION AND THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE
Although the government as a whole is not a single person,
viewing the executive branch that way is more plausible. Such
a conception has consequences for both constitutional concerns
about the justiciability of interagency suits. First, a unified ex-
ecutive might be the sort of single "person" incapable of having
a case or controversy with itself. More precisely, the President's
control over the potential litigants and their shared assignment
to execute the laws would negate adversity. Second, if article II
places the President in complete control of a unified and hier-
archical branch, allowing courts to give orders in the President's
place might be inconsistent with that article specifically and the
principle of separation of powers generally.
DOJ's concerted emphasis on presidential authority and cen-
tralized administration over the last decade has given new prom-
inence to the principle of the "unitary executive. '80 Because any
tive action of which it disapproves. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954-55 (1983).
Whether Congress could seek judicial review of a regulation that applied directly to
it raises a different question. Although Congress would then have standing, the fact that
it has a remedy through legislation might foreclose the judicial route. This legislative
remedy, however, is inadequate given the possibility of a presidential veto. Suppose the
original legislation had passed during a prior administration, and both the current
President and the regulating agency are of one mind. The original legislation would have
required only a congressional majority, whereas the correction of its misinterpretation
would now require a supermajority, even though the President's view would lack the
strength to pass Congress. When a regulation applies to private parties, this exceptional
circumstance is not worth worrying about and is subject to judicial correction in a suit
by such a private party. Congress should not be allowed to sue to protect the integrity
of its statutes from executive misconstruction. If the regulation applies to Congress itself,
however, Congress should be allowed to challenge it. First, no one else may be willing
to do so. Second, the possibility of bad motive suggests that Congress should be able to
defend itself. Third, this situation falls within the category of disputes between a
governmental regulator and a regulated governmental party which, as I discuss below,
should always be justiciable. Similarly, Congress could clearly obtain judicial review of
an administrative order directed to it.
79. But see Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 42 n.1 (D.C. Cir.) (Bork, J., dissenting) (arguing
that neither Congress nor either House individually may sue to challenge the President's
exercise of pocket veto), vacated as moot, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
80. This overall agenda receives a highly critical review in Rosenberg, Congress's
Prerogative Over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan
Administration's Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 627, 628-34
(1989). On the unitary executive generally, see Agency Autonomy and the Unitary Executive,
68 WASH. U.L.Q. 495 (1990) (panel discussion).
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growth in presidential authority means a decline in congressional
authority, Congress has greeted the unitary executive objection
to interagency litigation with suspicion and derision.8' As ambi-
tion counteracts ambition in this battle, both sides overstate their
case. The unitary executive model has an important and valid
idea at its core, but it does not painlessly resolve the justiciability
question. To be sure, under a strong view of the unitary execu-
tive, judicial resolution would interfere with presidential author-
ity. Yet the President does not enjoy complete control over
federal agencies either in theory or in fact. The unitary executive
argument rests on a faulty premise.
A. Presidential Control of the Executive Branch
The Constitution places executive authority in one person, the
President,82 who is politically accountable and charged with the
faithful execution of the laws.P As Chief Justice Taft lectured in
Myers v. United States,8 the President must be free to run the
executive branch to ensure the "unity and coordination in exec-
utive administration [that is] essential to effective action."8' 5 Lit-
igation between disagreeing agencies may undermine the
President's "general administrative control over those executing
the laws"' and prevent him from fulfilling his obligation to
"supervise and guide [executive officers'] construction of the
statutes under which they act in order to secure . ..unitary
and uniform execution of the laws."7
This view of the presidency rests, in particular, on the Framers'
adoption of a unitary executive.P The delegates to the 1787
81. See, e.g., Federal Environmental Compliance Hearing, supra note 15, at 285 (state-
ment of Rep. Sikorski); id. at 347 (statement of Rep. Cooper); 135 CONG. REC. H751 (daily
ed. Mar. 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Schroeder) (DOJ's constitutional objections to
interagency litigation are "legal window dressing on an essentially ideological argument").
82. U.S. CONST. art. H, S 1, cl. 1.
83. Id- S 3.
84. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
85. Id. at 134.
86. Id. at 164.
87. Id. at 135. Besides Taft's opinion in Myers, the other prominent early example of
this argument is the criticism of the "headless 'fourth branch'" formed by the independent
regulatory commissions in the report of President Franklin Roosevelt's special committee
to study the administrative state. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGT., REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT (1937), reprinted in part in SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SEPARATION
OF POWERS AND THE INDEPENDENT AGENCIES: CASES AND SELECTED READINGS, S. Doc. No.
49, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 343, 34548 (1969) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE].
88. For an example of reliance on the Framers' choice of the unitary executive, see
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Constitutional Convention seriously debated the choice between
a unitary and a plural executive. The former would ensure
efficiency and accountability; the latter thoroughness, independ-
ence, and a check against monarchy.S9 In The Federalist, Hamilton
echoed the arguments presented at the Convention. To make the
executive consist of several persons would create too great a
danger of disagreement and dissension, thus weakening the ex-
Presidential Laumaking Powers: Vetoes, Line Item Vetoes, Signing Statements, Executive
Orders, And Delegations of Rulemaking Authority, 68 WASH. U.L.Q. 533, 544 (1990) (panel
discussion) (remarks of Theodore Olson) (particularly in light of existence of independent
agencies, "without a constitutional amendment or even a direct Supreme Court decision,
the vote of the delegates on June 4, 1787, has been overridden and eroded so that we
now have precisely the plural executive rejected in Philadelphia").
Commentators generally view the choice of the unitary executive as one of the
Convention's central decisions. Professor Peter Strauss has written that "[o]f the decisions
[concerning the role of the executive] clearly taken, perhaps none was as important as
the judgment to vest the executive power in a single, elected official, the President:'
Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 599 (194); see also Pritchett, The President's Constitutional Position,
in THE PRESIDENCY REAPPRAISED 12, 14 (R. Tugwell & T. Cronin eds. 1974) (adoption of
unitary executive was "[tihe one decision about the executive that was basic to all
others").
89. The delegates debated the issue without resolution on Friday, June 1. They agreed
that there should be an executive, but disagreed as to whether it should consist of more
than one person. On the one hand, it was argued that a single person would be more
efficient and responsible; on the other, a plural executive seemed to offer greater
protection against monarchical tyranny and greater assurance of independence-although
not everyone agreed the latter was a good thing. See generally 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 65-73 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) [hereinafter CONVENTION
RECORDS]. The following Monday, after further debate, the delegates agreed to a single
executive by a vote of seven states to three. Id. at 93, 96-97, 101-02; see also id. at 119
(James Madison noted that "[a] principal reason for unity in the Executive was that
officers might be appointed by a single, responsible person:').
Despite the vote, proponents of the plural executive continued to press their caseJ On
June 15, William Patterson offered the New Jersey Plan, which called for an executive
consisting of "[blank] persons." Id. at 244. The following day's debate rehashed the plural
executive issue. Id. at 254, 261, 266-67. The convention set aside the New Jersey Plan
on June 18. Id. at 282. Even then, Hugh Williamson of North Carolina renewed the
argument for a plural executive during debate on how the executive was to be elected.
2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra, at 100-01 (debates of July 24). Among the features of the
proposal to which George Mason remained unreconciled, prompting him to refuse to sign
the final document, was the failure to provide the President with a "constitutional council,"
consisting of six geographically diverse members serving rotating six-year terms. Id. at
638-39; see also SUPPLEMENT TO MAx FARRAND'S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 249, item 7 & n.1 (J. Hutson ed. 1987).
As Madison later wrote to Jefferson, however, "The plurality of co-ordinate members
had finally but few advocates." Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct.
24, 1787), reprinted in THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 65, 66 (M. Kammen
ed. 1986). The states unanimously approved making the executive a single person on July
17 and August 24, 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra, at 22, 401, and, of course, in approving
the final document.
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ecutive's authority, distracting its attention, and perhaps para-
lyzing its operation. Most important, having a single executive
assured responsibility. An individual could not hide behind group
deliberations or palm off blame.9 Harry Truman thus echoed the
sentiments of the delegates in stating where the buck should
stop.91
Present-day supporters of strong presidential control also rely
on Madison's arguments during the First Congress' debate over
the President's removal authority:9
Vest this power in the Senate jointly with the President, and
you abolish at once that great principle of unity and respon-
sibility in the Executive department, which was intended for
the security of liberty and the public good. If the President
should possess alone the power of removal from office, those
who are employed in the execution of the law will be in their
proper situation, and the chain of dependence be preserved;
the lowest officers, the middle grade, and the highest, will
depend, as they ought, on the President, and the President on
the community 3
This view of the executive branch clearly argues against in-
traexecutive litigation. Requiring the President rather than the
courts to resolve interagency disputes enhances efficiency, ac-
countability, and consistency. Indeed, perhaps the executive branch
cannot have these characteristics unless the President runs the
show. Only if the President supervises and resolves disputes
between his subordinates will executive policy be effective, co-
herent, and known to the public.9 In contrast, if courts are drawn
into the resolution of interagency conflicts, the result is likely to
be delay and inconsistency rather than the "[diecision, activity,
90. THE FEDERAUST No. 70, at 426-29 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
91. J. BARTLETT, FAMILAR QUOTATIONS 788 (15th ed. 1980) (quoting Harry Truman).
92. E.g., Cleanup at Federal Facilities, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Transportation,
Tourism, and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 448 (1988) (statement of Roger Marzulla, Acting Ass't Att'y Gen.).
93. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 499 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
94. OFFICE OF MGT. AND BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE U.S. Gov'T 10-12 (Apr.
1, 1988-Mar. 31, 1989). See generally Federal Environmental Compliance Hearing, supra
note 15, at 207-11 (statement of F. Henry Habicht II, Ass't Att'y Gen.); Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1987: Hearings on S.508 before the Subcomm. on Federal Services, Post
Office, and Civil Service of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 452-53 (1987) (statement of Stuart Schiffer, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen.) [hereinafter
Whistleblower Hearings].
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secrecy, and dispatch" 95 that unity in the executive branch is
supposed to ensure.
These concerns can explain the best known example of inter-
agency litigation, United States v. ICC.9 The Army asked the
ICC to order a refund of certain charges the Army paid to
railroads. The ICC refused, and the Army petitioned for judicial
review; the Supreme Court found the suit justiciable.Y Although
this was not the Court's rationale, we might conclude that the
judiciary could resolve this dispute because the President could
not. First, because the proceeding before the ICC was an adju-
dication, the President could not dictate its outcome. Second, the
ICC is an independent agency and thus, to an uncertain degree,
beyond presidential control. Under this view, the dispute would
not have been justiciable if the President could simply have
dictated the outcome. Because Congress had already removed
the ICC's decision from presidential influence, however, permit-
ting judicial review constituted no further intrusion on executive
authority.98 In contrast, in situations in which the President
retains control-which, under this approach, is most of the time-
the principle of a unitary executive forbids judicial intrusion.99
95. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 424 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
96. 337 U.S. 426 (1949); see infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text (discussing this
decision in much greater detail).
97. United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. at 430-31.
98. This is only half of an explanation, of course. One could still argue that the same
imperative of presidential authority that forbids judicial resolution of intraexecutive
disputes in which the President controls the litigants also forbids insulating the ICC's
decision from presidential review in this way. Compare Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52 (1926) uith Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). The true believer
in the unitary executive should be more troubled than reassured to have United States
v. ICC explained in terms of the absence of presidential authority over one of the agencies.
99. The most sustained presentation of this argument is in 1987 congressional testimony
by then-Assistant Attorney General Henry Habicht. He argued that article H bars EPA
enforcement actions against federal facilities for violations of the environmental laws.
Federal Environmental Compliance Hearing, supra note 15, at 179, 206-13 (statement of
F. Henry Habicht H, Ass't Att'y Gen.). Mr. Habicht backed off ever so slightly from his
hard line during the hearings for confirmation to his present post, Deputy Administrator
of EPA. See Nomination of F. Henry Habicht II: Hearings Before the Senate Comm on
Environment & Public Works, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1989) (EPA lawsuit against another
agency was not "inconceivable").
Similar reasoning appears in a 1982 Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memorandum
concluding that the President can remove members of the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation at will. 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 180 (1982). One possible indication that
Congress had intended to limit the President's removal authority was that the statute
arguably authorized the Council to litigate against other federal agencies. OLC concluded
that the statute did not give the Council such authority, reading the statute to avoid
what It considered the dubious constitutionality of such a scheme. "If both the Council
918
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This argument is powerful. However, it significantly overstates
the cohesiveness of the executive branch.
B. The Disunited Executive
The term "unitary executive" has two meanings. First, it can
refer to a specific attribute of the executive branch, namely, that
it has one person at its head rather than a group. Second, it can
refer to a more general characteristic of the branch, namely, its
cohesiveness. The first of these tells us next to nothing about
how the executive branch should run in general or whether
agencies can sue each other in particular. The second idea seems
inconsistent, in the abstract, with interagency litigation. Yet an
examination of how the executive branch actually functions shows
that interagency litigation presents no incongruity.
1. Placement of the Executive Power in a President
The assumed attributes of the unitary executive should inform
our understanding of presidential authority and responsibility.
But to conclude that the existence of a single officer at the top
means that the other members of the executive branch cannot
litigate against each other requires some rather heroic inferences.
After all, having a unitary executive does not mean that the
entire executive branch consists of a single individual who alone
makes all decisions. As soon as one accepts that officers other
than the President will crowd the executive branch, the fact that
only one person is President is not much help in determining
how these additional elements of the branch should operate.
Indeed, the choice of a unitary rather than a plural executive
is not directly relevant to this issue. Suppose that advocates of
the plural executive had prevailed in Philadelphia. A three-
and the agency alleged to have violated the Act are within the Executive Branch, then
the President has both the power and duty to resolve any dispute between them as to
whether a violation of the Act has occurred." Id. at 188 n.11.
DOJ also emphasized presidential authority in arguing against the constitutionality of
a Special Counsel charged with litigating against federal agencies for illegal reprisals
against whistleblowers. See Whistleblower Hearings, supra note 94, at 452-53 (statement
of Stuart Schiffer, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen.); Memorandum, supra note 16. In light of
DOJ's objections and President Reagan's veto, the legislation ultimately enacted does not
authorize the Special Counsel to go to court against federal agencies. Whistleblower
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989); see 135 CONG. REC. S2779 (daily
ed. Mar. 16, 1989) (statement of Sen. Levin) (describing negotiations with DOJ and decision
to abandon troublesome provision).
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member council runs the executive branch. Its members are
irreconcilably divided'O° as to whether a DOD facility should
upgrade a leaking hazardous waste dump. One member thinks
that the site violates the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA)1°1 and that DOD should clean it up; the second thinks
that the site is in compliance; and the third thinks that the site
should continue as presently operated because national security
concerns outweigh environmental ones. Would this disagreement
be a justiciable controversy? If the unitary executive is the telling
argument as to why such a suit cannot be brought if the char-
acters are EPA, DOD, and OMB, then the existence of a plural
executive should be the telling argument as to why it can be
brought when the characters are joint heads of the branch.
Because the Constitution failed to identify a single decisionmaker
within the executive branch, the disputants can turn to the courts
to settle their controversy. 10 2 Yet the existence of a three-member
council is unlikely to appease those opposed to interagency liti-
gation; an argument based on respect for the council's authority
would be no weaker than an argument based on respect for the
President's authority.
Consider also another branch that is headed by a council of
sorts, the judiciary. Of the three branches, the judiciary has the
most hierarchical structure and the most powerful head. In the-
ory, the Supreme Court's decisions bind the entire judiciary in
the most compelling way. In practice, individual judges clearly
100. As James Wilson pointed out at the convention, an odd number of members of
an executive council does not ensure resolution of all disputes:
Among three equal members, he foresaw nothing but uncontrouled, contin-
ued, & violent animosities. ... IT]he making them an odd number would
not be a remedy. In Courts of Justice there are two sides only to a question.
In the Legislative & Executive departmts., questions have commonly many
sides. Each member therefore might espouse a separate one & no two agree.
1 CONVENTION REcORDs, supra note 89, at 96.
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988). As with most federal environmental statutes,
RCRA's substantive requirements apply equally to private and governmental facilities.
Id. S 6961.
102. The hypothetical would raise only slightly different questions if the council had
in advance, while still behind a pre-RCRA Rawlsian veil of ignorance, determined that
someone within the branch would have the final say in such disputes. Assuming all of
the players stick to the arrangement, then the controversy would stay out of the courts.
Of course, that may be a large assumption. The question whether the players can be
held to their agreement-by the courts? by threat of removal? by the voters?-raises all
of the same issues about justiciability and control that are involved in the initial problem.
The fight over the agreed-upon procedures for resolution would be one more intraexec-
utive dispute, and its resolution would be no different than the substantive dispute that
provoked it.
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have more freedom of movement than the theory would admit.
Nonetheless, the occasional, truly renegade judge notwithstand-
ing, the Court's general pronouncements do bind and control the
lower courts effectively. And in any individual case, theory equals
practice: any lower court decision is subject to review by a higher
court, and when a higher court dictates an outcome on remand
the lower court follows its instructions.
Imagining a judicial system in which judges sue one another
is possible. For example, two courts could litigate over which
has jurisdiction to review a particular agency action; or one court
might petition for a writ of mandamus to compel another to
abstain in light of related proceedings pending in the first.
Stretching further, an overruled district judge, or a dissenter on
the appellate panel, might petition for certiorari. 103 A judge who
presided over a criminal conviction might sue a later judge for
granting the defendant's habeas motion on the ground that the
first judge made an error. Many such possibilities are conceivable,
but our system does not use litigation to resolve disagreements
among judges.
In short, the judiciary thus has the attributes associated with
a strong version of the unitary executive: hierarchical structure,
a clear boss, and no intrabranch litigation. The Court, however,
is obviously plural; it is a council. The judicial branch thus
demonstrates that the choice of a unitary executive does not
determine dispositively the branch head's scope of control. The
model of the judicial branch does not disprove the unitary ex-
ecutive approach, but it does suggest that this approach is in-
complete. Necessarily, factors other than the unitariness of the
branch's head stand in the way of intrabranch litigation.
Consider also fights within Congress, which could not be more
different from the executive in structure. This is a collective
rather than a unitary body. All of the ideas of individual respon-
sibility, efficiency, and accountability thought to make intraexec-
utive disputes nonjusticiable are absent in the congressional
setting. Just the opposite model prevails. A single identifiable
hero or villain is not supposed to exist; the process is not
supposed to be swift and sure.104 The constitutional scheme for
103. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting) (raising
and decrying the possibility of such scenarios), vacated as moot, 479 U.S. 879 (1986).
104. Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from [infighting
within the branch] must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the
legislature .... In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an
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congressional decisionmaking often promotes deadlock and inac-
tion. Yet many disputes between members of Congress are clearly
inappropriate for judicial resolution.10 5 It would be surprising if
DOJ, for one, had a much broader view of the appropriateness
of litigation within Congress than it takes with regard to litiga-
tion with the executive branch.
What Congress, the judiciary, and the executive share is that
they all operate under a model, a partly explicit, partly implicit
constitutional mechanism for the resolution of internal disagree-
ments. The models vary, but each places limits on external
resolution of disputes. Courts cannot supplant the constitutionally
defined mechanisms for decisionmaking. Simply invoking the uni-
tary executive as the mechanism for executive branch decision-
evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarring of parties in
that department of the government, though they may sometimes obstruct
salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve
to check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too is once taken, the
opposition must be at an end. That resolution is law, and resistance to it
punishable. But no favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disad-
vantages of dissension in the executive department.
THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 426-27 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
105. McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REv. 241, 242-43,
263 (1981). As Hamilton says in the preceding quotation, supra note 104, once Congress
does finally act, "the opposition must be at an end." For examples of refusals to hear
internal congressional battles, see Metzenbaum v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1282, 1287 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (refusing to consider whether statute was passed in violation of House of Repre-
sentatives rules); Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 468 (D.C. Cir.) (refusing to consider
member's assertion that composition of Federal Open Market Committee of Federal
Reserve System was unconstitutional), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); Harrington v.
Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (refusing to review one member's challenge to
House's method of appropriating CIA funds, even though the named defendant was the
CIA director, because to do so would be to meddle in an internal House matter). Courts
have assumed jurisdiction in some such cases, but without actually deciding them. Instead,
recognizing that discretion may be the better part of valor, they have announced that
they could hear the case and then declined to do so. E.g., Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539,
544 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1176-77 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 823 (1983).
The best known example of litigation between members of Congress is Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). Although sometimes cited as an example of the courts
resolving an intra-Congress dispute, see, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 20, at 834, this was
actually a case in which the plaintiff sued in his individual capacity, essentially like a
dismissed employee, and should not be viewed as intrabranch litigation at all. An even
more famous intraexecutive counterpart to Powell, of course, is Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See also Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)
(action for back pay by estate of dismissed member of the Federal Trade Commission).
These suits are not true examples of intrabranch litigation; in each, the plaintiff was an
individual trying to keep his job, not an official trying to perform it.
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making and a complete bar on interagency litigation, however,
is as incomplete as saying that intragovernmental litigation is
nonjusticiable because one cannot have a justiciable controversy
with oneself.
2. Centralized Presidential Control
Although the existence of a President tells us little about the
constitutionality of intrabranch litigation, the more general sense
in which the executive is unitary may. Interagency litigation does
seem inconsistent with a model of centralized, hierarchical, and
self-contained decisionmaking. We infer this model in part from
the presence of one President and the perceived advantages of
having only one. More importantly, this model arises from the
implicit hierarchical structure of the executive branch, with its
clear boss charged with the ultimate responsibility to "take [care
that the laws [are] faithfully executed."'1 6 If this model is correct,
it would seem also to eliminate the possibility of article III
adversity within the branch. Someone internal to the dispute-
failing all else, the President-could always resolve it. The model,
however, is purely theoretical. A brief examination of the Pres-
ident's actual control over the executive branch shows that the
"unitary executive" is an oxymoron.
a. Constitutional Assignment of Authority
The Constitution itself does not establish a purely unitary
executive. Although it calls for one President, it also anticipates
the development of "executive Departments"107 and untold num-
bers of "other Officers of the United States"'0 8 and grants Con-
gress the power to create their offices.' 9 The Constitution does
not explicitly give the executive departments and officers of the
United States any duties."0 It does so implicitly, however, by
106. U.S. CONST. art. II, S 3. cl. 4.
107. Id. S 2, cl. 1.
108. Id. cl. 2.
109. Id-
110. It does anticipate that the heads of departments will, if asked, give written
opinions to the President, id. cl. 1, and, if so authorized by Congress, appoint inferior
officers, id. cl. 2. The opinions-in-writing provision also assumes that the heads of
departments will have "duties"; that is what they are to give their opinions in writing
about.
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referring to its having "vested" certain "[p]owers" in them"' and
by using the passive voice in the "take care" clause."2
b. The Realities of Modern Government
In a famous memorandum to his cabinet, President Jefferson
described the President's supervisory role during the Washington
administration, in which Jefferson had been Secretary of State:
Letters of business came addressed sometimes to the Presi-
dent, but most frequently to the heads of departments. If
addressed to himself, he referred them to the proper depart-
ment to be acted on: if to one of the secretaries, the letter, if
it required no answer, was communicated to the President,
simply for his information. If an answer was requisite, the
secretary of the department communicated the letter and his
proposed answer to the President. Generally they were simply
sent back after perusal, which signified his approbation. Some-
times he returned them with an informal note, suggesting an
alteration or a query. If a doubt of any importance arose, he
reserved it for conference. By this means, he was always in
accurate possession of all facts and proceedings in every part
of the Union, and to whatsoever department they related; he
formed a central point for the different branches; preserved
an unity of object and action among them; exercised that
participation in the suggestion of affairs which his office made
incumbent on him; and met himself the due responsibility for
whatever was done.11
Jefferson's description sounds like make-believe. Perhaps it
was once so, but nothing could be further from present-day
realities."4 The President's theoretical oversight extends to sev-
111. Id. art. I, S 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress power to "make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or officer
thereof"). This language may be a holdover from prior drafts that had more fully specified
the role of executive departments. Strauss, supra note 88, at 600-01 & 601 n.108.
112. U.S. CONST. art. II, S 3 (President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed"). This phrasing implies that the bureaucracy is to execute the laws and the
President is to supervise-that is, take care that the laws are faithfully executed as
opposed to faithfully executing them himself.
113. Memorandum from Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 6, 1801), quoted in L. WHr, THE
FEDERALISTS 35 (1956).
114. Compare the reminiscences of an aide to President Kennedy:
JFK used to receive about an 80-page compilation of weekly reports from
the various departments and agencies to brief him on controversies or trouble
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eral million employees, spread over hundreds of departments,
agencies, bureaus, and commissions, many of whom are career
civil servants"5 with policymaking and regulatory authority of
which the Framers never dreamed. To insist that the Framers'
conception of how the executive branch would operate-to the
extent such a thing can be determined or ever existed-should
control two centuries later is blindly unrealistic.116
The most conspicuous effort to ensure presidential control of
the bureaucracy has been the gradual establishment-culminating
in President Reagan's Executive Orders 12,291117 and 12,498"18-
of a mechanism for presidential review of agency rulemaking.
Although many of the specifics have been controversial, 1 9 there
is striking support for presidential oversight of the far-flung
federal rulemaking apparatus. 20 The primary reason for this
spots (for example, on the Billie Sol Estes affair); essentially these were
progress reports-but not much follow-through occurred. Kennedy basically
felt that the people he appointed would do the coordination and implemen-
tation of his policies.
Cronin, Presidents as Chief Executives, in THE PRESIDENCY REAPPRAISED, supra note 88,
at 238.
115. The permanent bureaucratic staff precedes and succeeds any individual President
and his appointees and has expertise, institutional memory, and day-to-day authority that
newly elected or appointed officials cannot match. As a result, in practice instructions
and control do not flow only from the top down. Eizenstat, The State of the Moderm
Presidency: Can It Meet Our Expectations? 11 (1990) (U. Chi. L. School Occasional Paper
No. 26).
116. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 493-94
(1987).
117. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
118. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986).
119. For criticisms of OMB's obstructionism under Executive Order No. 12,291, see
Morrison, OMB Inteference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write A Regu-
lation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1986); Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management
and Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive
Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1 (1984).
120. See, e.g., Administrative Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 88-9, in RECOMMEN-
DATIONS AND REPORTS 42, 42 (1988) ("An effective mechanism is needed to coordinate
agency decisions with the judgments of officials having a broader perspective, such as
the President and Congress:); Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, in
Administrative Conf. of the U.S., supra, at 527; Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of the
President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (1986); Sunstein, supra
note 116, at 455-56; Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the
White House, 80 COLum. L. REv. 943 (1980) (endorsing White House influence on policy
decisions in both rulemaking and adjudicatory settings); see also Sierra Club v. Costle,
657 F2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
This view is not unanimous. For hesitations about the value and appropriateness of
presidential involvement in agency decisionmaking, see McGarity, Presidential Control of
Regulatory Agency Decisionmaling, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 443 (1987).
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widespread support, however, is the general absence of effective
presidential control over the administrative apparatus. The Ex-
ecutive Orders are still far from direct presidential control of
agency rulemaking and are themselves symptoms of the lack of
presidential control.
c. Absence of Presidential Involvement
Efforts to enforce the unitary executive model do not even
pretend to involve the President himself in the oversight process.
At best, it is "the White House" that oversees agency activities;121
more often, it is OMB.22 Although we recognize OMB as being
full of "the President's men," it is not the President. Equating
OMB with the President for most purposes of agency oversight
is already a big step away from the pure unitary executive
model. As item b, above, suggests, this step has to be taken; but
it is important to recognize that even in its purest modern form,
this type of executive oversight is a far cry from George Wash-
ington's involvement in the details of government. When advo-
cates of a strong version of the unitary executive speak of the
necessity for the President to have the final say, what they mean
as a practical matter is that the President's inner circle-that is,
a group perhaps the size of George Washington's entire admin-
istration-must have the final say.
d. Interagency Control
Agencies often take orders not from the President, not from
the White House, and not even from OMB, but from other
agencies. The striking extent to which agencies are subject to
each other's control further undercuts the unitary executive
model. For example, one agency must often obtain a permit from
another in order to construct or operate some type of facility.l23
121. As a former DOJ official has put it, "'the White House is calling' is a far more
common telephone message than 'the President is calling.'" D. MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT,
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 2 (1980); see also id. at 27-36
(President unable to manage DOJ; neither the President nor the White House can address
a significant number of specific cases).
122. For example, Executive Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), requires agencies
to submit proposed regulations to OMB for review, and under Executive Order No.
12,088, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), 0MB resolves conflicts between EPA and other agencies over
compliance with pollution control standards.
123. For example, RCRA requires that all hazardous waste disposal facilities obtain a
permit from EPA. 42 U.S.C. S 6925 (1988). This obligation applies to federal as well as
private facilities. See id. S 6961; Federal Environmental Compliance Hearing, supra note
15, at 203 (statement of F. Henry Habicht, H, Ass't Att'y Gen.).
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such permits will not merely grant permission to proceed, but
impose a number of binding conditions. These requirements are,
in essence, orders from one agency directly to another without
a trace of presidential involvement. Second, agencies are fre-
quently bound by the regulations of other agencies. Although
0MB may have some input into a regulation, neither it nor the
President has the final say as to its content.124 Third, the exec-
utive may subject agencies to more direct interagency control,
as the Court's decision in United States v. ICC 25 illustrates. The
ICC required the Army to pay the full amount charged by the
railroads-or, to be completely precise, refused to require the
railroads to pay any of it back.22 Fourth, under various schemes,
one agency has initial decisionmaking responsibility, but another
agency can overrule it.' 2
In short, components of the executive branch-broadly under-
stood to include independent agencies-order each other around
in a hundred different ways without the President's involvement.
The conception of the executive branch as dominated by the
President, with its component agencies operating only on his
orders in a tidy hierarchical pyramid, is false.
e. Placement of Responsibility with the Agency
Giving added significance to the prior items, Congress may,
and usually does, place decisionmaking power in an agency head
rather than in the President. If Congress does so, the President
may influence the decision indirectly, but the decision remains
that of the department head.m Even the Supreme Court opinion
124. By its terms, Executive Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), requires only that
an agency submit proposed rules and accompanying regulatory impact analyses to OMB
for review; hold off on publication until OMB has completed its review; respond to OMB's
views, if any; and include those views and the agency's response in the rulemaking file.
Exec. Order No. 12,291 S 3(c), (e), 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). OMB review does not even apply
to independent agencies. Id. 5 1(d). To be sure, OMB's actual influence over agency
regulations is significantly greater than these provisions imply.
125. 337 U.S. 426 (1949); see supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text; infra notes 174-
83 and accompanying text.
126. 337 U.S. at 428.
127. For example, the discharge of dredged or fill material into the waters of the
United States requires a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers. 33 U.S.C. S 1344
(1988). Although the Corps has the basic permitting responsibility, EPA can veto a Corps
permit. Id. S 1344(c). On several occasions the Corps has issued a permit to a private
applicant, only to have EPA step in and revoke it. See, e.g., Bersani v. Robichaud, 850
F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, Bersani v. EPA, 489 U.S. 1089 (1989).
128. E.g., R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO, & P. VERKum, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 111
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that most insistently protects the President's administrative pre-
rogatives, Myers v. United States,129 endorses this scheme. Al-
though the opinion is for the most part a paean to presidential
authority, it acknowledges that "there may be duties so peculiarly
and specifically committed to the discretion of a particular officer
as to raise a question whether the President may overrule or
revise the officer's interpretation of his statutory duty in a
particular instance."1 0
Placing final decisionmaking authority in an agency head rather
than in the President may not look so meaningful if the former
serves at the latter's pleasure.13' What official will ignore the
President's wishes if doing so is just going to get her fired? In
practice, however, the removal power does not undermine place-
ment of decisionmaking authority with the subordinate. 3 2 Re-
moval is an atom bomb. Although it serves some of the deterrent
functions thought to be served by nuclear weapons, its very
power means it will be used only rarely. Removal is disruptive,
uncertain (given the Senate's advice and consent role with regard
to the supposedly more amenable replacement), and at best a
slow and roundabout way of reversing the offending decision. 133
(1985) [hereinafter R. PIERCE]; Harter, Executive Oversight of Rulema ing: The President
is No Stranger, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 557, 563 (1987); McGarity, supra note 120, at 465-72;
Strauss, supra note 88, at 649-50; Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 120, at 200-01; Verkuil,
supra note 120, at 957. But see Miller, Independent Agence, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 41, 58-
59.
129. 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (Taft, C.J.).
130. Id. at 135. Between his tenure as President and that as Chief Justice, William
Howard Taft wrote:
[Clonsider the drawing of money from the Treasury Department under an
appropriation act. The drawing of the warrant must be approved by the
Comptroller of the Treasury. It is for him to say how the appropriation act
shall be construed and whether the warrant is lawful and whether the money
can be drawn. The Comptroller of the Treasury is an appointee of the
President, and in a general sense is his subordinate. If the President does
not like him as a Comptroller, he can remove him and with the consent of
the Senate put in another one, but under the act of Congress creating the
office, the President cannot control or revise the decisions of this officer.
W. TAFT, THE PRESIDENT AND HIS POWERS 81 (Columbia Paperback ed. 1967).
131. See R. PIERCE, supra note 128, at 111 ("Attorneys General have long advised their
Presidents to acquiesce in the congressional decision to locate authority in subordinates.
After the fact, the President can always exercise his executive will by ordering the
offending official to be fired ....") (footnote omitted).
132. E.g., Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 120, at 201 n.56.
133. The fact that the agency took action against the President's wishes, leading to
the dismissal of the agency head, in no way affects the validity of that action. A successor
more congenial to the President's point of view can of course revoke or amend the now-
removed officer's action, but the action is effective unless and until that happens.
Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency Rule-
making Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193, 208 (1981).
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Additionally, it can carry an enormous political price. Giving the
final decision to an agency head who serves at the President's
pleasure, therefore, is not the functional equivalent of giving the
decision directly to the President.
Further eroding the President's theoretical ability to run the
executive branch is the fact that the President also lacks legal
authority to supervise directly subordinate officers within exec-
utive departments. Only the department heads may exercise such
control.1 1
f Adjudications
When an agency adjudicates, the President is not free even to
influence, much less direct, the result. The Administrative Pro-
cedure Act'see requirement that the agency decision rest exclu-
sively on the record of the hearing186 and statutory and
constitutional prohibitions on ex parte contacts3 preclude pres-
idential control.
g. Removal
The existence of the civil service,ee the independent counsel,13
and independent agencies1 40 underline the incompleteness of pres-
idential control of the executive branch. Each of these examples
of Congress' ability to insulate executive officers from removal-
and thus some degree of control-by the President would violate
a strong version of the unitary executive theory.
h. Summary
These considerations are not exhaustive. They are sufficient
to indicate that presidential control over agencies is hampered
134. 1 J. STEIN, G. MITCHELL, & B. MEZINES, ADMINISTRATiVE LAW S 4.02[2] (1988) (citing
10 Op. Att'y Gen. 527-29 (1863)).
135. 5 U.S.C. SS 555-706 (1988).
136. Id. S 556(e).
137. Id. SS 554(dXl), 557(d)(1); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 406-07 (D.C Cir. 1981)
(noting that due process may limit presidential interference in adjudications and that
"there is no inherent executive power to control the rights of individuals in such settings");
see also Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (inferring limits on President's
removal authority in adjudicatory setting despite statutory silence).
138. See United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886).
139. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); 28 U.S.C. S 596(a) (1988) (independent
counsel may be removed only by the Attorney General and only for cause).
140. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). But see infra Part
V.A.2.
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in many ways and that agencies constantly interact without
presidential supervision. Government agencies necessarily have
a life of their own; they are not merely the eyes and ears of the
President. The pristine model of the unitary executive has no
relation to political or constitutional reality.41 Interagency liti-
gation is not inherently or per se inconsistent with the functioning
of the executive branch.
In short, the choice of a unitary rather than a plural executive
reveals little about the constitutionality of intraexecutive litiga-
tion. To observe that nominally one person sits at the top is only
the beginning, not the end, of the analysis. The principles under-
lying the choice of the unitary executive may inform our under-
standing of the operation of the executive branch. The view that
interagency litigation is per se inconsistent with the proper
functioning of the executive branch is, however, untenable. Nei-
ther in itself nor via article III does the unity of the branch
automatically close the door to interagency litigation.
C. Resolution of Interagency Disputes as Advisory Opinions
We may quickly reject one other argument that rests on the
President's authority as Chief Executive. At first blush, a decision
in a suit between executive branch agencies might appear to be
an advisory opinion 42 because the President, who controls both
parties, would be able to accept or ignore the ruling.'4 This
concern does not withstand analysis.
141. To return to the corporate analogy, whatever the merits of the "new economic
theory of the firm" as applied to corporations, it seems to me a much more accurate
model of the executive branch than its managerialist competitor. See supra note 46.
142. A lawsuit is a nonjusticiable request for an advisory opinion if there is not a
substantial likelihood that the court's decision will bring about some change or have some
effect. E. CHEMEBINSKY, supra note 38, at 45. The classic example is a case in which the
executive or legislative branch can choose to accept or reject a court's conclusion.
Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
143. See Note, supra note 36, at 1054 (raising but dismissing the advisory opinion
concern). DOJ has so argued on at least one occasion. See Whistleblower Protection Act of
1986: Hearings on H.R. 4038 Before the Subcomm. on Civil Service of the House Comm. on
Post Offwe and Civil Service, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1986) (statement of Stuart Schiffer,
Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen.) (citing Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410 n.(a)). Its confidence
in this argument seems slight. Mr. Schiffer did not repeat the advisory opinion argument
in giving otherwise essentially identical testimony at two subsequent hearings on the
same legislation. Compare id. with Whistleblower Hearings, supra note 94, at 453, and
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1987: Hearing on H.R. 25 Before the Subcomm. on Civil
Service of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1987).
[Vol. 32:893
UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES
Such dual control, to the extent it in fact exists,144 does not
reduce a court's ruling to an advisory opinion. As the loser, the
President is not free to ignore a court ruling in this setting any
more than when he controls only the losing party. In either case,
a court's declaration of the law and any mandated relief are
binding. The President's discretion to resolve disputes between
subordinate agencies operates only within judicially determined
limits of legality.
Conversely, as the winner, the President is indeed free to forgo
the fruits of victory, in which case the decision would have no
effect; but this too is no more or less true than when the opponent
is a private party. The government, like any litigant, can always
let the loser off the hook or consent to its wishes; that possibility
has nothing to do with whether the loser is also a governmental
party. The fact that the President is on both the winning and
losing sides thus does not diminish the binding effect of the
court's ruling.
IV. INTERAGENCY LITIGATION: PREREQUISITES AND
PRESUMPTIONS
In light of the foregoing, blithely invoking principles of the
unity of a single person or of the executive branch cannot
determine the justiciability of intragovernmental litigation. In
fact, the surface appeal of these principles is insufficient even to
establish a presumption against such litigation. This Part pro-
poses that, assuming Congress has authorized interagency suits,
the presumption should be in favor of justiciability.
A. Statutory Authorization of Litigation
Whatever the constitutional rule, an agency cannot go to court-
against another agency or anyone else-without statutory au-
thority to do so. Congress could have foreclosed judicial resolution
of all of the cases discussed herein. In the United States v. ICC 45
setting, for example, Congress could have placed agencies outside
the ICC's jurisdiction altogether, leaving resolution of wharfage
charges to negotiation and lawsuits between the government and
the railroads. Alternatively, it could have given other agencies
some special role or authority within the ICC proceedings or
144. See supra notes 106-41 and accompanying text.
145. 337 U.S. 426 (1949).
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forbidden governmental petitions for review of the ICC's orders,
making the ICC's decision conclusive as to any other federal
agency. Any of these statutory schemes would have eliminated
the possibility of the case of United States v. ICC.146
I do not raise this point to reassure those concerned about
weakening presidential power. We cannot rely on Congress to
preserve presidential authority by foreclosing interagency liti-
gation; the opposite is more likely. Rather, I mean only to point
out that in any given case, a court must determine that the
agencies involved are properly before it as a statutory matter
before turning to the Constitution.
Whether a cause of action exists will, in general, turn on the
judicial review provision of the particular substantive statute.
The two primary default statutes, the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA)Y7 and the Hobbs Act,1' differ. By its terms, the APA
does not create a cause of action for one agency to sue another.
It authorizes an aggrieved person to seek judicial review'49 and
explicitly defines "person" to exclude agencies.1'0 However ag-
grieved an agency might be, it has no cause of action under the
APA to challenge another agency's action. In contrast, the Hobbs
Act, which applies to review of decisions by five specific agen-
cies,15' permits any party to the administrative proceedings, with-
out limitation, to seek judicial review. The Hobbs Act contains
no indication that it excludes other agencies from the category
of parties who can seek judicial review, nor have courts so readit.152
146. For an example of a setting in which interagency litigation would be appropriate
under the standards proposed in this Article but has not been permitted by Congress,
consider the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 4321-4370a (1988). The
Council on Environmental Quality is charged with overall implementation of the Act. Id.
S 4344. It has issued regulations, 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500-17 (1990), and is responsible, for
example, for resolving interagency disagreements over proposed projects with possible
adverse environmental effects. Id. pt. 1504. It has no authority, however, to challenge
the adequacy of an impact statement in court, and it has never attempted to do so. Such
an action would fall neatly within the category of justiciable interagency disputes set out
in this Article.
147. 5 U.S.C. SS 551-706 (1988).
148. 28 U.S.C. SS 2341-2351 (1988).
149. 5 U.S.C. S 702.
150. Id. S 701(b)(2) (for purposes of provisions on judicial review, definition of "person"
in S 551 applies); id. S 551 ("person" is "an individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or public or private organization other than an agency") (emphasis added).
151. The Hobbs Act covers petitions for judicial review of decisions by the FCC, the
Federal Maritime Commission, the Department of Agriculture, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, and the ICC. 28 U.S.C. S 2342.
152. See United States v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 694 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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Courts should interpret statutory authority to litigate to apply
to interagency litigation unless Congress clearly has indicated
the contrary. This was the Court's approach in United States v.
ICC.16 As shall become clearer below, there is no reason to
interpret the statute otherwise.'54
B. A Presumption of Justiciability
For several reasons, I begin with a presumption in favor of
justiciability of interagency disputes. First, a nonjusticiability
rule would be an exception to the general principle that courts
have the authority to give orders to the other branches (to the
extent such orders rest on legal grounds, of course). As a result,
arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise illegal agency actions would
stand.15s In intragovernmental suits, the judiciary fills its normal
role of policing other governmental actors, a function it is, by
hypothesis, free to perform if only someone else would ask it to
do so. Judicial review of agency action is critical to the legitimacy
of the administrative state;156 immunizing a class of agency de-
cisions from review undermines that legitimacy. Moreover, an-
other agency may be uniquely able to inform the court of the
153. 337 U.S. 426, 430 (1949) ("Unless barred by statute, the Government is not less
entitled than any other shipper to invoke administrative and judicial protection.").
154. For example, the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. SS 1531-1544 (1988), has never
been the basis of interagency litigation, but should be. The Act forbids any federal agency
to harm any member of a species designated as endangered by the Department of the
Interior (DOI). Id. S 1536(a). The Act also authorizes DOI to assess an administrative
penalty on "any person" who violates the Act and to request DOJ to bring a civil action
to enforce the penalty. Id. S 1540(a). "Person" is defined to include "any officer, employee,
agency, department, or instrumentality of the Federal Government." Id. 5 1532(13). The
statute's plain words thus authorize D(dI enforcement, including a civil action, against
sister agencies. They should be read to mean what they say.
In practice, this has not occurred. For example, in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153 (1978), the famous snail darter case, DOI had told the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) that the TVA would violate the Act were it to complete Tellico Dam.
DOI was powerless to prevent the TVA from pressing ahead, so private citizens brought
the lawsuit. DOI did not participate. When the case reached the Supreme Court, the
Solicitor General represented the TVA, taking a position at odds with Dors.
155. It is easy to overemphasize the harmful consequences of precluding such litigation.
In most cases, a private litigant will challenge the agency action. A no-intragovernmental-
litigation rule is therefore hardly a prescription for open lawlessness. In addition, allowing
intragovernmental suits could mean that reasonable and legal actions also will be chal-
lenged, with attendant delay, disruption, and expense.
156. Sunstein, supra note 116, at 463-78. The presumption in favor of the justiciability
of interagency litigation thus reflects many of the same concerns that underlie the usual
"presumption of reviewability" of agency action. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967).
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reasonableness and consequences of the challenged agency action.
These concerns would easily be outweighed if interagency
litigation was fundamentally inconsistent with the overall consti-
tutional scheme. It is not. The general objections to judicial
resolution of intraexecutive disputes draw on two prominent
strands of separation of powers analysis. One is the basic idea
that each branch must stay off the others' turf; each must do
only its job except to the extent the Constitution explicitly
authorizes officious intermeddling.'5 7 The second is that the Court
will set aside the actions of one branch (usually Congress) if its
actions so interfere with another branch's (usually the President's)
functioning that the latter cannot fulfill its constitutionally as-
signed role.16
Judicial resolution of interagency disputes neither trespasses
nor interferes. First, the real interference by courts in executive
affairs is in telling officers within that branch what to do. Yet
this authority has been settled since Marbury v. Madison,5 9 and
courts exercise it all the time. Indeed, by hypothesis, courts can
boss the executive around in these cases; the argument is only
that an outsider must invoke that authority. To say that courts
can tell the executive branch what to do only if it is at the
request, and for the benefit, of someone outside the branch is
incongruous.
Second, not only do the courts frequently tell the executive
what to do, the executive often, if not quite as frequently,
presents multiple and conflicting views to the courts. Although
the executive aims for a consistent litigating position, 1 ° it does
not always achieve it. At times, DOJ alerts a court to conflicting
agency positions,'6' or an agency that is not a party participates
157. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721-27 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 956-58 (1983).
158. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-86 (1988); Nixon v. General Servs.
Admin., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
159. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
160. See Exec. Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 310 (1979); Note, Government Litigation in
the Supreme Court: The Roles of the Solicitor General, 78 YALE L.J. 1442, 1459, 1464 (1969).
161. For example, St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961), concerned
a company's refusal to provide the FTC with copies of reports it filed with the Census
Bureau. The Solicitor General's brief informed the Court that the Department of Com-
merce, the Census Bureau, and the Bureau of the Budget believed that the reports were
not subject to compulsory production, whereas the FTC and the Antitrust Division of
DOJ held the contrary view. The Solicitor General himself, "fully recognizing the delicate
balance of opposing considerations," ultimately sided with the first three and against the
Antitrust Division. Id. at 217. He lost. Id. at 217-18.
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as an amicus, taking a position in conflict with another agency
that is a party.162 The article III problem does not arise in such
cases because they involve a single governmental party. The
article II concerns might still be present, although the President
can be deemed to have consented to presentations of these
disparate positions.16 If, as no one seems to deny, the Constitution
permits two governmental nonparty participants to present con-
flicting positions to a court, then one would expect it to be
equally acceptable for two governmental parties to do so as well.
The practical differences between these two situations are vir-
tually nil.64
Third, the reason that judicial involvement in executive mat-
ters is not a per se violation of separation of powers is that the
courts' scope of review is limited. Courts cannot make the exec-
utive's decisions or supplant the executive's discretionary au-
thority; all they can do is ensure that the executive acted within
the law. 6 5 A court's review, at one agency's request, of the
legality of another agency's action therefore is the most limited
sort of interference with the President's authority. Indeed, es-
pecially since the Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
162. See Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
Investment Co. Inst. v. SEC, 110 S. Ct. 3214 (1990). In this case, the court had to
determine whether an "index participation" was a security, and so within the jurisdiction
of the SEC, or a futures contract, and so within the jurisdiction of the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Id. at 539. Deeming index participations to be
securities, the SEC had authorized stock exchanges to trade them. Id. at 54041. Three
futures markets filed petitions for review. Id. The CFTC filed an amicus brief, siding
with the petitioners. Id. at 538. In effect, both agencies were before the court.
163. The President's concurrence in the presentation of conflicting positions cannot
salvage the practice if, as a strong version of the unitary executive would have it, the
President is constitutionally obligated to hammer his subordinates into a single position.
164. Two responses are possible. First, perhaps the government should not be permitted
to present conflicting views to a court even when there is only one governmental party.
Such a rule would have little to recommend it. On the value of presenting multiple
government positions to a court, see Stern, "Inconsistency" in Government Litigation, 64
HARv. L. REv. 759, 768-69 (1951); Note, supra note 160, at 1466-67.
Second, one might distinguish the two situations on the ground that if the disagreeing
agencies are not both parties, the case necessarily arose between the government and a
private party. Only a court can resolve that dispute. And in resolving it, knowing the
range of views within the executive branch is valuable to the court. If this distinction is
valid, it becomes an argument for allowing an agency to intervene in pending litigation
against another agency but not to bring such a suit itself. Such a rule is discussed infra
Part VD.
165. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In principle, therefore,
judicial resolution of a dispute cannot, by definition, conflict with the President's obligation
to execute the laws faithfully. The court does no more than determine what the law
requires.
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Natural Resources Defense Council, 166 the constraints on judicial
review of agency decisions are generally far greater than those
that limit the decisionmaking agency in the first place. To say
that interagency litigation requires courts to resolve disputes
over regulatory policy is also misleading. Such a judicial role
would be unseemly at best. Although the policy disagreement-
for example, should this hydroelectric project go ahead?-may
be what got the case into court in the first place, it is not the
issue that the court will resolve. Rather, the court will decide
legal issues, fulfilling a judicial rather than an executive function,
exactly as it does in litigation between the government and a
private party. I do not mean to overstate this point. If courts
truly exercised only "judgment" and never "will,"167 then inter-
agency litigation could never trespass on the President's author-
ity. In this sense, interagency litigation is a concern at all because
judicial decisionmaking inescapably does involve so much poli-
cymaking.168
Fourth, courts often will decide intragovernmental legal dis-
putes in the end because a private party sues. Allowing an
executive agency to influence or prevent such litigation by bring-
ing its own lawsuit may enhance rather than reduce presidential
control,16 9 particularly if the agencies settle the case, thereby
166. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (unless congressional intent is clear, court must accept an
agency's interpretation of statute it administers if the interpretation is not wholly
unreasonable); see also 5 U.S.C. S 706(2)(A) (1988) (court to set aside agency action that is
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion).
167. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
168. Judicial resolution of interagency disputes thus becomes increasingly dubious as
they involve more policy and less law. For a court, at the request of one agency, to set
aside another agency's decision as arbitrary and capricious would be more problematic
than for it to determine that the challenged agency lacked jurisdiction under the statute.
I argue below that agency turf wars are justiciable; courts should enforce statutory
allocations of responsibility. Such interagency litigation threatens the proper functioning
of the executive branch and requires the judiciary to do the executive's job far less than
if, for example, the Surgeon General, concerned over public health, had brought the air
bags case. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29 (1983) (setting aside as arbitrary and capricious decision of the National Highway
Transportation Safety Administration to withdraw requirement that new cars be equipped
with passive restraints).
169. EPA has noted its particular concern over the fact that others could sue federal
facilities whereas it could not:
[Federal facilities] will be sued whether or not EPA is allowed to sue them,
and the courts will have to decide those cases. In such circumstances, to
deny that EPA could also bring such actions would be to deny the agency
that is supposed to shape enforcement policy under the statute the full right
to shape it in this significant class of cases through the pattern of law suits
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protecting themselves against future litigation by entry of a
consent decree.1 70 In addition, the possibility of later litigation
means, for example, that the Attorney General's resolution of an
interagency legal dispute may be only temporary because it is
subject to judicial reversal. Dispositive judicial resolution earlier
rather than later would further consistent and predictable ad-
ministration.17'
Fifth, if one accepts the unitary executive model, under which
the President has close control over agency actions, 72 then the
President will always be able to keep a dispute out of the courts
either by ordering a resolution himself or by forbidding litigation.
Only if the President is too busy, too unconcerned, or too uncer-
tain to resolve an interagency dispute, or if he affirmatively
desires judicial resolution, will a dispute reach the courts. If one
assumes that the President can prevent the litigation if he so
desires, interagency litigation by definition does not interfere
with his authority. The response would be that the point is not
that the President must be allowed to settle interagency disputes;
he must settle them as a matter of constitutional obligation.
Merely keeping the matter out of the courts, however, will not
force the President to decide such disputes; often it will only
it brought and did not bring, any [sic] arguments it made [in] cases at trial.
In addition, it would deprive EPA of the most effective means in many cases
of educating such facilities to their responsibilities under the statute.
1 Op. EPA General Counsel 297, 311 (1973).
The argument goes beyond merely the value of EPA's participation in the overall
enforcement process. Under the pollution statutes, an enforcement action by EPA pre-
cludes a citizens' suit. E.g., Clean Air Act of 1970, S 304, 42 U.S.C. S 7604(bX1XB) (1988).
Were EPA to sue DOD, private citizens could not. Of course, to the extent that this
argument is that EPA enforcement fosters presidential authority because the President
could influence both sides of the litigation, it raises significant article III concerns.
170. Review of Hazardous Waste Disposal Practices at Federal Facilities: Hearing Before
Subcomm. of the House Comm on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 260 (1983)
(memorandum from M. Durning, EPA Ass't Adm'r for Enforcement, to EPA Dep. Adm'r
(Mar. 12, 1979)) (lamenting that DOJ's refusal, on justiciability grounds, to file a consent
decree between EPA and DOD would only subject the Army to greater uncertainty and
the threat of additional litigation).
171. Note, Judicial Resolution of Interagency Legal Disputes, 89 YALE L.J. 1595, 1604-
06 (1980). These considerations, however, cut both ways. If the overall issue actually
matters, the fact that a private party will sue might also mean that interagency litigation
is not necessary. Furthermore, the possibility that private parties might not sue suggests
that interagency litigation would be not merely unnecessary but mistaken. If the directly
affected private parties are not sufficiently concerned to sue, then the federal agencies
should not rock the boat. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REv. 1669, 1736 (1975). The scheme proposed in Part V obviates many of
these concerns.
172. As discussed above, this model is in many ways inaccurate. See supra Part I.B.
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allow the existing dispute to fester. In addition, in many situa-
tions, the decision is not the President's to make because Con-
gress has granted decisionmaking authority to an agency head.
In sum, intragovernmental litigation hardly means the end of
constitutional government as we know it. In addition, turning to
the courts rather than to the President for resolution of intera-
gency disputes has several practical advantages. Litigation will
put the matter to rest. It may settle a tricky legal issue as to
which the President is uncertain. It will keep the government's
hand in litigation that is likely to occur anyway at the insistence
of private parties. Lastly, an injunction may improve the execu-
tive's ability to get money from Congress to perform the action-
now clearly legally mandated. These goals raise article III ques-
tions, although none are unanswerable. 73 They do not, however,
raise concerns about undermining the President's authority.
V. THREE MODELS OF INTERAGENCY LITIGATION
Interagency litigation falls into three categories according to
the capacity in which the litigants appear. First, one agency may
challenge a decision that applies directly to it. Second, agencies
may disagree over actions that affect private parties. Third,
agencies may have disputes over regulatory authority, such as
disagreements over jurisdiction. Courts have heard interagency
173. For example, if the President wants to go to court merely because he is uncertain
of the legal rules, would judicial resolution be an advisory opinion? It would not. The
motivation for bringing a lawsuit has nothing to do with the fact that the result is
advisory. As decades of test cases have shown, the fact that a lawsuit is brought more
for the sake of obtaining a legal ruling than to resolve a particular dispute does not in
itself render the suit nonjusticiable.
Similarly, the fact that both parties may welcome judicial resolution of the legal issue
does not mean they are not adverse. Adversity is lacking only if the respondent agency
wants to be reversed. The situation is akin to that in which the Solicitor General responds
to a certiorari petition by stating that the decision, though correctly decided below, is
sufficiently important to merit review. That petitioner and respondent agree the Court
should take the case does not mean that they are not adverse.
A harder question is whether the executive branch's desire to support a later appro-
priations request with a judicial decree renders the suit collusive. The shared desire of
the litigants to obtain a judgment that will be useful against a third party is a classic
example of collusion. See, e.g., Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251 (1850). The adversity
requirement, however, is flexible, and courts have allowed plenty of suits that appeared
more suspicious than this example. The possibility of collusion of this sort does not justify
a per se prophylactic bar on interagency litigation. Rather, it means that the court must
be alert for the possibility, dismissing the suit if it concludes that the litigation is a joint
effort to make it look as if the courts are forcing the agency to do something it in fact
wants to do but could not otherwise fund. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696-
97 (1974).
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lawsuits of all three types, usually without discussing justiciabil-
ity. This Part argues that cases in the first and third categories
are justiciable and those in the middle category are not. To reach
that conclusion, however, we must first consider possibly relevant
factors other than the roles of the litigants.
A. United States v. ICC and Interagency Regulation
The best known and most often cited example of interagency
litigation is United States v. ICC.174 The Army ran up a substantial
bill by using railroads for the shipment of goods during World
War II. The railroads' rates included a charge for wharfage, the
unloading of goods from the railroad car to the pier. During the
War, the Army had unloaded the trains itself. It accordingly
asked the railroads to refund the wharfage portion of its bill.
When the railroads refused, the Army, represented by DOJ, filed
a complaint with the ICC for reparations. The ICC denied relief,
and DOJ sought judicial review. Because the authorizing statute
stated explicitly that the action for review was "against the
United States,"'175 the three-judge district court dismissed the
complaint on the theory that a person may not sue himself.176
The Supreme Court reversed.'77 Admonishing that "courts must
look behind the names that symbolize the parties to determine
whether a justiciable case or controversy is present,"' 78 it found
that the government, like any shipper, could invoke the usual
administrative and judicial apparatus to determine who was en-
174. 337 U.S. 426 (1949). Two other Supreme Court decisions bear this caption. See
United States v. ICC, 396 U.S. 491 (1970) ("Northern Lines Merger Case") (DOJ challenge
to the ICC approval of a railroad merger); United States v. ICC, 352 U.S. 158 (1956)
(Army challenge to ICC denial of its request for reparations from private railroads). Only
the 1949 opinion discussed justiciability.
For cases with an essentially identical arrangement of parties and similar issues, see
Ford Motor Co. v. ICC, 714 F.2d 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1983), and United States v. United States,
417 F. Supp. 851 (D.D.C. 1976), affd sub nom. National Classification Comm'n v. United
States, 430 U.S. 961 (1977).
175. United States v. ICC, 78 F. Supp. 580, 582 (D.D.C. 1948) (quoting 28 U.S.C. S 46
(1946)).
176. Id. at 583. The incongruity of the suit being both by and against the United States
was underlined by the fact, specifically pointed out by the court, that the same Assistant
Attorney General signed the pleadings for both the petitioner and the respondent.
177. United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. at 426. DOJ had by now settled on representation
of the United States alone; the ICC had its own counsel, though the "surface anomaly"
of the "formal appearance of the Attorney General for the Government as statutory
defendant" remained. Id. at 432.
178. Id at 430.
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titled to the alleged overpayment.179 Even though "this case is
United States v. United States,"' 80 it presented a justiciable con-
troversy. 8'
The Court's discussion is incomplete. It gives little hint of the
exact limits of justiciability for interagency litigation. The Court
looked behind the names that symbolized the parties, 82 but did
not say what it found there that ensured justiciability. It observed
that the issue to be resolved was of a normally justiciable sort
and that both sides were ably and separately represented. Nei-
ther of these factors, important though they may be in general,
is responsive to the United States v. United States problem.
The result in United States v. ICC makes intuitive sense.83 A
more complete analysis of why the decision seems right is nec-
essary, however, to determine what other intragovernmental
battles are appropriate for judicial resolution.
1. The Presence of a Nongovernmental Real Party in Interest
Under one view, United States v. ICC was first and foremost
a dispute between the United States and the railroads. After all,
the government and the railroads were fighting over money.1'
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Its justification for doing so was an analogy to a hypothetical suit by John Smith
against John Smith. That there might be two different John Smiths, said the Court,
"illustrates" the need to look behind the names in the caption. Id. at 430. Of course, the
Court would not look behind the names of John Smith v. John Smith if it knew there
was only one John Smith in all the world; the possibility of two John Smiths does not
in itself justify looking behind "the United States." The Court did not explain why or to
what extent there can be two United States.
183. Most commentators seem to accept United States v. ICC as rightly decided. But
see J. RADCLIFFE, supra note 22, at 56-58; Agency Autonomy and the Unitary Ezecutive,
supra note 80, at 502, 517 (remarks of Judge Silberman).
184. See also Ishverlal Madanlal & Co. v. SS Vishva Mangal, 358 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). The Indian Supply Mission, an arm of the President of India, owned cargo lost in
a fire aboard a ship owned by the Indian government. It brought a negligence action
against the vessel. Id. at 387-88. The defendants argued that no case or controversy could
exist between the government of India as shipper, on the one hand, and the government
as owner of the vessel, on the other. Id. at 388. The court allowed the action to proceed
for two reasons. First, the vessel was owned by a quasi-public corporation somewhat
separate from and certainly not managed by the Indian government. Id. at 390-91. Second,
and immediately relevant to this reading of United States v. ICC, the court relied on the
fact that the true defendant was the insurer of the cargo. Id. The insurance company
was doing the actual litigating and would be liable for any judgment. Id. at 387-88. A
justiciable controversy existed because the action was in essence between the Indian
government and a private company. Id. at 391.
940
1991] UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES
In the absence of the ICC and the attendant regulatory scheme,
this dispute would be a garden-variety contract action that clearly
would be justiciable.1e The fact that Congress had created a
federal agency to resolve such quarrels in the first instance
should not have precluded ultimate judicial resolution. The rail-
roads themselves, intensely interested in holding onto their money,
appeared before the Court to argue their cause. Indeed, the
Court at one point referred to the railroads as "real parties in
interest," although in a section of the opinion dealing not with
justiciability but with congressional intent to authorize judicial
review of the ICC's order.es The government may well be unable
to sue itself, then, but that is not what it was doing in this
case.'87
Although a nongovernmental-real-party-in-interest test pro-
vides a tidy rationale for United States v. ICC,188 it does not
185. In fact, under the statutory scheme as it then existed, the Army could have sued
the railroads directly in district court without going first to the ICC. 49 U.S.C. 5 9 (1946).
The principal holding of the case was that Congress did not intend, in offering this choice
of remedies, to preclude judicial review of an adverse determination by the ICC. United
States v. ICC, 337 U.S. at 432-40.
186. 377 U.S. at 432.
187. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 1318 (asking whether interagency
litigation presents a case or controversy "[ilf no private parties, such as the railroads [in
United States v. ICC], have a real interest in the result").
DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) concluded that an interested private party is
indispensable to the justiciability of interagency disputes. 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 79
(1977). The question arose during a dispute between the Postal Service and the IRS. Id.
at 79. The IRS had assessed the Postal Service $10 million under a transportation tax
payable by all shippers of goods by air. Id. at 80. Had the Postal Service been a private
party, it would have had to pay the tax, claim a refund, and then sue the IRS. Id. OLC
concluded, however, that a suit between the IRS and the Postal Service would be
nonjusticiable because the litigants were both federal agencies. Id. at 81. The memorandum
distinguished United States v. ICC on the ground that it involved private real parties in
interest, namely, the railroads. Id. at 80-84. In contrast, the fight between the Postal
Service and the IRS was a purely intragovernmental disagreement over which of two
governmental entities was entitled to money that Congress appropriated. Id. at 81. The
opinion acknowledged that the Postal Service enjoys "a degree of independence from the
executive branch," id, at 83, and so real adverseness might exist between the parties.
The absence of a private real party in interest, however, was fatal.
OLC's memo predates DOJ's infatuation with the unitary executive idea, and its
rationale is completely unresponsive to concerns about presidential authority. DOJ has
not abandoned this approach, however, although it has shifted its emphasis from article
I to article II. DOJ thus has repeated the nongovernmental-real-party-in-interest rule
in arguing that EPA cannot bring an enforcement against another agency that is violating
the environmental laws. See Federal Environmental Compliance Hearing, supra note 15
(memorandum from John Harmon to Michael J. Egan); see also 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel
180 (1982).
188. The same is true for other intragovernmental suits. For example, the many suits
between the FLRA and federal agencies lend themselves to such an explanation. See,
e.g., cases cited supra note 7. Such litigation is actually between the employing agency
and its employees or their union; the FLRA is merely the regulatory intermediary.
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magically explain all the cases. First, the test is at odds with
the few decisions dismissing interagency litigation as nonjustici-
able. The two cases DOJ cited as important examples of appro-
priate judicial self-restraint both involved private parties. In
Defense Supplies Corp. v. United States Lines,1' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed a suit by a
government corporation against the United States for damages
to wool carried on a government-owned ship.19° In a short opinion
by Judge Frank, the court reasoned that the parties were one
and the same, and the plaintiff could not sue itself.191 Private
insurers, however, were out $22,000; they would be reimbursed
to the extent that the plaintiff recovered. A clearer example of
private real parties in interest is difficult to imagine. 92 Similarly,
in United States v. An Easement and Right of Way,193 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee dis-
missed a condemnation action brought by the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA), a governmental corporation, because one of the
defendants was the Farmers Home Administration, which held a
security interest in the property. Another of the defendants,
however, was a private party-the actual owner of the land over
which the TVA sought an easement. The primary dispute was
between the TVA and this private party.194
189. 148 F.2d 311 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 746 (1945).
190. Id. at 311-13.
191. In fact, Defense Supplies is not about the constitutional limits on intragovernmental
litigation. The court held only that the suit did not lie under the Suits in Admiralty Act.
Id. at 313. It expressly reserved the question whether "such an action," "i.e., a dispute
about the proper allocation of government funds between different parts of the govern-
ment,. . . would be justiciable" if authorized by statute. Id. at 313 n.5.
192. Indeed, the court stated that "the real parties in interest are the insurance
companies." Id. at 312; see also Ishverlal Madanlal & Co. v. SS Vishva Mangal, 358 F.
Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) Gargely identical case held justiciable on nongovernmental-real-
party-in-interest rationale).
193. 204 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
194. DOJ's approach is equally inconsistent with other cases, which the OLC memo
does not cite, that dismissed intragovernmental litigation as nonjusticiable. Private parties
abound, for example, in Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Co. v. Hines, 273 F. 774 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 643 (1921). The actual litigants-an insurance company on one
side and a former government official and a railroad (presumably with another insurance
company behind them) on the other-were private, interested, and wholly adverse. Id.
at 775-76. The court dismissed because the insurance companies were subrogated to the
rights of the insureds, id. at 776-77, and the insureds, who were also private parties,
were deemed to be the United States government because the federal government had
taken over the railroads at the time of the collision. Id. at 784. This litigation meets any
conceivable test for the presence of a nongovernmental real party in interest.
A private party was also present in Employees Welfare Committee v. Daws, 599 F.2d
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Second, a nongovernmental-real-party-in-interest test must be
massaged a fair amount to explain those cases in which the
government is not in a financial dispute with a private party.
For example, in United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power
Commission,195 the Supreme Court allowed the Secretary of the
Interior to challenge a license that the Federal Power Commission
(FPC) had granted to a private company for construction of a
hydroelectric dam. Undeniably, one of the defendants was an
immediately interested private party-the utility that would be
unable to build the dam if the Department of the Interior (DOI)
succeeded. At this level, however, there will almost always be
an interested private party. The range of private parties that
may challenge governmental action'9 illustrates the extent to
which almost anything the government does affects private in-
terests. Conceiving of a government action that would not affect
some private party sufficiently to permit that person to go to
court is difficult. If that is the test, then the nongovernmental-
real-party-in-interest test is meaningless. On the other hand,
drawing lines based on the directness or substantiality of the
effect is probably doomed.'9 At the very least, this rationale for
United States v. ICC loses its simple elegance when stretched to
cover cases in which the private party, albeit interested indeed,
1375 (5th Cir. 1979). The court held that a group of Postal Service employees was an
instrumentality of the Postal Service and therefore could not sue the regional postmaster
for removing vending machines that the employees had maintained in the post office. Id.
at 1378. Because the suit concerned income from the vending machines that went to the
employees, it was arguable that the group was actually private. But even assuming that
it was part of the government, then the vending machine company, which also lost money
because of the postmaster's decision, was a private real party in interest for purposes of
DOJ's test. In factin litigation arising on similar facts at another post office, the vending
machine company itself sued over the elimination of its machines. Automatic Retailers of
- Am., Inc. v. Ruppert, 269 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. Iowa 1967) (dismissing suit for want of
jurisdiction because employees were instrumentality of United States and plaintiffs could
not bring a contract suit against the United States for more than $10,000 in district
court).
Finally, in Juliano v. Federal Asset Disposition Association, 736 F. Supp. 348 (D.D.C.
1990), a private party brought the suit.
195. 345 U.S. 153 (1953).
196. See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (ad hoc group of law students
allowed to challenge ICC across-the-board rate increase on allegations that higher trans-
portation costs would give virgin materials a comparative advantage over secondary
materials, in turn causing less recycling, in turn leading to more garbage and fewer trees,
which would harm the plaintiffs).
197. As Professor Stewart has pointed out, "[T]he rippling effects of a governmental
decision on interests throughout the economic and social universe have no limits definable
a priori." Stewart, supra note 171, at 1735.
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and the petitioning agency have a dispute only because of the
action of the respondent agency.198
Regardless of whether the nongovernmental-real-party-in-
interest test is consistent with the case law, it does not make
sense in its own right. First, it rests uneasily on the sleight of
hand of simply overlooking the very real dispute within the
government. The fact that United States v. ICC, for example, was
an intragovernmental suit is difficult to ignore. The Army had
the choice of suing the railroads or seeking relief from the ICC;
inescapably, it did the second. As far as the Army was concerned,
the ICC had caused the problem, and the Army sought an order
to the ICC. In the words of the Administrative Procedure Act,
the ICC's action, not the railroads', was what "adversely affected
or aggrieved" the Army.199 Indeed, this is a basic premise of
modern administrative law. A well-known example illustrates the
point. To prevent the Walt Disney Corporation from despoiling
a pristine wilderness, the Sierra Club sued not Disney but the
agency that had given Disney permission.200 That is how public
litigation works in the modern administrative state.
Second, even accepting that the railroads, or the utility in
Chapman, are also parties in interest, it is difficult to see in what
meaningful way they are the real or only party in interest. In
United States v. ICC, the Department of the Army had a disa-
greement with the railroads, but it also had a huge disagreement
with the ICC. Similarly, the Secretary of the Interior in Chapman
had no dealings with the utility and no dispute with it except to
the extent that the FPC's license created one. If we must set
out in search of a private party because the government cannot
sue itself, finding a private party does not mean that the gov-
ernment is no longer suing itself and so does not remedy the
initial problem. It does not explain why a suit like this is any
less a bona fide dispute within the government for being also a
dispute between part of the government and a private party.20'
198. Because I argue below that cases such as Chapman, 345 U.S. 153 (1953). were in
fact wrongly decided, I do not see their inconsistency with the nongovernmental-real-
party-in-interest test as proof that the test is wrong. DOJ, however, derives its test from
the decided cases and defends it on the ground that it explains the cases. 1 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 79, 81 (1977). For the reasons I give in the text, it does not.
199. 5 U.S.C. S 702 (1988).
200. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
201. The logical implication of requiring a private party to render the dispute justiciable
is that the governmental respondent should not actually participate in the litigation. To
the extent the two agencies are at odds, they have a nonjusticiable controversy; to the
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Indeed, reliance on the private-real-party-in-interest rationale
only underlines the inherent difficulties with these lawsuits. If
the United States actually has a dispute with a private party,
then perhaps the Constitution requires it to litigate against that
party rather than against itself. The fact that the underlying
dispute is supposedly between the government and the private
party shows that Congress could create a regulatory scheme to
allow such litigation.2 2 Saying that agencies can litigate against
each other only in those settings in which the participation of
both is not necessary to settle the dispute is somewhat perverse.
On the other hand, only part of the government has a dispute
with the private party. In United States v. ICC, the ICC had no
dispute with the railroads; indeed, it believed the railroads were
correct. There is no reason that it should have been the Army's
dispute with the railroads and not the absence of any dispute
between the ICC and the railroads that counted. Indeed, if the
view of any one agency should count, that agency must be the
ICC. If it is enough that any part of the government has a real
controversy with a private party, then we have moved far away
from the premise that the government is too much a single entity
to fight with itself in court. Yet that premise is what required
the presence of a nongovernmental party in the first place. Seeing
the Army and the ICC as wholly disconnected acknowledges a
degree of separateness between the agencies that would seem to
make the private-real-party-in-interest requirement unnecessary
in the first place.
Third, the private-real-party-in-interest test does not escape
the empty formalism of viewing governmental agencies as the
same person, a formalism the Court properly rejected in United
States v. ICC. This approach looks behind the caption to see who
is actually litigating against whom, but is itself merely another
sort of formalism.2°3 The existence of an interested private party
extent the petitioning agency is at odds with the private party, that party can litigate
on its own behalf. The nongovernmental-real-party-in-interest approach thus becomes an
argument against intragovernmental litigation by allowing it precisely in the one setting
in which it is unnecessary.
202. In fact, Congress did so in United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949). The Army,
like any shipper, had the option of either filing suit against the railroads or filing a
complaint with the ICC. Id. at 433.
203. This defect characterizes the OLC memo, for example. It accepts, without analysis,
that the bar on litigation by a person against herself forbids interagency litigation; it is
because the Army and the ICC are the same person that another party must be found.
Then, implicitly recognizing that this rule is silly, OLC finds a silly, formalistic way
around it. It does not explain why the silly, formalistic rule should apply in the first
place or why an equally formal exception solves the underlying problem with that rule.
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does not alter the nature of the dispute between the govern-
mental parties.
Finally, no sensible justification for this role exists. From an
article II standpoint, if litigation between federal agencies indi-
cates a breakdown of executive branch decisionmaking, the in-
volvement of a private party hardly remedies the situation.20 5
There is an article III argument for a nongovernmental-real-
party-in-interest test: the presence of an outsider may ensure
concrete adversity, divergent interests, and effective advocacy.
Yet such adversity can easily exist even absent an interested
private party.20 4 More important, so justified a nongovernmental-
real-party-in-interest rule ultimately dissolves into absurdity. As
a case-or-controversy requirement, this rule makes sense only if
the private party is also before the court. The mere existence of
a directly affected private party out there somewhere in no way
furthers case-or-controversy policies; that party must be before
the court if its existence is to ensure effective advocacy and
guard against collusion. Indeed, if a private party has a unique
interest in the outcome of the lawsuit, then we should be espe-
cially concerned if two other, nominally identical parties are doing
the actual litigating. Yet requiring not merely the existence but
also the participation of a nongovernmental party completely
undoes the test. Such a requirement would mean, for example,
that the railroads in United States v. ICC could have avoided the
litigation completely merely by not intervening. If the railroads
had to be present for the case to be justiciable, then their lawyers
surely committed gross malpractice by intervening and so allow-
ing the suit to proceed.20 6
205. One possible argument in favor of the nongovernmental-real-party-in-interest lit-
mus test is that courts must be involved when the government has a dispute with a
private party in order to protect the private party's interests. When the Post Office and
the IRS are fighting, courts are not necessary to protect private interests; they are when
the Army is at odds with the railroads.
The protection of private interests requires a judicial forum, however, only when the
private party seeks to challenge the agency action. That forum is available even if
intragovernmental litigation is wholly nonjusticiable; had the railroads lost before the
ICC, they could have obtained judicial review of the ICC's decision. For just such a suit,
see Consolidated Rail Corp. v. ICC, 685 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (DOJ and ICC attorneys
collaborated on a single brief defending an ICC order granting refunds to the United
States for overcharges for the transport of spent nuclear fuel). An aggrieved private
party can challenge the agency action itself. The role of courts as protectors of private
interests against governmental power cannot justify interagency litigation if it is other-
wise nonjusticiable.
204. See infra notes 281-302 and accompanying text.
206. Similarly, on a technical level, insisting on the presence of private parties creates
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2. The Presence of an Independent Agency
A second possible explanation of United States v. ICC is that
one party was an executive agency and the other an independent
agency. Indeed, most interagency litigation to date has been
between an executive agency and an independent agency.2°7 This
is not a surprise; if nothing else, DOJ's control over the litigation
of all executive agencies makes it unlikely, if not impossible, that
two executive agencies will appear on opposite sides of a lawsuit.
The decisions themselves have attached no significance to the
independence of one of the parties; yet if one litigant is wholly
free of presidential authority, both article II and article III
concerns about interagency litigation are substantially eliminated.
Perhaps, then, interagency litigation is constitutionally permis-
sible if, but only if, at least one of the parties is an independent
agency. 208
a Catch-22. A justiciable controversy exists only if a private real party in interest has
intervened; before such a party intervenes, there is no justiciable controversy before the
court and so nothing in which it can intervene. Without the private party, no case or
controversy exists; because no case or controversy exists, the private party cannot be
added.
These problems do not exist if the second governmental party joins an existing suit
between the government and a private party. For consideration of this variation, see
infra Part V.D.
207. The prominent exceptions are United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S.
602 (1974) (DOJ and Comptroller of the Currency); United States v. Connecticut National
Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974) (same); and Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d
1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Department of Agriculture and EPA).
208. See Kurland, United States v. Nixon: Who Killed Cock Robin?, 22 UCLA L. REy.
68, 72 (1974) (speculating that "an administrative [i.e., independent?] agency in conflict
with the executive may ask for resolution of that controversy by the judiciary [because]
an administrative agency is not within the chain of command that leads to the President");
Note, Res Judicata and Intra-Governmental Inconsistencies, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 640, 644-
46 (1949); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 94 n.2 (raising the question).
In concluding that EPA can litigate against the Tennessee Valley Authority, EPA
General Counsel stressed the TVA's freedom from presidential control. Although the
TVA directors technically serve at the President's pleasure, they are functionally wholly
independent-indeed in many ways more independent than the "independent" regulatory
agencies. 1 Op. EPA General Counsel 297, 312-13 (1973).
DOJ has argued both for and against an independent/executive agency distinction. In
a 1985 letter to Congressman John Dingell, Assistant Attorney General John Bolton
argued that EPA could not sue the Department of Energy for violations of environmental
standards. Letter from John Bolton to John Dingell (Dec. 20, 1985), reprinted in Federal
Environmental Compliance Hearing, supra note 15, at 709. He divided the cases allowing
interagency litigation into three categories. The largest
consists of suits brought by or against one of the so-called "independent
regulatory agencies." . . . In none [of these cases] was the court asked to
decide, nor did it decide, a legal controversy between two agencies both of
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a. Arguments for Allowing Interagency Litigation Involving
Only Independent Agencies
At first blush, the constitutional concerns about interagency
litigation apply with far less force when an independent agency
is a party. First, such litigation is perhaps not intrabranch at all.
If independent agencies are part of the legislative branch,20 9 then
litigation between an independent agency and an, executive agency
would fall into the category of interbranch litigation and so be
justiciable under the criteria discussed in Part I.C.210 This view
is extreme. More accurately, independent agencies are independ-
ent of political forces generally. 21' The usual view of the inde-
whose heads serve at the pleasure of the President, as do the heads of EPA
and DOE.
Id. at 710-11. The 1977 OLC opinion concerning the Post Office and the IRS, on the other
hand, placed no emphasis on the prominence of independent agencies in the case law and
expressly rejected an argument that the Postal Service's independence made the dispute
justiciable. 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 79, 83 (1977). In 1987 congressional testimony, DOJ
also seemed to reject any distinction between executive and independent agencies, at
least with regard to law enforcement. See Federal Environmental Compliance Hearing,
supra note 15, at 269 (response of F. Henry Habicht H, Ass't Att'y Gen.) ("it would be
unconstitutional for legislation to authorize a federal [independent] regulatory agency to
assume a core executive function such as law enforcement and to carry out that activity
against other elements of the federal government in a manner which in any way hindered
the President's ability to resolve disputes within the Executive Branch"); see also ia at
265-69 (questions and answers regarding the constitutionality of an agency's actions
against other federal agencies).
209. In sparring with Assistant Attorney General Henry Habicht, Congressman Swift
contended that the unitary executive theory was at least inapplicable with regard to "an
independent regulatory agency such as FERC or the SEC" because "[tihe independent
agencies are creatures of the Congress, not of the President:' Federal Environmental
Compliance Hearing, supra note 15, at 266 (statement of Congressman Swift). Similarly,
House Speaker Sam Rayburn is reported to have told the Chairman of the FCC that
"'your agency is an arm of the Congress; you belong to us,"' Minow, Book Review, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 383, 384 (1968) (reviewing W. CAREY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY
AGENCIES (1967)), and Senator Hart once stated that "[the commissions, if I may risk
oversimplification, are ours." 5 SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T AFFAIRS, STUDY OF FEDERAL
REGULATION, S. Doc. No. 91, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1977); see also Humphrey's Ex'r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935) (FTC a "legislative agency"); Cushman, The Problem
of the Independent Regulatory Commissions, reprinted in REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, supra
note 87, at 364 (independent commissions "are 'agents' of Congress.").
210. In arguing that a dispute between the President and the Special Prosecutor was
a nonjusticiable intrabranch dispute, Richard Nixon's attorneys distinguished United States
v. ICC on the ground that, because the ICC was an independent agency, "that dispute
was plainly inter-branch in nature, and therefore within the Court's jurisdiction to resolve
controversies arising among the various branches." Brief for Respondent & Cross-Peti-
tioner, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), reprinted in UNITED STATES V. NIXON:
THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 343 (L. Friedman ed. 1974).
211. This was of course the original model. James Landis perceived the independent
agency as a body of politically neutral, objective experts. See J. LANDIS, THE ADMINIS-
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pendent agencies is of a "headless fourth branch, 212 composed of
free-floating, self-confined bodies that both the President and
Congress can influence, but neither can control.213 This form of
quasi-independence is still enough for present purposes, however.
Independent agencies need not be part of the legislative branch
to avoid the intrabranch problem. As long as such agencies are
outside the presidential family, then litigation in which they
participate does not resemble a single person suing herself.
Second, we do-not perceive independent agencies as subordi-
nate to the President. Pinning down the difference between their
relation to the President and that of the executive agencies has
never been possible, but everyone understands that the President
is in some way the boss of the executive agencies but not the
independent agencies.2 4 In regard to article IlI, if the President
cannot resolve a dispute involving an independent agency merely
by telling it what to do, then a case or controversy may exist in
a way that one does not exist between two executive agencies.
Similarly, in regard to article H, an "independent" agency does
not fit within the unitary executive model, in which the compo-
nents of the executive branch are arrayed hierarchically beneath
the President, who not only can, but must, make all ultimate
decisions and can impose his determination on any of the agencies.
If it is permissible to free an agency from presidential supervision
in the first place, then allowing it to fight with other agencies
in court is no further intrusion on presidential authority.
b. The Same Standards of Justiciability Should Apply to
Both Independent and Executive Agencies
Although superficially plausible, this reasoning rests on an
understanding of the differences between executive and inde-
TRATIVE PROCESS (1938); see also Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.) (per
curiam) (three-judge court), affid sub nor. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). In an
opinion universally assumed to have been written by then Judge, now Justice, Scalia,
Synar described the New Deal theory as involving "genuinely 'independent' regulatory
agencies, bodies of impartial experts whose independence from the President does not
entail correspondingly greater dependence upon the committees of Congress." Id. at 1398.
Such a conception places the independent agencies in neither the legislative nor executive
branch.
212. Report of the Committee, supra note 87, at 30.
213. Id. at 592.
214. See, e.g., FTC v. American Nat'l Cellular, Inc., 810 F.2d 1511, 1513 (9th Cir. 1987).
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pendent agencies that is more theoretical than real. The inde-
pendent agencies are not truly in a different branch than executive
agencies; they are not significantly more adverse than executive
agencies simply because they need not answer to the President;
and presidential authority is intruded upon comparably regard-
less of whether the litigants are independent or executive agen-
cies. Independent agencies indisputably enjoy more freedom from
presidential control than do executive agencies. But the difference
is generally overstated and rests more on political accommodation
than on legal requirements. Independent agencies are not suffi-
ciently different from executive agencies to justify different
standards for justiciability for the two.
(1) The Interbranch Argument
The argument that independent agencies are part of the leg-
islative branch is hard to take seriously. Off Capitol Hill, the
view of independent agencies as arms of Congress is quickly
dismissed, and for good reason.215 Indeed, one inescapable lesson
from Bowsher v. Synar216-in which the Court struck down a
statute that gave executive tasks to an independent legislative
agency although purporting not to cast doubt on the constitu-
tional status of other independent agencies 217 - is that independ-
ent agencies are not part of the legislative branch.
If independent agencies are not part of the legislative branch,
the obvious place for them is in the executive branch. Independ-
ent agencies seem to be executing the law; in any event, their
functions do not differ in any essential respect from agencies
everyone views as indisputably part of the executive branch. If
independent agencies must be part of the executive branch,218
then the general principle that interbranch litigation is justiciable
cannot be the justification for allowing suits in which one party
is an independent agency, but not suits between two executive
agencies.
215. E.g., L. JAFFE, supra note 34, at 21 (Humphrey's description of FTC as "an 'agency'
of the legislature[ ] is baffling and contradictory") (citing Humphrey's Ex'r v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)); Miller, supra note 128, at 63-64; Strauss, supra note 88, at
592.
216. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
217. Id. at 732-34.
218. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1984, 424-25 n.85 (5th ed.
1984) ("all nonjudicial agencies for carrying out the law [are] 'executive' in the sense of
the Constitution"); Miller, supra note 128, at 65-67 (arguing that "independent" agencies
belong within the executive branch).
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Even if independent agencies occupy their own headless fourth
branch, that does not automatically make a case like United
States v. IC9 19 justiciable because it is interbranch. The Consti-
tution contains no safe harbor provision for interbranch litigation.
Suits between the "big three" branches are justiciable not be-
cause the litigants are separate branches, but because the suits
themselves meet the necessary requirements for justiciability.
The question here is not whether Congress can make agencies
independent of the executive branch. Rather, the question is
whether independent agencies, wherever they fit in the consti-
tutional structure, are sufficiently different from executive agen-
cies to give them greater freedom in interagency litigation.
Suppose independence is the critical factor. Then the Depart-
ment of Agriculture could sue the ICC over the establishment of
transportation rates that it considers injurious to farmers,20 but
it could not sue EPA, whose administrator serves at the Presi-
dent's pleasure, for canceling registration of a pesticide.22 The
ICC action and EPA action, however, are essentially identical
instances of execution of the laws cum policymaking. In both, the
Department of Agriculture disagrees with, but is not subject to,
the regulatory decision. Its governmental role, in short, is the
same as both EPA's and the ICC's. Emphasizing that fact in one
setting2 and denying it by resort to a meaningless formalitym
in the other makes no sense. Both are intragovernmental disputes
about executing the law. Even if the fact that this is execution
is not clear, the essential point is that both agencies are trying
to do the same thing; they simply disagree about how to do it.
Such a disagreement is a far cry from litigation between the
President and Congress and is difficult to perceive as interbranch
regardless of the degree of independence of one of the parties.
(2) Disputes Involving Independent Agencies do not in any
Meaningful Way Involve Greater Adversity than Disputes
Involving Only Executive Agencies
Independent agencies do enjoy a measure of freedom from
presidential control that executive agencies do not. Scholars have
219. 337 U.S. 426 (1949).
220. See Secretary of Agric. v. United States, 347 U.S. 645 (1954).
221. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
222. EPA and the Department of Agriculture are both part of the executive branch
and therefore cannot litigate against each other.
223. The fight between the Department of Agriculture and the ICC is interbranch and
thus justiciable.
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invested many hours trying to identify the essential differences
between independent and executive agencies. The most common
rule of thumb is that an agency is independent if the President
can remove its head or heads only for cause. 4 The tenure of
independent commissioners contrasts with the "Damocles' sword
of removal" that hangs over and theoretically so constrains the
head of an executive agency. Although additional characteristics
tend to distinguish the independent agencies, 26 the limitation on
the President's removal authority is the essential basis for clas-
sifying them as independent 227 and therefore the essential basis
for the claim that independent agencies can litigate against other
agencies when executive agencies cannot.
This difference looks bigger than it is.22 A large body of
scholarship details the numerous ways in which the President
cannot actually control executive agencies and can actually con-
trol independent agencies.m Even without an unfettered removal
power, the President retains the critical power of appointment-
limited, to be sure, by bipartisanship requirements and the need
for a vacancy-extensive control over budget proposals, the au-
224. E.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES S 1.09 (1976); Miller,
Introduction: The Debate Over Independent Agencies in Light of Empirical Evidence, 1988
DUKE L.J. 215, 216-17. For example, Executive Order Number 12,146 requires "Executive
agencies whose heads serve at the pleasure of the President" to submit legal disputes
to the Attorney General, but only "encourages" other "Executive agencies" to do so.
Exec. Order No. 12,146, SS 1-4, 3 C.F.R. 310 (1979).
225. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958).
226. Independent agencies are usually headed by multimember panels, with no more
than a simple majority thereof from the same political party, and simultaneously possess
broad rulemaking, adjudicatory, investigative, and enforcement authority. Miller, supra
note 224, at 216-17 n.5. These characteristics are more fully described in Verkuil, The
Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257, 259-63.
227. Two other typical characteristics also lend independence: political criteria for
appointment-that is, the requirement of a bipartisan commission-and staggered, fixed
terms of office that do not correspond to the presidential term. See K. DAVIS, supra note
224, S 1.09.
228. In fact, it may be no difference at all. Professor Miller makes a compelling case
that "cause" may include refusal to obey an order from the President to take an action
that is within the agency's authority. Miller, supra note 224, at 217 n.12. If the President
thus is free either to dictate agency policy or to remove agency officials for failure to
follow his orders, then the agency no longer looks so independent. More precisely, its
degree of independence is not meaningfully different from that of the so-called executive
agencies.
229. E.g., S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & REGULATORY POLICY 123-
26 (2d ed. 1985); Foote, Independent Agencies Under Attack: A Skeptical View of the
Importance of the Debate, 1988 DUKE L.J. 223, 232-36; Moe, Regulatory Performance and
Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. Sci. 197 (1982); Robinson, Independent Agencies:
Form and Substance in Executive Prerogative, 1988 DUKE L.J. 238; Strauss, supra note
88, at 583-96.
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thority to review and alter the agency's proposals for legislation,
the power to select or demote the chair, an uncertain amount of
moral suasion, and control over the lawyers who represent the
independent agency in court.2O
On the other hand, even in regard to executive agencies, (1)
the basic policy decisions remain Congress' rather than the Pres-
ident's 231 (2) the President must obtain the consent of the Senate
for important appointments.2 2 (3) actual decisionmaking respon-
sibility generally lies with the agency head rather than the
President;23 (4) litigating decisions are made by the Attorney
General rather than by the President, and sometimes not even
by him;m (5) a politically oriented generalist will have difficulty
controlling the actions of technically oriented experts and career
bureaucrats;s and, last but not least, (6) the cherished power of
removal is often simply not available.=m
230. One of the strongest statements of presidential control over independent agencies
came from DOJ in arguing that the President could, if he wanted, apply Executive Order
12,291 to independent agencies. Role of OMB in Regulation: Hearings Before the Subcom7m.
of Oversight & Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 152, 160-62 (1981) (memorandum from L. Sims, Acting Ass't Att'y Gen., OLC, to D.
Stockman, Dir., Off. of Mgt. and Budget (Feb. 12, 1981)).
231. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
232. U.S. CONST. art. 2, S 2, ci. 1.
233. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text. An agency so charged is in much
the same position, vis-i-vis the President, as an independent agency-especially if Pro-
fessor Miller is correct that ignoring a presidential order to do something within the
agency's power constitutes "cause" for dismissal. In both cases, the President cannot
decide himself and cannot directly veto the decision of the agency, but can fire the
offending official after the fact.
234. For example, the Solicitor of Labor can represent the Secretary of Labor in OSHA
actions, 29 U.S.C. S 663 (1988), and EPA attorneys can represent EPA in any Clean
Water Act suit if the Attorney General declines to do so. 33 U.S.C. S 1366 (1988).
235. Eizenstat, supra note 115; Robinson, supra note 229, at 246-48. As a former
Johnson aide said, "[The White House stands precariously atop . .. a bottom-heavy
administrative system, consisting of departments and agencies equipped with resources,
clientele and historical baggage that continually threatens to out-think and out-run the
tenuous policy management capabilities of the White House." Cronin, Presidents as Chief
Executives, in THE PRESMENCY REAPPRAISED, supra note 88, at 238-39.
236. First, the President can use removal only so many times; it is hardly a daily
remedy for the irritations of recalcitrant agency heads. See supra notes 132-33 and
accompanying text. In addition, there are times when it simply cannot be exercised, as
when Ronald Reagan turned to squeaky-clean William Ruckelshaus-first EPA Adminis-
trator and noted Saturday Night Massacre victim-to restore credibility to EPA after
the resignation of Anne Burford. N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1984, at A19, col. 6. Upon his
arrival, Ruckelshaus was outspoken in his criticism of EPA's lax enforcement (including
a much-publicized comment that he had expected to find "tigers in the tank" but it turned
out there were only "pussycats"). Id. It is fair to assume that Ruckelshaus was not
serving "at the President's pleasure" during this period; however, Ruckelshaus could
have been far bolder than he was, and the President could have done nothing about it,
least of all fire him.
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The view of independent agencies as free of presidential control
is especially inappropriate in regard to litigation. As a practical
matter, the President has identical control over litigation by
independent and executive agencies. By and large, both must be
represented by DOJ, must obtain approval of the Solicitor Gen-
eral to appeal an adverse ruling, and must be represented by
the Solicitor General before the Supreme Court.m This is not
universally the case;m however, the fact that it is mostly so-
indeed the fact that it is ever the case -shows that, at least in
regard to litigation, viewing independent agencies as different
from executive agencies is a mistake.239
In short, the supposed independence of the independent agen-
cies does not distinguish them sufficiently from executive agen-
cies to justify treating the two differently as litigants against
other agencies. The President has comparable authority and
responsibility to settle interagency disputes in either setting. The
article III adversity that exists when an independent agency is
involved is not significantly different from that present in liti-
gation between executive agencies. 240
(3) The Independent/Executive Agency Distinction is at War
with Itself
Assume that, notwithstanding the foregoing, real differences
do exist between executive and independent agencies. The in-
dependent/executive agency distinction still proves too much and
produces nonsensical results. It means that Congress can allow
interagency litigation as long as it removes at least one agency
from presidential control. This is hardly a step forward for the
unitary executive and presidential authority.
For example, the unitary executive argument is that EPA
cannot bring an enforcement action against DOD. Because the
President controls both agencies, they cannot have a justiciable
controversy, and allowing courts to resolve this dispute would
interfere with the President's management of the executive
237. 28 U.S.C. SS 516, 518(a), 519 (1988).
238. See supra note 55.
239. See infra Part V.A.3 (discussing whether a grant of independent litigating authority
is sufficient in itself to justify interagency litigation).
240. L. JAFFE, supra note 34, at 541 (justiciability of suit between DOI and the FPC
did not turn on the latter's independence); Steinberg, supra note 20, at 337 ("tension and
animosity" between EPA and executive agency in violation of environmental statutes is
no less real than adversity between executive agency and independent agency).
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branch. The President must either tell DOD to mend its ways,
if he believes they actually need mending, or tell EPA to lay
off. "
If the underlying concern is one of presidential authority and
accountability, it is no improvement if Congress makes EPA an
independent agency. With EPA beyond presidential control, its
litigating authority seems a much greater threat to the unitary
executive. EPA is still executing the laws, but now without
presidential involvement. This scheme serves no principle of
executive authority or separation of powers. If Congress can
create an agency that is shielded from presidential supervision
and allow it to litigate against other agencies, then surely it can
create an agency subject to presidential supervision and allow it
to litigate against other agencies. The latter arrangement is truer
to the unitary executive vision.
The response would be that if both disputants are subject to
presidential supervision, litigation is unnecessary. Such a re-
sponse is logically sound, but one must question logic that leads
directly in what should be the wrong direction.
(4) The Independent/Executive Agency Distinction is
Unworkable
If the rule were that at least one party had to be an inde-
pendent agency for interagency litigation to be justiciable, de-
termining just what makes an agency adequately independent
would be necessary. This determination is not straightforward,
as efforts to grapple with the nature of independent agencies in
general242 and the requisite independence for justiciability in
particular24 have amply demonstrated. Indeed, saying that an
agency can litigate against other agencies if it is independent
makes no sense. To quote John Hart Ely out of context, it
"mistake[s] a definition for a syllogism."m One could say equally
241. See Federal Environmental Compliance Hearing, supra note 15, at 211-13 (statement
of F. Henry Habicht H, Ass't Att'y Gen.).
242. On the problem of figuring out what is an independent agency, see S. BREYER &
R. STEWART, supra note 229, at 123-26.
243. See 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 79, 83 (1977) (Postal Service "has a degree of
independence from the executive branch," but not enough to render its dispute with the
IRS justiciable); 1 Op. EPA General Counsel 297, 312-13 (1973) (TVA directors are
removable at will but nonetheless are more independent than Commissioners of many
independent agencies); id. at 307 n.5 (FPC Commissioners are removable at will, but are
recognized as independent).
244. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
924 (1973).
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well that an agency is independent because it can litigate against
other agencies. The more appropriate inquiry is to the specific
authorities and freedoms that Congress has granted to any given
agency.245 An agency's independence is nothing more or less than
its freedom of movement in each particular setting.
c. Summary
An agency's independence from presidential control is indis-
putably related to its constitutional capacity to litigate against
other agencies. Imagining a setting in which independent agencies
would lack adversity merely because they are both agencies of
the United States government is difficult. It seems like a far
smaller intrusion on executive authority for independent agencies
to slug it out in court than for the "eyes and arms of the
President" to do so. Nonetheless, independence should not be the
critical factor in deciding the justiciability of interagency dis-
putes. If agencies should not be litigating against each other, the
fact that at least one is independent is not enough to overcome
the objections to such litigation. On the other hand, if such
litigation is acceptable, independence is not necessary.24s
3. Independent Litigating Authority
If the ICC's status as an independent agency cannot explain
United States v. ICC,27 a related but more specific factor may do
so: the Army and the ICC had separate counsel and full statutory
authority to litigate. Indeed, although the district court had
tripped over the fact that the same lawyer represented both
sides,m the Supreme Court was careful to point out that the
Attorney General's appearance on behalf of the Army "does not
in any way prevent a full defense of the Commission's order."' 9
If we are to look to specific powers and freedoms given to an
agency by Congress rather than its label as independent,25 then
the logical place to begin for present purposes would be the
245. E.g., Miller, supra note 128, at 43-44.
246. If I were to draw a different line than the one proposed herein, however, I would
say that intragovernmental litigation involving at least one independent agency is justi-
ciable, whereas litigation between two executive agencies is justiciable only when one
regulates the other or they are fighting over turf, as discussed in the following parts.
247. 337 U.S. 426 (1949).
248. United States v. ICC, 78 F. Supp. 580, 583 (D.D.C. 1948), rev'd, 337 U.S. 426 (1949).
249. 337 U.S. at 432.
250. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
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agency's litigating authority. Perhaps if Congress has said that
an agency can litigate against sister agencies-a necessary prem-
ise for this entire discussion-then it has made the agency
independent to that extent, and that fact suffices for justiciability.
For example, the Clean Air Act 251 authorizes EPA to bring
enforcement actions against federal facilities violating federally
enforceable emissions standards. 2 Perhaps such litigation is jus-
ticiable precisely because Congress authorized it. Agencies have
the characteristics Congress gives them pursuant to the neces-
sary and proper clause.2 By permitting EPA to bring the ac-
tion -represented, if necessary, by its own attorneys rather than
DOJ-Congress has simultaneously given EPA the constitution-
ally requisite independence, created the necessary adversity, and
removed the unitary executive impediment. Likewise, by arrang-
ing for separate representation of the Army and the ICC, Con-
gress created sufficient distinctness to permit litigation.
DOJ probably cannot represent both agencies in the same
suit.2 Congress has a free hand in vesting litigating authority
in agencies other than DOJ2 and has done so frequently.2
Having a lawyer empowered and willing to bring the lawsuit,
however, is necessary but not sufficient. For one thing, the
decision whether to litigate is subject to just as much presidential
control as other decisions. More important, the practical ability
to litigate cannot amount to the constitutional authority to do
so. Congress could not ensure justiciability by immunizing that
decision from presidential control.
We can isolate the second concern by hypothesizing an envi-
ronmental independent counsel, nominally within EPA but re-
movable only for cause, charged with bringing environmental
enforcement actions against the federal government.? Once Con-
gress had created such a position, the argument would run,
justiciability problems disappear because presidential control also
251. 42 U.S.C. SS 7401-7642 (1988).
252. I& 5 7413.
253. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
254. See supra notes 176-77.
255. Miller, supra note 128, at 97.
256. See supra note 55.
257. Proposals to create such an office are pending. See H.R. 2135, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989). DOJ vehemently challenged the constitutionality of a comparable scheme for
protecting whistleblowers under which a special counsel could have sued federal agencies
by obtaining judicial review of decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board. See
supra notes 16, 99.
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has disappeared.2a- This is certainly the easiest way out of the
problem. The constitutional inquiry exactly duplicates the statu-
tory inquiry. The freedom to decide whether to bring an action
itself creates the separation needed for a justiciable controversy.
This logic is flawed, however. First, it contains the same
problems as the independent agency approach generally: inde-
pendence is hard to define and the extent to which Congress can
immunize the litigating decision from presidential control, either
practically or constitutionally, is unclear. Moreover, although this
exception purports to be responsive to concerns about presiden-
tial control, it hardly represents an important blow for presiden-
tial authority. Assume that at present EPA cannot sue DOD,
even though the President probably could urge a lawsuit forward
or call it off. If Congress created an independent environmental
counsel, thereby eliminating presidential control over the litigat-
ing decision, EPA could sue. This logic is backwards.
More importantly, this argument answers the wrong question.
Even if an agency was utterly free to make its own litigating
decisions, it would not be able to sue another agency in the
absence of a justiciable controversy. The existence of such a
controversy is a function of the agency's position in every respect
other than its litigating decisions. The argument for nonjusticia-
bility is that the President should decide which agency is correct
and then make an order accordingly. The President must decide
whether DOD should clean up its hazardous waste site and
whether EPA should allow the disputed pesticide to remain on
the market. Immunizing the agency's litigating decision from
presidential control in no way affects the President's authority
over the substantive decision, nor does it magically create diver-
gent interests or concrete adversity if such elements otherwise
would be lacking.259
This is one reason why Morrison v. Olson, which upheld the
independent counsel,2 60 says little about the justiciability of in-
258. The argument assumes the constitutionality of placing an enforcement official,
responsible for litigation, beyond direct presidential control. See Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654 (1988).
259. This analysis ducks the question of the constitutionality of such litigation in which
one party is solely a litigating agency. For example, suppose there was an independent
environmental counsel wholly separate from EPA. Or, to put the question more broadly,
could there be a Federal Office of the Public Advocate, charged with suing on behalf of
the public interest? I think the answer is no. By definition, the litigation brought by the
Public Advocate would arise out of a pure regulatory disagreement; the Public Advocate
would sue in the belief that the challenged action was a mistake. I argue below that such
regulatory disputes are nonjusticiable.
260. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696-97.
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teragency lawsuits in general or the constitutionality of other
independent counsels in particular.261 The statute upheld in Mor-
rison empowered the independent counsel to bring criminal
charges against individuals. The justiciability of such litigation
is well established,26 2 and DOJ itself could have brought the
action had the President permitted it. The justiciability of such
actions in no way depends upon the independence of the prose-
cutor, although their likelihood obviously does. By the same
token, creation of an independent counsel to litigate against other
parts of the government, or an explicit congressional statement
that an agency be able to litigate against other agencies-with
or without presidential input-cannot create justiciability in cases
in which it would not otherwise exist.26
In short, it is important that separate governmental parties
have separate representation, as in United States v. ICC. That
alone does not guarantee justiciability, however, even if Congress
purports to give an agency not only its own lawyer, but also a
free hand in deciding when to use her.
4. The Presence of Multiple Governmental Capacities
The critical factor in United States v. ICC was neither the
presence of the railroads nor the presence of an independent
agency; it was the presence of a nongovernmental interest on
the part of the United States. The Army operated within the
ICC's jurisdiction exactly as a private party would. It was part
of the regulated community or, more precisely, a beneficiary of
the regulatory scheme. The case was a run-of-the-mill dispute
under that scheme. The point is not that the respondent was not
actually the ICC; it is that the petitioner was not actually the
United States. The petitioner was, in the words of the Supreme
261. The other reason Morrison does not tell us much about this problem is that it
was not an intragovernmental suit. As a criminal prosecution, it involved no division
within the government; rather, the United States was pursuing an individual. The decision
held merely that Congress can remove control of the prosecutorial apparatus from the
President. That conclusion does not tell us what sort of separation is permissible or
sufficient to allow intragovernmental suits.
262. Viewing such an action as an intrabranch dispute is a mistake. The suit is a
garden-variety criminal prosecution against a defendant who happens to be an employee
of the government. The defendant appears in his personal capacity.
263. I argue below that if one agency is subject to the regulatory authority of another,
its disputes are justiciable. An independent environmental counsel, therefore, would be
litigating justiciable controversies. My only point here is that if EPA is presently unable
to bring an enforcement action against a federal facility, the establishment of an inde-
pendent counsel would not solve that defect.
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Court, like "any other shipper,"264 the government with a small
&a "9265
g.
In United States v. ICC, the ICC administered the regulatory
scheme; the Army operated within that scheme. These distinct
and opposing capacities obviated any article III concerns. The
setting is identical to a petition for judicial review brought by a
private party.216 Although both petitioner and respondent are
parts of the United States government, their different capacities
mean that they have different interests, different lawyers, dif-
ferent aims, and different views of the law. These disagreements
surely are enough to satisfy any concern with effective, full-
fledged advocacy and with the less clearly articulated normative
goals of the case-or-controversy requirement. For article III pur-
poses, the parties are adverse; they are different persons.
Furthermore, the Court is not trenching on the President's
authority to execute the laws. At the very least, article H permits
interagency litigation in disputes in which one agency regulates
the other. Such litigation does not interfere with the requirement
of an internally determined executive branch bottom line. Only
one agency is executing the laws. Because the regulated agency
that challenges the regulating agency's decision is not executing
264. United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, 430 (1949).
265. The government has appeared in its regulated capacity in many interagency suits.
In Western Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 347 U.S. 67 (1954), for example, the
Postmaster General challenged the CAB's determination of the rates the Post Office had
to pay to airlines it hired to transport mail. In the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General
represented the Postmaster General and the United States; the CAB had its own counsel.
The governmental party was the CAB; the United States was merely a member of the
regulated community. The same relation of governmental interests arises in litigation
between an agency (as a regulated employer) and the Federal Labor Relations Authority.
See, e.g., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89 (1983); supra
note 7; see also United States v. ICC, 352 U.S. 158 (1956) (facts almost identical to those
of United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, discussed in the text); Ford Motor Co. v. ICC, 714
F.2d 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (DOD challenge to ICC refusal to order reparation of alleged
railroad overcharges); United States v. FCC, 707 F.2d 610, 612 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(challenge to long distance rates set by FCC; "United States represents the consumer
interests of the Department of Defense, the General Services Administration, and other
federal executive agencies"); Secretary of the Army v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 F.2d
496 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (challenge to the FPC's refusal to regulate natural gas supplied to
military base); United States v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 851 (D.D.C. 1976) (per curiam)
(DOD challenge to ICC order resulting in higher costs for shipping automobiles), affd,
430 U.S. 961 (1977).
266. United States v. ICC and similar cases "merely confirm that when the United
States or one of its agencies is placed in the position of a private person burdened by
administrative action, it may take advantage of statutory procedures for judicial review
like any other private litigant." United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 503 (2d Cir. 1986)
(Friendly, J.).
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or enforcing the law,267 the executive branch is executing with
one voice.
This distinction is similar, but not identical, to that between
official and individual capacity.P One could characterize any
federal criminal prosecution against an executive branch em-
ployee as an intrabranch dispute. Doing so never crosses one's
mind, however, because the defendant is participating not as part
of the government, but as a member of the regulated community.
Indeed, some cases that have the look of intrabranch disputes
are best explained as being between the government and an
individual.2s9 Just as these suits are clearly justiciable, so are
suits in which part of the government appears in a private
capacity.20
Distinguishing the government as regulator from the govern-
ment as member of the regulated community or beneficiary of
the regulatory scheme also looks similar, perhaps uncomfortably
so, to a distinction between proprietary and governmental capac-
ities. The Supreme Court frequently has attempted such a dis-
tinction.m l In some settings, its efforts have been notoriously
unsuccessful, at times belittled by the Court itself.22 Yet govern-
267. One might say that anything an agency does is, by definition, executing the laws.
If so, then in shipping material, paying the railroads, and asking the ICC to order a
refund, the Army, which is an executive agency, could only have been executing the
laws. Not everything an agency does is execution, however, any more than everything a
law school does is education. (The relative percentages can be left for another day.) An
agency enforcing statutory requirements is distinct from an agency subject to such
requirements.
268. Indeed, the no-person-can-sue-herself principle has on occasion yielded even in
regard to a single individual who appears in two capacities. See supra note 36.
269. For example, Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), in which Adam Clayton
Powell, Jr., challenged his exclusion from the House of Representatives, was an action
by Powell in his individual capacity. See supra note, 105.
270. Returning to the model of intracorporate litigation, see supra notes 37-49 and
accompanying text, the equivalent justiciable controversy is a shareholders' derivative
suit. In such suits, the corporation, via the shareholders, is suing the officers in their
private capacities. The basic premise of the litigation is that the officers have acted in
their own interest rather than in the corporation's.
271. For a thorough litany of the many settings in which the governmental/proprietary
distinction is invoked, see Wells & Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction
in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REv. 1073, 1073-74 n.9 (1980).
272. For harsh judicial criticism, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolition Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 541-47 (1985) (criticizing governmentallproprietary distinction and
abandoning a related effort to identify governmental functions that are "integral" or
"traditional"); Employees of the Dep't of Health v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 411 U.S.
279, 297 n.l1 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("I had thought we had escaped such
unenlightening characterizations of States' activities:'); Rayonier, Inc. v. United States,
352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957) (rejecting the governmental/proprietary distinction as a test for
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ments do sometimes act like private parties and sometimes act
like something quite different. The distinction continually resur-
faces. 273
The governmental/proprietary distinction has two basic flaws
that have made its application troublesome. Neither is present
here. First, the distinction attempts to keep separate two cate-
gories that blend and overlap. The concrete line drawing diffi-
culties that plague its application are a symptom of this conceptual
difficulty. The regulating/regulated distinction, in contrast, does
not suffer from that basic incoherence. To distinguish the gov-
ernment's regulatory from its regulated capacity, one need look
no farther than the governing statute. To the extent the statute
imposes substantive requirements on federal entities, it places
the government in the position of a member of the regulated
community. To the extent the statute charges federal entities
with formulating, implementing, and enforcing such requirements,
it places the government in a regulatory capacity.
The second shortcoming of the governmental/proprietary dis-
tinction is the absence of an adequate theoretical explanation for
just why we should ever view the state as a private party.274 The
government liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act); Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955) (describing the governmental/proprietary distinction as a
"quagmire" that is "inherently unsound").
273. The distinction is well entrenched, for example, in the market participant doctrine,
which permits some state actions that flatly discriminate against out-of-state parties. See
South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984); Coenen, Untangling the
Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REv. 395
(1989).
The market participant doctrine offers a close analogy to the regulating/regulated
distinction. In United States v. ICC, the government sought to recover charges that it
had paid for the unloading of trains; the Army was a market participant. In contrast,
when the Secretary of Agriculture challenged the ICC's approval of special charges for
unloading fruits and.vegetables from trains, see Secretary of Agriculture v. United States,
347 U.S. 645 (1954), he was a market regulator (albeit a failed one). The Agriculture
Department was not subject to the ICC's order because it did not unload vegetables or
pay to have them unloaded. The Secretary viewed the charges as a mistaken policy
because of their harm to agricultural interests.
274. This tension is apparent, for example, in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298 (1974), which upheld a municipality's refusal to accept political advertising on
its buses. Justice Blackmun relied, confusingly, on the fact that the city was engaged in
a commercial venture. Id. at 303-04 (plurality opinion). This fact did not eliminate
constitutional requirements altogether. "Because state action exists," the refusal to accept
such advertisements could not be arbitrary. Id. at 303. It did drastically water down, if
not eliminate, first amendment protections, however. Just like a private venture, the
City did not have to make available "its vehicles" for any advertising proffered by the
general public. Id.
To the dissenters, on the other hand, what mattered was not that the activity was
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government may be doing something that we ordinarily expect
private actors to do, but it is still the government. As such, it
may not be subject to the same practical, marketplace constraints
as private actors, and it is at least presumptively subject to
constitutional constraints that do not apply to private actors. The
regulating/regulated distinction, in contrast, does not require
closing one's eyes to the fact that the parties are governmental.
The government can be and often is sued as the United States
in each of these capacities. Viewing the government as subject
to statutory requirements just like a private party is perfectly
coherent.
Any of the foregoing rationales supports the result in United
States v. ICC. Many cases will arise in which these rationales
point in opposite directions, however. Take the fight between
the IRS and the Postal Service over the Postal Service's alleged
failure to pay taxes.21 5 Under the nongovernmental-real-party-in-
interest or independent agency tests, this controversy is nonjus-
ticiable. 16 I would argue, however, that it is justiciable because,
in this situation, the Postal Service is like any other taxpayer.
Similarly, those tests would find no jurisdiction in Dean v. Her-
rington,2 77 in which the TVA sought payment from DOE under
electric power contracts. No private party was directly involved
in the dispute,1 8 and the TVA directors were removable at will.1 9
Under the rationale offered here, the case was clearly justiciable
because neither party was acting in a regulatory capacity; they
were both like private parties.s °
commercial, but that the City of Shaker Heights was engaged in it. Id. at 314 n.6
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissenters rejected the comparison to private billboards
and newspapers precisely because the government owned the buses. Id.; see also South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (municipal theater a public
forum); id. at 573 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("A municipal theater may not be run by
municipal authorities as if it were a private theater, free to judge on a content basis
alone which plays it wishes to have performed and which it does not.").
275. See 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 79 (1977).
276. Id. at 83-84.
277. 668 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Tenn. 1987).
278. In a consolidated action, other users of TVA power asserted claims against DOE,
arguing that if DOE escaped liability, the TVA would eventually shift those costs to
them. Id at 648-49. The court dismissed the action for lack of standing. Id- at 653-54. For
the very reason that the connection to the dispute was too tenuous to support standing,
the presence of these plaintiffs would not be enough to salvage the suit under OLC's
nongovernmental-real-party-in-interest test. In any event, DOJ represented DOE and
argued that this was a nonjusticiable, intragovernmental dispute; it apparently did not
think that the other TVA users qualified. Id. at 652-54.
279. But see 1 Op. EPA General Counsel 297, 313 (1973) (stressing the TVA's inde-
pendence).
280. In Dean, the court found that the legal issue-essentially a breach of contract
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B. Regulatory Disputes
Disputes between an agency as regulator and an agency as a
regulated party are, then, justiciable. Perhaps the more common
type of interagency disagreement, however, is over regulatory
policy, in which both agencies act in their regulatory capacities.
For example, suppose it is not the Army that is paying the
railroads' ICC-approved wharfage charges, but shippers of agri-
cultural produce. The Secretary of Agriculture believes that the
railroads' rates for unloading fruits and vegetables are too high.
Unlike the Army in United States v. ICC, here the Secretary of
Agriculture has a regulatory disagreement with the ICC. The
dispute is over what the government should require in certain
private transactions. Can the Secretary challenge the ICC deci-
sion?2sl
claim-was of a type traditionally justiciable and that it arose in a setting that ensured
concrete adversariness, an adversariness that would only be enhanced by the TVA's
independence. Dean, 668 F. Supp. at 655. The court also held that Executive Order
Number 12,146, requiring federal agencies to submit legal disputes to the Attorney
General for resolution, did not apply to the TVA. Id. at 652-53 (citing Exec. Order No.
12,146, 3 C.F.R. 5 409 (1979)).
Having concluded that the case could proceed, the district court transferred the action
to the court of claims. That court agreed with the justiciability holding, but concluded
that the Executive Order did require submission of the dispute to the Attorney General.
TVA v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 692, 697-702 (1987). It suspended the case to allow
resolution by the Attorney General. Id. at 703.
281. He did so in Secretary of Agriculture v. ICC, 347 U.S. 645 (1954). See also Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R. v. United States, 366 U.S. 745 (1961) (challenge to
ICC route decision); Secretary of Agric. v. United States, 350 U.S. 162 (1956) (challenge
to ICC order limiting railroads' liability for eggshells broken during shipment); ICC v.
Mechling, 330 U.S. 567 (1947) (Secretary of Agriculture, among others, challenged ICC
decision regarding railroad ratps for grain shipments); Secretary of Agric. v. ICC, 551
F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Secretary of Agriculture challenged ICC decision not to order
railroads to refund portion of tariffs); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977) (Secretary of Agriculture challenged an
EPA pesticide registration decision); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (Secretary of Agriculture challenged an EPA withdrawal of pesticide
registration).
The Secretary of Agriculture is a relatively frequent participant in interagency liti-
gation in part because of specific statutory authorization to intervene in ICC proceedings
and to seek judicial review of ICC decisions relating to the transportation of farm
products. 7 U.S.C. S 1291 (1988). Litigation between agencies in which the underlying
dispute involved not the application of one agency's authority to the other but a conflict
over the assertion of governmental authority upon private parties has not been limited
to suits involving the Secretary of Agriculture, however. See, e.g., United States v. ICC,
396 U.S. 491 (1970) ("Northern Lines Merger Cases") (DOJ challenge to ICC approval of
railroad merger); American Commercial Lines v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 392 U.S.
571 (1968) (the United States, that is, DOJ, although a statutory defendant, argued on
behalf of railroads challenging the ICC's denial of their petition for a rate decrease);
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One could draw the justiciability line for such disputes in any
of four places. In order of increasingly tangible divergence of
interests, they are as follows. First, any agency could challenge
any governmental decision. Not only the Department of Agricul-
ture, but also the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
could challenge the vegetable unloading tariff. Second, an agency
could challenge any governmental decision adversely affecting
private interests that it regulates or protects. Thus, the Secretary
of Agriculture could challenge the vegetable tariff because it is
"bad for agriculture," but the SEC, which carries no particular
brief for agricultural interests, could not. Third, an agency could
challenge another agency's action if it affected not merely private
interests within the challenging agency's jurisdiction, but that
agency's regulatory program itself. Under this approach, the
Department of Agriculture could not challenge the tariff merely
because it was bad for agriculture; it could get to court only if
the tariff hampered the Department's own regulat6ry efforts-
for example, if varying rates for different vegetables undercut a
set of price supports it had established. Finally, perhaps none of
these are justiciable, and one agency can sue another only when
subject to the other agency's authority, as in United States v.
ICC.
Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428 (1967) (Secretary of the Interior challenged
FPC's grant of an exclusive license for hydroelectric dam); United States ex rel. Chapman
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 345 U.S. 153 (1953) (Secretary of the Interior challenged FPC's
grant of a license for hydroelectric generating plant); Far East Conference v. United
States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952) (DOJ challenged, under the Sherman Antitrust Act, freight
rates approved by the Federal Maritime Board); Levinson v. Spector Motor Serv., 330
U.S. 649 (1947) (ICC versus the Wage & Hour Administration); ICC v. City of Jersey
City, 322 U.S. 503 (1944) (Office of Price Administration, represented by the Solicitor
General, challenged the ICC's approval of a railroad rate increase); ICC v. Inland Water-
ways Corp., 319 U.S. 671 (1943); Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation v. FERC, 746 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1984) (National Marine Fisheries Service challenged
the license granted for a hydroelectric dam on the ground that the impact on fish
populations was inadequately taken into account), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985); United
States v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 694 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (challenge by Antitrust
Division of DOJ to the FMC's approval of a shipping rate agreement among six ocean
carriers); United States v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 655 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same);
United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en bane) (DOJ challenged the FWC's
grant of a license to a private corporation to construct and operate satellites as a common
carrier); Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 642 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (DOJ represented
the United States as a nominal respondent, but argued that the FCC rulemaking was
arbitrary and capricious), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 920 (1981); United States v. Civil Aero-
nautics Bd., 511 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (DOJ challenged the CAB's approval of
multilateral capacity reduction agreements among air carriers in response to fuel short-
age); American Mail Line v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 503 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir.) (DOJ
challenged FMC approval of shipping agreement), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974).
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1. Regulatory Disputes and Article III
The first of the above categories is clearly nonjusticiable.
Messy though standing principles are, one can safely say that an
agency unrelated to the challenged decision or the parties it
affects has not suffered a constitutionally adequate injury-in-
fact. 2 Standing concerns aside, the required situational adversity
is, not coincidentally, absent here. The two agencies do not have
a concrete dispute.
In the other three situations, however, standing and situational
adversity may well exist. Plainly, a constitutionally adequate
injury exists if the agency itself is directly aggrieved or if a
regulatory program it is charged with administering is harmed.z
Whether standing exists is less clear if the injury is to private
interests that the agency is charged with protecting. Principles
of associational standing,2 however, could reach this situation.
Just as an ideological or advocacy interest is not enough to create
standing for a public interest organization but specific harm to
its members is enough,2 so the advocacy interest of, for example,
the Department of Agriculture may be insufficient to give it
standing to challenge actions that harm its constituency, but the
constituents' injury does create standing.
282. Because an agency is part of the same government, it automatically may have a
stake in any and every governmental decision. The same argument holds, however, for
any citizn yet such ideological or emotional injury flowing from an individual's compelled
support or association with governmental practices that she deems unwise or illegal are
inadequate to create standing. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1986); McKinney
v. Department of the Treasury, 799 F.2d 1544, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Moreover, if the
idea of the government as one person has any substance, government agencies should be
less, not more, free than private citizens to challenge governmental actions that do not
directly affect them.
283. United States v. FMC, 694 F.2d 793, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1939) (administrative commissions have a "legitimate interest"
in resisting attempts to prevent enforcement of statutes). Although the courts did not
discuss standing directly in those cases cited supra note 281, their decisions must have
rested on that basis.
The distinction between a harm to an agency's regulatory program and a harm to the
agency's constituency is not crystal-clear. A regulatory program consists of ways in which
the agency imposes certain requirements and ways in which it chooses to leave private
parties alone. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824); id. at 227 (Johnson, J.,
concurring). Regulation by another agency that does not directly conflict with the first
agency's requirements may nonetheless disrupt the overall regulatory scheme. The same
idea surfaces in preemption analysis. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
284. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
285. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972).
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Perhaps, however, notwithstanding satisfaction of the usual
standing requirements, the fact that both of the potential litigants
are part of the executive branch operating in the same capacity
creates a unity of interests that renders their dispute nonjusti-
ciable. After all, if the government's litigating role is "to promote
the interest of all, and to prevent the wrongdoing of one resulting
in injury to the general welfare," then allowing two govern-
mental parties to litigate against each other is a logical impos-
sibility-except, of course, when one of them is the alleged
wrongdoer who has harmed the general welfare and the other
one of those whose welfare has been harmed. This view is,
however, wholly unrealistic. Twenty-five years ago, Professor
Jaffe pointed out that conflicting private interests are not rec-
onciled in a unitary "public interest" served by every agency
individually and the government as a whole:
The public interest no longer can be limited to one mask worn
by the Attorney General. The United States may incestuously
sue itself. It may, in the carnival of the public interest, appear
in many guises in which if one looks he may see-without too
much effort-twitching behind the august lineaments of the
ICC, the Department of Agriculture, and the Secretary of the
Interior, the eager grimaces of railroad, farmer, and rural
electrifier. All of these interests are represented in this mode
on the Congressional and administrative stage; it has come to
be thought appropriate that they be so represented in the
courts of law when a legal issue is relevant to the exercise of
power.2
Jaffe thus suggests that a justiciable controversy arises in
situations in which one agency challenges another even if it is
not subject to a decision of that agency. This view recognizes
that there is no unitary governmental or public interest separate
and apart from diverse private interests.2 The pluralist battle
286. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 584 (1895).
287. L. JAFFE, supra note 34, at 541-42 (footnote omitted). In the immediately preceding
passage, Jaffe explicitly denies that the justiciability of such interagency litigation as has
occurred-in particular, United States ex re. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153 (1953)-
hinged on the presence of an independent agency. His point is that justiciability is the
result of the agencies' divergent interests.
288. A slightly different view of the nature of the public interest, though one which
also argues for justiciability of interagency disputes, is evident in the establishment of
an agency specifically charged with representation of the public interest. New Jersey,
for example, has created a Department of the Public Advocate, N.J. STAT. ANN. S 52:27E-
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does not cease inside the halls of government. Each agency has
a mission and a constituency that will conflict with the interests
and constituencies of other agencies.2 Any rule about justicia-
bility must come to grips with the fact that the government itself
represents different interests and is therefore composed of con-
flicting entities with different goals and views. In furthering the
interests of American agriculture, for example, the Secretary of
Agriculture might quite sensibly go to court to cure an injury
to the particular facet of the public interest that she represents.
Even apart from any personal interest in the development and
maintenance of a coherent and effective agricultural policy, the
Secretary is the single-minded proxy for a particular segment of
the public. Either or both of these interests provides her with a
sufficient stake in the controversy to satisfy any concerns about
adversity and collusion. To the Secretary of Agriculture, an ICC
ruling that raises farmers' expenses hits home in something of
the same way as an ICC ruling that raises the expenses of the
Department of Agriculture. One could argue, as Jaffe seems to,
that as long as the challenging agency regulates or represents a
directly affected interest, or implements a statutory scheme that
will be affected, even if indirectly, by the challenged action, it
can go to court.20
This liberal view of article III requirements is evident, for
example, in various cases in which courts have heard DOJ chal-
lenges to allegedly anticompetitive agreements that another
1 (West 1990), containing a Division of Public Interest Advocacy. Id. S 52:27E-28. The
director of this Division may in her discretion commence or intervene in any administra-
tive or judicial proceeding in furtherance of "the public interest," id. S 52:27E-29, which
is "an interest or right . . . inhering in the citizens of this State or in a broad class of
such citizens." Id. S 52:27E-30. If the director perceives conflicting public interests, she
may represent none, one, or more than one through lawyers from outside the Division
or the Department. Id. S 52:27E-31.
The underlying premise of such an office appears to be that the twin evils of "agency
capture" and "tunnel vision" are so pervasive as to require a separate agency charged
exclusively with the representation of the public interest. Similar concerns argue for
allowing those within the government to challenge agency action. For present purposes,
the key question is not the theoretical one of whether such a thing as "the" public
interest exists, as the New Jersey statute for the most part assumes, but the practical
one of whether single-mission agencies represent it. Jaffe and the New Jersey legislature
agree that they do not.
Creating a Division of Public Interest Advocacy within the government to litigate
against the government is comparable to permitting litigation of interagency regulatory
disputes. The challenging agency, although not directly affected, invokes a broader
interest.
289. Eizenstat, supra note 115 ("Each department has its own constituencies to serve
based on its mission and mandate. This is the essence of a representative democracy.").
290. L. JAFFE, supra note 34, at 537-43.
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agency has approved. Consider a DOJ challenge to the Federal
Maritime Commission's (FMC) approval of a price-fixing agree-
ment among shippers. The FMC's approval exempts such agree-
ments from the antitrust laws 1 The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has held that a justiciable controversy exists
if DOJ seeks review of the FMC's order.2 Invoking a two-part
test drawn from United States v. Nixon,293 the court found an
article III controversy because (1) the issues were of the sort
that are traditionally justiciable and (2) the setting assured con-
crete adverseness.2 The test was in part inadequate and in part
misapplied.
Looking at the legal issue misses the point. The problem of
intragovernmental litigation turns on the identity of the parties.2 5
For that matter, a court always has to determine whether the
291. 46 U.S.C. S 814 (1988). The FMC should approve an agreement if it is not unjustly
discriminatory or unfair, will not be detrimental to commerce, and is not contrary to the
public interest.
292. United States v. FMC, 694 F.2d 793, 794-95 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. FMC,
655 F.2d 247, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1980); American Mail Line v. FMC, 503 F.2d 157, 159-60 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974).
293. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Nion involved a motion by the Special Prosecutor, in the
name of the United States, for a subpoena duces tecum directed to the President,
countered by the President's motion to quash on the ground of executive privilege. Id.
at 686. Nixon argued that this was a nonjusticiable intrabranch dispute. Id. at 693-94.
Relying on United States v. ICC for the proposition that the court must look behind the
caption, the Court disagreed. Id. at 693. The particular issue was of a sort courts
traditionally resolve, the setting ensured concrete adverseness, and, as it arose out of a
criminal prosecution, the matter was within the traditional scope of the article III power.
Id. at 696-97.
294. United States v. FMC, 694 F.2d at 810 (citing Nixon, 418 U.S. 683). The government
argued that the case was justiciable because the true parties in interest were itself and
the ocean carriers. Id. The court neither accepted nor rejected this argument, id., but
its application in this setting shows how little the nongovernmental-real-party-in-interest
test actually means. This is a far cry from United States v. ICC, in which the Army and
the railroads were contesting a sum of money. DOJ's quarrel was with the commission
for authorizing the carriers to do something that it considered illegal, but that had no
direct effect on DOJ. The Department had to challenge the FMC order because, given
the FMC's approval, it had no dispute with the carriers. Indeed, in holding that the
Department had standing, the court identified the Department's injury as being the
FMC's interference with the Department's discharge of its statutory duties. Id. at 802.
If that is the injury, then the dispute can only be described as being between DOJ and
the FMC.
295. As Professor Van Alstyne wrote about the Nion decision soon after it came
down, "of course the issue was justiciable, but only if one abstracts 'the' issue as though
it were but an ordinary case" involving a dispute over discovery. Van Alstyne, A Political
and Constitutional Review of United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REV. 116, 132 (1974);
see also supra note'17 (distinguishing the problem of interagency litigation, which turns
on the parties litigating, from that of political questions, which turns on the issue litigated).
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issue is justiciable. The first prong thus has nothing to do with
intrabranch litigation as such.2
As for the second prong of the test, there is no question that
DOJ and the FMC were adverse in fact. They fundamentally
disagreed over the legal issues involved and the wisdom of the
order; they had disagreed during the administrative proceedings;
and they gave no indication that this disagreement was feigned
or halfhearted. Yet fierce disputes occur within the giant bu-
reaucratic machine that is the United States government or even
the smaller machine that is an individual agency. If the rule is
merely that bureaucrats holding conflicting views must do so
with sincerity and perseverance, then almost any intragovern-
mental conflict-at least any that actually ends up in court-
would be an article III case or controversy.
Quoting United States v. Nixon, the court in United States v.
FMC found that the "setting" assured "concrete adverseness."' 7
Yet the "setting" merely involved two agencies that disagreed,
each invoking the "public interest.a'  The only thing about the
setting that indicated adverseness was the fact that both agencies
were before the court and in disagreement.
Article III requires more. 9 At the least, it demands that
governmental litigants not merely disagree, but also represent
296. The Court's application of this prong of its test was indisputably correct, however.
The Department had contended that the FMC order was invalid because it was not
limited to agreements pertaining solely to ocean carriage, it violated the basic antitrust
public interest standard, and the FMC's procedures were incomplete. United States v.
FMC, 694 F.2d at 796, 809-10. If the inquiry is merely whether these are the sorts of
issues that courts traditionally decide, the answer is plainly yes, and one can imagine a
garden-variety petition for review brought by a private party making precisely those
arguments.
297. Id. at 810 (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 697).
298. Id The Court could only say that DOJ "is the authorized and traditional advocate
of antitrust policies in agency litigation, . . . which policies are implicated by the 'public
interest' standard of section 15 of the Shipping Act, and the Commission obviously has
a role before this court as an advocate of its own perception of the public interest." Id
(citation omitted). Such a divergence does not seem to extend beyond the fact of
disagreement.
299. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (sincere disagreement alone does
not create justiciable controversy). The Court in Nixon noted that its "starting point is
the nature of the proceeding for which the evidence is sought," Nixon, 418 U.S. at 694;
it cautioned that "controversy means more than disagreement and conflict[;] rather it
means the kind of controversy courts traditionally resolve," id. at 696; and it concluded
its substantive discussion by noting that "since the matter is one arising in the regular
course of a federal criminal prosecution, it is within the traditional scope of Art. mI
power," id. at 697. Taken together, these statements indicate that not only must the
dispute involve a legal issue and concrete adversariness, but the judicial resolution must
be appropriate given the role of the courts in the constitutional scheme. The opinion is
not much help in identifying just what this role is.
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different interests or appear in different capacities. In this liti-
gation, DOJ and the FMC did not appear in different capacities;
they both appeared as antitrust enforcers. Arguably, however,
they represented different interests; they at least were pursuing
different regulatory agendas. By immunizing this agreement from
the otherwise-to-be-expected DOJ challenge, the FMC order stood
in the way of DOJ's enforcement program. Because the dispute
involved not only mere disagreement but also direct interference,
the two agencies' interests were sufficiently divergent to satisfy
article III.
So where does that leave us? The strong position would be
that such generally divergent interests are still not enough to
satisfy the adversity requirement and that article HI requires
the specific conflict that exists in situations in which one agency
asserts its authority over another. 300 Requiring that one agency
assert regulatory authority over the other would render antitrust
litigation between DOJ and the FMC nonjusticiable,s 1 unless, of
course, the United States as a shipper was forced to pay higher
rates as a result of the challenged agreement.30 2
In the article III context, however, the regulating/regulated
distinction rests as much on intuition as argument, a feeling that
two agencies truly are part of the same person when both are
acting in their regulatory capacities. Intuition counts, but given
300. The regulating/regulated distinction is in fact lurking just beneath the surface in
the Nixon opinion. The Court tended to view President Nixon as a nongovernmental
entity. It was not because Nixon appeared in his personal capacity; plainly his defense,
executive privilege, was available only in his official capacity. As President, however,
Nixon was a member of the regulated community, subject to the ordinary evidence-
gathering regime of the criminal law.
301. In another DOJ challenge to an FMC-approved rate agreement, Judge Markey
unsuccessfully argued, in essence, that the case was nonjusticiable because both agencies
were trying to regulate. United States v. FMC, 655 F.2d 247, 256-57 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(Markey, J., concurring). Markey acknowledged that the same challenge to the FMC's
order, if brought by a private party with a pecuniary interest, would present a ease or
controversy. Id. at 257 (Markey, J., concurring). "The true issue presented however, is
whether the DOJ view of antitrust law and the public interest, or that of FMC, shall be
applied." Id. I argue below that this issue is indeed nonjusticiable, not because no case
or controversy exists, but because this issue presents larger separation of powers
concerns.
302. Such circumstances have arisen. In Far East Conference v. United States, 342
U.S. 570 (1952), DOJ brought an action seeking to enjoin a dual rate system employed
by carriers to the Far East. The Court ordered DOJ to initiate its challenge before the
Federal Maritime Board. In response to DOJ's suggestion that perhaps it could not appear
before a sister agency, the Court observed: "We ought not to dally longer with this
objection, considering the fact that the United States, as a matter of common knowledge,
is today one of the largest shippers in the Far East trade." Id. at 576 (citing United
States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949)).
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the conflicting goals and interests within the government, a rule
limiting suits to those in which one agency is regulating the
other is hard to base on article III alone. Viewed strictly in
terms of article III, the received notions of adverse parties, and
the purposes adversity is thought to serve, no per se rule bars
litigation of interagency disputes as long as one agency has in
fact harmed the other agency, its regulatory program, or the
interests it represents.
2. Unitary Execution
Administrative agencies are in a variety of ways largely in-
dependent actors. As Part III shows, the objection that permit-
ting agencies to square off in court would violate the unitary
executive principle does not ring true.8°3
Notwithstanding the many defects of the unitary executive
model, however, the goals of efficiency, consistency, and account-
ability do argue against interagency litigation. Although the term
unitary executive is a misnomer and the President is not the
person who does or should make all executive branch decisions,
the Constitution does in a sense require the unitary execution of
the laws.
The Constitution creates an executive branch. It assigns to
that branch the task-admittedly ill-defined-of executing the
laws. That is not a task that the branch can pass on to others.
As a result, a dispute arising within the branch as to how best
to execute a law must be resolved within the branch. Congress
can involve any number of agencies in the decisionmaking proc-
ess, but ultimately one has to make the final decision. Except to
the extent that an agency is itself affected by that decision or
contends that it was slighted in the decisionmaking process, it
has no judicial remedy. If execution of the laws is to reside in
the executive branch, then this must be so.
In part this limitation reflects respect for the allocation of
regulatory authority. In a sense, once the decisionmaking agency
has made its decision, the dispute no longer exists: the govern-
303. Some commentators conclude that therefore anything goes with regard to inter-
agency litigation. See, e.g., Amending and Extending the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund): Hearings Before the Senate
Environment and Public Works Comm., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 461-63 (1984) (statement of
Kenneth Kamlet, National Wildlife Federation) (DOJ's unitary executive theory "exalt[s]
the fiction of a monolithic Executive Branch over the realities of everyday life"); Rosen-
berg, supra note 80, at 684-88.
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ment has spoken through the office charged with making the
final determination; that ends the matter insofar as the United
States is concerned. By placing a decision in the hands of a
particular agency, Congress has implied that it does not want
other agencies to gum up the works. This implication is obvious
at the intra-agency level. Take the example of a Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) Under Secretary challenging a HUD
grant. One adequate reason for dismissing such an action would
be that Congress did not authorize it. By placing the final decision
with the Secretary, Congress indicated that it did not want the
Under Secretary to stand in the way. Similarly, by placing grant-
making authority with the HUD Secretary, Congress has made
all other agencies subordinate with regard to that decision.304 We
can infer from Congress' decision to place the final determination
with the Secretary that it does not want other persons or
agencies, to which it chose not to give this authority, to interfere
with the Secretary's execution of that responsibility.
If whoever allocated the authority-usually Congress-also
endorsed interagency litigation, however, then respect for that
allocation is not enough to compel a court to stay its hand. Stay
its hand it should, however. The strictness of antitrust enforce-
ment, for example, is not something for the enforcers to fight
about in court. Their constitutionally assigned task is to figure
out enforcement policy on their own. A private party with stand-
ing can of course attack the government's determination in the
normal course, but the government cannot attack itself.
An extreme example illustrates the point. Suppose that the
Department of Labor adopts workplace safety regulations over
OMB's objections. OMB complains to the President, who is dis-
mayed with the content of the regulations. The President can
fire the Secretary of Labor, trusting a more sympathetic replace-
ment to revoke the regulations. That, however, seems like the
long way around, so the President challenges the regulations in
court. Such a suit looks bizarre; I would say it is also unconsti-
tutional. The executive branch cannot litigate about how to
execute the laws; it must execute them. This principle of unitary
execution rests not so much on the inviolability of presidential
authority as it does on a scheme of separate powers and the
relations between the government and the governed.30 5
304. This is also an article III argument.
305. The same principle therefore applies whether the agency is independent or
executive. Unitary execution has nothing to do with freedom from presidential control;
rather, it concerns the respect one executor of the laws must accord another.
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The question is how far this requirement of unitary execution
should go. It might suggest that the Court's decision in United
States v. ICC, for example, was wrong because the ICC should
have had the final, unreviewable say. If Congress and the Pres-
ident want the advantages of an expert administrative agency
within the federal government to regulate interstate commerce,
they must live with the decision to place decisionmaking authority
in such an agency-especially if submission of a claim to the ICC
is voluntary. Congress need not have placed the United States
within the ICC's jurisdiction. By doing so, however, Congress
determined who in the government would make decisions about
railroad regulation. However unhappy others in the government
may be with the decisionmaking agency, they have no legal
recourse.
To the extent this argument relies on congressional intent to
give the ICC the final say, the short answer is that Congress
gave the ICC the final say subject to judicial review. The sepa-
ration of powers question-whether courts can review an agen-
cy's execution of the laws-is easily answered in the affirmative
and is not altered by the fact that the aggrieved party is gov-
ernmental. To the extent this argument rests instead on an
understanding of unitary execution, it is equally misplaced. In
disputes in which one governmental party acts in its regulatory
capacity and the other appears as a member of the regulated
community or as a beneficiary of the regulatory scheme, each of
the litigants, and the court, is doing exactly what it ordinarily
does. Only one agency, the ICC, is executing the laws. The
different capacities of the two governmental parties ensure uni-
tary execution.
The United States v. ICC situation contrasts with cases in
which DOJ challenges a merger that another agency has ap-
proved. For example, the Comptroller of the Currency must
approve any merger involving a national or a district bank.m
The Comptroller must withhold approval if the merger would
violate the antitrust laws and must notify the Attorney General
before granting approval.3°7 If the Attorney General deems a
Comptroller-approved merger improper, he can bring an antitrust
action. The reviewing court must apply "standards . . identical
with those that the [Comptroller of the Currency is] directed to
306. 12 U.S.C. S 1828(c)(2) (1988).
307. Id. S 1828(c)(5).
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apply.'"85 The Comptroller is entitled to intervene as of right in
any such action, represented by its own counsel.s
One might view this litigation as a garden-variety antitrust
prosecution in which the defendants rely on the Comptroller's
approval either as (1) res judicata, (2) an administrative deter-
mination to which the court must defer, or (3) a complete defense
on the merits. This is more or less how the Court viewed the
United States v. Marine Bancorporatio3 10 and United States v.
Connecticut National Bank"' cases 12 The disputes were between
the antitrust division and the banks; the Department was oper-
ating exactly as it was supposed to; the Comptroller's prior
determination did not alter the basic nature of the lawsuits; and
the issues, to use, anachronistically, the Court's language in
United States v. Nixon, were of a sort traditionally justiciable
and arose in a setting that assured concrete adverseness.313
This view of the litigation does not hold up because all three
versions are inconsistent with the statute. First, the banks cannot
argue that the Comptroller's decision is res judicata on the
question of antitrust liability for the simple reason that Congress
said it is not. Congress is wholly free to define the scope of res
judicata with regard to administrative determinations 1 4 Second,
the banks might point to the Comptroller's decision as an admin-
istrative interpretation of the antitrust laws to which the court
must accord deference. Given the absence of specific congres-
sional guidance, deference to the agency could be pivotal if the
court takes a hands-off approach 15 The disagreement between
DOJ and the Comptroller raises some thorny problems about
deference 16 In any event, the statute's specific requirement that
308. Id, $ 1828(c)(7)(B).
309. Id. S 1828(c)(7)D).
DOJ and the Comptroller of the Currency have frequently litigated against each other
under this scheme. See United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974);
United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank,
390 U.S. 171 (1968); United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967). None of
these decisions addressed justiciability. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974),
however, the Court relied on the 1974 decisions in holding that Nixon was not a
nonjusticiable intrabranch dispute. Id. at 693.
310. 418 U.S. 602.
311. 418 U.S. 656.
312. See supra note 309 and text accompanying notes 303-09.
313. 418 U.S. 683, 697 (1974).
314. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS S 83 (1982).
315. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
316. For example, the Comptroller has primary responsibility for regulating bank
mergers; DOJ has primary responsibility for administering the antitrust laws. To which
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the court apply standards identical to those the Comptroller is
directed to apply suggests that Congress sought essentially de
novo rather than deferential review. Third, the very fact that
the statute expressly authorizes the DOJ lawsuit makes clear
that Congress did not intend the Comptroller's approval, in itself,
to be a defense on the merits.
The second reason one cannot view these cases as ordinary
antitrust actions, with the Comptroller's prior approval just a
minor wrinkle meriting some undetermined weight, is that op-
posing governmental parties are actually before the court. By
allowing the Comptroller to intervene as of right, Congress has
acknowledged- indeed, anticipated- the possibility of regulatory
disagreement between two executive agencies without giving
either the final say. The litigation resolves a breakdown within
the executive branch, which was unable to determine how best
to execute the antitrust laws. Behind the named parties is the
executive branch, divided against itself. DOJ is not subject to
the Comptroller's order; nor is it directly affected by the alleged
anticompetitive effects of the merger; nor was its role in the
decisionmaking process overlooked. Rather, it simply disagrees
with the Comptroller's execution of the antitrust laws 3 17
In short, two agencies disagree over the execution of the laws,
and the matter passes to the judiciary, which is charged with
applying the same standards as the agency. If the idea of unitary
execution or an executive branch bottom line is valid, this ar-
rangement is impermissible.
Congress had available other mechanisms short of litigation to
involve DOJ in the decisionmaking. First, Congress could have
agency do courts owe deference? Cf. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 144-45
(1976) (deference not useful in cases in which two agencies charged with implementation
of statute had opposing views).
317. Presumably DOJ, which was the plaintiff and as far as we know did not challenge
the Comptroller's participation, considered the suit justiciable. See also United States v.
FMC, 694 F.2d 793, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Under DOJ's article III analysis, the merged
bank constituted a nongovernmental real party in interest and DOJ's quarrel was actually
with the bank for merging. As discussed above, this setting is a stretch from the United
States v. ICC model, for the bank did not hurt DOJ except to the extent its existence
undermined DOJ's regulatory program and its efforts on behalf of the public interest.
Although the distinction is a stretch that DOJ was willing to make under article I,
reconciling its litigation against the Comptroller of the Currency with its unitary executive
theory is difficult-all the more so because (1) the Comptroller is not an independent
agency and (2) in other settings DOJ represents the Comptroller, suing as the United
States. See, e.g., United States v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 881 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1118 (1990).
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required the Comptroller to solicit the views of other agencies.
Indeed, it did so; the Comptroller must consult DOJ about the
antitrust issues of a merger before approving it.a 8 If, as was
evidently the case, Congress deemed mere consultation insuffi-
cient, the answer was to give DOJ the final say.3 19 Such an
allocation of responsibility would be perfectly sensible and con-
sistent with Congress' authority to assign decisionmaking re-
sponsibility within the executive branch. In a way, that is all
that Congress has done here. The Comptroller makes the initial
decision, but DOJ can disagree by bringing an enforcement action
against the merged banks. The form of the disagreement, how-
ever, makes all the difference. If DOJ had veto authority, then
by the time the matter reached the courts, the executive branch
would have taken a single position. Under the statutory scheme
Congress has in fact chosen, the opposite is true; the litigation
hinges on the disagreement within the branch and assumes the
participation of two agencies. The relevant statute directs the
judiciary to resolve their dispute by applying exactly the same
standards as the agencies. 20 In other words, the courts are
supposed to do the agencies' job for them.
C. Turf Wars
A third type of case falls between the two categories discussed
above. It is a challenge on the ground that the decisionmaking
agency slighted the challenger's role in the decisionmaking proc-
ess. In ICC v. City of Jersey City,32' for example, the Price
Administrator of the Office of Price Administration (OPA) unsuc-
cessfully challenged the ICC's approval of a rate increase on a
318. 12 U.S.C. S 1828(C)5) (1988). If the Comptroller failed to consult DOJ, DOJ could
challenge the Comptroller's decision on that basis. See infra notes 321-34 and accompanying
text.
319. The Clean Water Act's permit program for the discharge of dredged and fill
material is an example of such a scheme. 33 U.S.C. S 1344 (1988). The Act requires a
permit from the Army Corps of Engineers for such discharges. Id. EPA can review and
veto a Corps permit. Id. S 1344(c). If EPA does so, the unsuccessful applicant must sue
EPA, and the Corps does not participate. For an example of such litigation, see Bersani
v. Robichaud, 850 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089 (1989). During oral
argument before the court of appeals in that case, Judge Timbers wondered where the
Corps was, implying that they should have been represented separately. Counsel for the
government assured the court that he represented both the Corps and EPA. The Corps
may well have been rooting for the developer to win and EPA to lose, but it was not
permitted, correctly, to take that position in court.
320. 12 U.S.C. S 1828(cX7)B).
321. 322 U.S. 503 (1944).
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commuter railway. Represented by DOJ, he contended that his
opposition to the increase was entitled to special, perhaps dis-
positive, weight.32
Such a dispute does not arise merely out of a disagreement
over the merits of the challenged action. Rather, the petitioning
agency argues that it had a role in the decisionmaking process
that the respondent agency ignoredsas As the Court put it in an
earlier OPA case, "[T]he controversy is essentially one between
two governmental agencies as to whether the powers of the one
or the other are preponderant in the circumstances."324 In its
extreme form, this sort of fight is over jurisdiction; that is, two
agencies disagree as to which has authority over a particular
matter. These disagreements are generally resolved within the
executive branch, although the legal issue may well ultimately
reach the courts in litigation brought by private parties32s
Under the regulating/regulated rule, these cases are nonjusti-
ciable. The OPA was plainly not a regulated party in the sense
that the Army was in United States v. ICC.M26 The OPA and the
ICC were both participating in the suit in their regulatory ca-
pacities; indeed, the OPA sought to vindicate its regulatory
authority.32
322. In a decision that was clearly correct under the statute, the Court held that
Congress could have given the OPA such power but did not. Because the OPA had no
special role and had received a full hearing, no error resulted. Id. at 514-24. The Court
did not discuss justiciability.
ICC v. City of Jersey City was one of a series of interagency suits in which the courts
rebuked the OPA's efforts to carve out special authority over economic regulation. See
also Vinson v. Washington Gas Light Co., 321 U.S. 489 (1944) (objection to rate increase
authorized by the Public Utilities Commission of Washington, D.C., a federal instrumen-
tality); North Carolina v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.C. 1944), rev'd on other
grounds, 325 U.S. 507 (1945); Alabama v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Ky. 1944)
(three-judge Court), rev'd on other grounds, 325 U.S. 535 (1945) (OPA challenge to ICC
decision). In the Alabam case, the OPA and the ICC were each represented by their
own attorneys; the local United States Attorney appeared on behalf of the United States
and adopted a neutral position. Alabama, 56 F. Supp. at 478.
323. For another example of litigation over turf, see Northwest Airlines v. CAB, 539
F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The United States, represented by DOJ, successfully argued
that the CAB had exceeded its authority to permit "temporary" changes in international
airline routes without, as is normally required, obtaining presidential approval, by allowing
such temporary changes to remain in effect for two years. Id. at 752-53. This case is a
straightforward example of the President suing to protect his regulatory authority.
324. Vinson v. Washington Gas Light Co., 321 U.S. 489, 497 (1944).
325. See generally Note, supra note 171 (advocating judicial resolution of disputes
beween executive departments and agencies over congressional allocations of regulatory
power).
326. 337 U.S. 426 (1949).
327. One might argue that the OPA was regulated because it was invoking a particular
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Nonetheless, such a case should be justiciable. Plainly, no
article III concerns are present. The petitioning agency is making
a claim specific to it, that it was denied its legally mandated role
in the decisionmaking process. Rather than asserting merely a
general interest in the integrity of its programs or the facet of
the public interest it represents, the agency challenges a direct
attack on its authority. The injury is immediate, personal, and
direct. No concerns over adversity or collusion are present.3s
Nor need we worry about interfering with presidential authority.
The fight is over not what the government says, but who says
it, a decision that is not solely the President's to make.
Ultimately the executive branch must take one position in its
regulatory capacity. Parts of the executive branch cannot fight
over what that decision should be in court. Yet precisely because
a bottom line must exist, with one agency having the final say,
allowing the slighted agency to protect its statutory decision-
making prerogatives through the courts is appropriate. Under
the principle of unitary execution, the OPA should stick to its
tasks and not interfere with other agencies' fulfillment of theirs,
but that is exactly why judicial enforcement of those respective
roles should be available. By definition, Congress cannot give one
agency the final say in a dispute that is about who gets the final
say. Even if the President opts for one or the other, his deter-
mination is reviewable s2
Respect for Congress' authority and the rule of law counsel
for judicial resolution of the disagreement. The courts' central
function in the administrative state is to delineate and enforce
statutory provision that, it claimed, gave it certain responsibility or authority that had
been slighted. Regulators themselves are inevitably regulated in this sense, however.
Agencies are always controlled by statute; the question is whether they are controlled
by another agency.
328. See Note, supra note 171, at 1613-16.
329. The President (that is, 0MB or DOJ) should, and often does, resolve such fights
among his subordinates. Executive Order 12,146 requires executive agencies whose heads
serve at the pleasure of the President to submit interagency legal disputes to the
Attorney General "prior to proceeding in any court" and encourages other executive
agencies to do the same. Exec. Order No. 12,146 SS 1-401, 1-402, 3 C.F.R. SS 409, 411
(1979). There are limits, however, to the President's ability to settle such jurisdictional
battles, some imposed by Congress, some self-imposed. When a turf war involves binding,
judicially cognizable standards, then the President cannot make an unreviewable deter-
mination of which agency decides. As long as there is, in the administrative law sense,
"law to apply," Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413 (1971); see
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), courts must apply it. To view turf wars as
nonjusticiable merely because the President should run the branch is an invitation for
the President to ignore the limits that Congress, or he himself, has established. See
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (relying on regulation making independent
prosecutor removable oniy for cause).
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congressionally assigned agency responsibilities. Perhaps the
competing agencies should sort out these battles internally, and
they generally do. Perhaps cases will arise in which Congress
did not assign tasks, leaving their assignment to the executive
branch, in which case the court will play no role as long as the
executive branch sticks to its own rules.m As long as the court
enforces the legally mandated division of responsibility, however,
then it is not intruding on presidential authority. To the contrary,
it is in essence enforcing the unitariness of the executive.3 1
Consider judicial resolutions of fights within Congress. Resort
to the courts by members of Congress looks immediately like
sour grapes; having failed to convince their colleagues on the
merits, the losers attack the outcome in court.S2 Their objections
to the legislation or its harm to their constituents should not
provide access to the courts; the forum for those objections is
Congress itself. Suppose, however, that the democratically con-
trolled House of Representatives refused to count the votes of
Republican members.s Such an action would be justiciable. To
330. Courts should and do enforce executive orders and agency regulations that allocate
administrative responsibilities. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 694-96.
331. An example is Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. FERC, 692 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir.
1983), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla
Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765 (1984). One part of this complex case was a DOI
challenge to a FERC license for an enormous water project on and affecting several
Indian reservations. Id. at 1229. FERC had rejected permit conditions proposed by DOI.
Id. at 1228. DOI argued, and the court held, that the relevant statute required FERC to
accept any conditions DOI proposed. Id. at 1229, 1234-36. The court did not discuss
justiciability. This interagency litigation clearly was justiciable, however, because DOI
went to court to vindicate its own congressionally established authority. The court was
performing its appropriate role of ensuring that the various agencies adhered to Congress'
allocation of authority.
This case also is an example of the regulating/regulated distinction. Congress had
designated DOI as a trustee for the tribes. Id. at 1234-35. As such, DOI stepped into
their shoes in the litigation. As trustee, DOI was a member of the regulated community;
once completely identified with the tribes, it could challenge regulatory actions of the
government that applied to them and thus to it.
332. McGowan, supra note 105.
333. For a less extreme example of such a controversy, see Vander Jagt v. O'Neill,
699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983). In that case, 14 members of
the House sued the majority leader, among other members, contending that the Democrats
had systematically discriminated against them by providing them with fewer seats on
committees than they were due. Id. at 1167. Devoting its justiciability analysis to the
question of standing, the court found the case justiciable, id. at 1168-71, but withheld all
relief and dismissed the action in the exercise of its discretion, citing separation of
powers concerns. Id. at 1175-77. The court took the same approach in Gregg v. Barrett,
771 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (dismissing a complaint filed by members of Congress seeking
an injunction against improper preparation of the Congressional Record). Compare cases
cited in supra note 105.
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the extent members of Congress represent constituents, they
must do so by participating in Congress, not by bringing lawsuits.
Because that is the limit of the members' authority, however,
they must be able to go outside Congress to defend their full
participation in Congress' activities.
DOJ's challenges to FMC-approved rate-setting agreements
further illustrate this point. Cases in which DOJ argues merely
that the agreement is so contrary to the public interest that the
FMC's action was an abuse of discretion or contrary to the statute
present a pure regulatory dispute. If, on the other hand, DOJ
argues that the type of agreement at issue is not in fact the
type that should even be before the FMC to approve or disap-
prove-and is therefore subject to DOJ's ordinary responsibility
as antitrust enforcer-such an action would be justiciable.3m
D. Interagency Litigation Accompanied by Private Litigation
One other type of interagency litigation merits separate con-
sideration. Arguably, as long as litigation is already taking place
between a private party and the government, other governmental
parties should be able to join or file companion suits. In practice,
most interagency litigation occurs alongside companion suits by
private parties; an agency seeking judicial review usually has
some private co-petitioners. Perhaps their participation is what
makes these cases justiciable.
In part, this suggestion rests on the same justifications as the
nongovernmental-real-party-in-interest test discussed above.3 The
334. For an example of such litigation, see American Mail Line v. FMC, 503 F.2d 157
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974) (on petitions for review from, among others,
DOJ, the court set aside FMC approval of an agreement, under which two shippers were
to become subsidiaries of the same corporate parent, as beyond the FMC's jurisdiction).
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), also supports such a distinction. The
President's attorneys contended that disagreement over what to do with the tapes was
a jurisdictional dispute over whether the President or the Special Prosecutor had the
final decision over the use of evidence in criminal proceedings. Id. at 693. This charac-
terization would not render the dispute nonjusticiable; the Court would still be free to
determine which had jurisdiction. In essence, that is what it did.
335. See United States v. FMC, 694 F.2d 793, 800 nn.22-23 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (suggesting,
without deciding, that DOJ may be more free to challenge another agency's decision if
it is not the only petitioner).
336. See supra notes 184-206 and accompanying text. Note, however, that the two are
quite distinct. The former was an abstract, case-or-controversy argument that rested on
the idea that the suit in essence was not actually between two parts of the government,
but between the government and a private real party in interest. In contrast, the present
suggestion is a practical argument that looks less to the presence of private parties than
to the existence of their lawsuit.
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fight between one part of the government and private parties
ensures that the court has before it a justiciable controversy
between truly adverse parties who are pursuing divergent inter-
ests, are not subject to mutual control, and will provide effective
advocacy. Adding another governmental party does not eliminate
that justiciable controversy and could be justified under some
sort of pendent party theory. Furthermore, allowing agencies to
intervene against the government in litigation already com-
menced between the government and a private party, but not to
initiate litigation against other agencies, makes sense to the
extent that the concern is with unnecessary judicial involvement
in intragovernmental disputes. As long as affected private parties
have brought the case to court, nothing will be lost and a good
deal may be gained from greater agency participation. The ex-
ecutive branch is not turning to the courts to resolve its disputes;
the court will be doing so in any event, and the question is
whether all parts of the executive branch will have the oppor-
tunity to present their views. For the reasons discussed below,
however, the existence of a private suit should not affect the
justiciability of its interagency equivalent in either direction.
1. Article III Concerns
If the argument up to this point is correct, then the presence
or absence of private litigants does not matter under article III.
I have argued that article III generally permits intragovernmen-
tal litigation, even in cases in which no private litigants are
involved; therefore, determining whether their existence renders
a suit more justiciable is not necessary. Even if this analysis is
wrong, however, accompanying private litigation still makes no
difference to the article III analysis.e 7
337. If any accompanying private litigation should matter, it can only be in cases
brought by private parties. First, the idea that private parties have forced judicial
resolution of the dispute applies only if, in fact, the private parties have brought the
litigation. In DOJ challenges to bank mergers approved by the Comptroller of the
Currency, see supra note 309 and accompanying text, the presence of the bank as a party
thus cannot justify the litigation between DOJ and the Comptroller; no private party
upset with the government's decision forced judicial review. If, on the other hand, private
parties-for example, rival banks-first sought review of the Comptroller's merger, then
their presence might justify the participation of DOJ and/or the Comptroller in the banks'
lawsuit.
Second, allowing interagency suits as long as they began as litigation between the
government and a private party, even if they were brought by the government, would
create a large and unjustifiable loophole if the general rule is one of nonjusticiability.
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If the private and intragovernmental suits are separate, the
pendency of private litigation should make no difference. It would
be bizarre and almost aggressively sloppy if a nonjusticiable suit
were saved because someone else has filed a justiciable one. The
same is not true, however, of agency intervention in an existing,
justiciable suit or of consolidated actions.m The question then is
how broad a suit that has an undeniably justiciable core can
become. The usual pendent party/ancillary jurisdiction rationale
is that in the interests of efficiency and judicial economy, a court
having jurisdiction over part of a case ought to be able to decide
all of the issues rather than having another court later resolve
some tiny corner of the dispute.m If that corner is not justiciable
at all, however, the same considerations argue against appending
it to the justiciable core. One thus cannot invoke the usual
pendent party rationale to let an agency that could not proceed
directly against another agency into a case brought by a private
party.
A line of cases holds, however, that an intervenor as of right
need not have a justiciable controversy with the opposing party.
The lower courts are divided; the Supreme Court has noted but
not resolved the conflict.30 The majority rule is that an intervenor
as of right need not have been able to bring the suit itself.341
Under this approach, a court would allow any governmental party
to intervene as long as some statute gave it the right to do so,
regardless of whether that party could have been an original
party. This rule would justify, for example, litigation between
DOJ and the Comptroller of the Currency which began as a suit
between DOJ and a merged bank.3 2
The DOJ/Comptroller example illustrates the shortcoming of
the rule that allows intervention without an independent juris-
Congress can set up any regulatory scheme in such a way that if an agency is unhappy
with another's decision it sues an affected private party. If naming a private party as
the respondent is all it takes to get an interagency dispute into the courts, then a
purported bar on such litigation amounts to nothing. A DOJ challenge to the merged
bank is not meaningfully different from a DOJ challenge to FMC-approved rate agree-
ments, even though in one DOJ formally sues the bank and in the other it formally sues
the FMC.
338. Although many instances of interagency litigation have resulted from the consol-
idation of private and intragovernmental suits, few, if any, have involved formal agency
petitions to intervene.
339. See, e.g., Bowers v. Moreno, 520 F.2d 843, 846-48 (lst Cir. 1975); Leather's Best,
Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 809-11 (2d Cir. 1971).
340. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 & n.21 (1986).
341. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 553 (3d ed. 1985).
342. See supra notes 306-09 and accompanying text.
1991]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
dictional basis.4 Irrespective of how the case began, in deter-
mining whether the Comptroller can intervene, the court must
face the basic problem of whether DOJ and the Comptroller can
square off in court. The case is in no essential way different from
the suits over FMC-approved rate agreements that began as suits
filed by DOJ against the FMC. Regardless of the caption, two
federal agencies were fighting out their disagreements in court.
The fact that the Comptroller joined the suit after it had started
did not alter its underlying nature. Whatever the merits in
general of allowing intervention by a party that could not have
brought suit in the first place, this seems, therefore, an inappro-
priate setting in which to apply that rule.
In cases in which the second governmental party joining the
litigation seeks permissive intervention, the argument fails be-
cause the intervenor must satisfy the same jurisdictional require-
ments as an original party 44
Ultimately, this approach proves too much, for it is in no way
limited to intragovernmental lawsuits. The same rationale would
apply to anyone who wanted to join an existing lawsuit. That is
a conceivable system, but it is not the one we have. In short,
allowing intragovernmental litigation as long as private parties
initiated and are pursuing the litigation is responsive to article
III concerns about adversity and the necessity for judicial reso-
lution. Nonetheless, the existence of parallel litigation between
an agency and private parties should not open the article III
door to other agencies if such litigation is not independently
justiciable.
2. Article II/Separation of Powers Concerns
The presence of private parties in the litigation does not
significantly affect separation of powers/article II concerns. To
be sure, in this setting the courts are, by definition, not deciding
issues they should not be or unnecessarily meddling in executive
affairs. The unitary execution, or unitary executive, arguments,
however, remain as strong, or weak, as ever: if allowing agencies
343. The general appropriateness of this rule is beyond the scope of this Article.
Commentators have in general endorsed it. See, e.g., 3 J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 24.18[1] (2d ed. 1987); C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 507
(4th ed. 1983).
344. Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 (1885); FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b); F. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, supra note 341, at 554.
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to appear on different sides of a lawsuit is an abdication of
presidential authority, the fact that at least one of the agencies
appears alongside private parties changes nothing; the agencies
are still out of control.
3. Practical Considerations
The benefits of making an exception to any general rule of
nonjusticiability in cases in which the courts will review an
agency's action in any event are not obvious. The court can
achieve all of the advantages of having multiple agency views
before it by accepting amicus briefs without making the inter-
vening agency a party. Although an amicus does not enjoy all
the rights of participation of an actual party, most cases of
interagency litigation rest on stipulated facts or a preexisting
record. As a result, there is little in which to participate other
than brief-writing. The key right an intervenor would have is
the ability to appeal an adverse decision. Even if intervention
can occur without an independent jurisdictional basis, however,
such an intervenor cannot appeal on its own.1 5 If the presence
of private parties is necessary to allow a second agency into
existing litigation, and those parties choose not to appeal, the
agency would not be allowed to do so on its own. The difference,
therefore, between amicus and party status is insubstantial.
Finally, a rule that looks to the presence of private parties in
the case would have to require not merely that private parties
be present, but that they raise the particular claim the latecoming
governmental party seeks to make. For example, if private par-
ties challenge an agency decision as too stringent, an agency
could not intervene to argue that it was too lax. The underlying
justification for the rule-that a court must decide the issue
anyway and might as well be fully informed-does not apply in
that circumstance.UB Yet once one limits the latecoming govern-
345. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
346. Even if we accepted this rule, it would not render justiciable a case like Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975). This case was a challenge
to EPA's decision to suspend registration of a pesticide while allowing the depletion of
current stocks. Id- at 1295-96. The private parties argued that EPA should have forbidden
any future use. Id- at 1296. The Secretary of Agriculture argued that the registration
should not have been suspended. Id. The environmentalist's challenge cannot justify
hearing the Secretary's challenge if the latter would be otherwise nonjusticiable.
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mental party to those claims the original party already made,
then little justification remains for allowing the governmental
party into the case at all. Again, agency participation as an
amicus is just as valuable.
Ultimately, then, the existence of a lawsuit between and agency
and a private party cannot justify otherwise nonjusticiable inter-
agency litigation.
VI. LITIGATION BETWEEN PARTS OF THE SAME AGENCY
Against this background, consider briefly one last type of
intragovernmental litigation-that arising between parts of a
single agency. Such litigation looks nonjusticiable.4 7 Suppose an
Under Secretary of HUD seeks judicial review of the HUD
Secretary's decision to award a particular grant. Such a suit has
the indicia of justiciability that the Court identified in United
States v. Nixonw and that the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia applied in United States v. FMC.39 First, there is
concrete adverseness; if the Secretary prevails, HUD will award
the grant, whereas if the Under Secretary prevails, it will not.
Second, a justiciable issue could easily exist. For example, the
Under Secretary might claim that the recipients of the grant do
not meet certain statutory criteria-a completely run-of-the-mill,
judicially manageable question of the sort that courts resolve
every day.
The example of litigation within an agency shows the poverty
of this analysis, however. Surely the HUD Under Secretary could
not challenge the Secretary's grant decision. Entirely apart from
whether the Under Secretary would have a cause of action ° or
standing,351 the identity of the parties forecloses the litigation.
347. Note, supra note 208, at 643. Professor Jaffe, for example, seemed to assume that
litigation within an agency is nonjusticiable. See supra text accompanying note 34.
348. 418 U.S. 683, 697 (1974).
349. 694 F.2d 793, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
350. To my knowledge, no federal statute gives subordinate decisionmakers the right
to challenge their superiors' decisions. Such a scheme would certainly be surprising.
Implicit in giving the final decision to the Secretary of an agency is a determination that
the Under Secretary should not interfere. Moreover, the subordinate would not be
"adversely affected or aggrieved" under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. S
702 (1988), because she would have no personal interest at stake. See, e.g., Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 177-78 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc).
351. The Under Secretary would seem neither to have suffered an injury-in-fact nor
to be within the statute's zone of interests. See, e.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area School
Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (school board member lacks standing to seek judicial review of
[Vol. 32:893
1991] UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES
Two parties who share a boss cannot sue each other over a
matter the boss can resolve.= A necessary corollary to this
principle is that an employee cannot sue her own boss over a
matter that the boss can resolve; for that reason alone, the HUD
dispute does not pose a case or controversy. In addition, the
Secretary and the Under Secretary do not represent divergent
interests. They merely disagree on the merits. On a continuum,
just as the underlying interests in United States v. ICC1 were
more distinct than those of the Secretary of Agriculture in
challenging an ICC ratemaking policy that affected farmers, so
that setting involved greater divergence than is found here. That
the individuals disagree is not enough.38
board's decision).
Similar reasoning is found in a District of Columbia Circuit decision holding that the
Administrator of the CAB could not seek judicial review of the Board's dismissal of
complaints that the Administrator had filed. Lee v. CAB, 225 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
The court reasoned that the Administrator had not been aggrieved. Id. at 951. The
dissenting judge argued that the Administrator, who brings complaints in his own name,
had an adequate interest in the proceeding to support a petition for judicial review. Id.
at 952 (Prettyman, J., dissenting). Whether the majority or dissent was correct as to the
nature of the Administrator's status is not important here. The opinion suggests, correctly,
that an agency employee who contributes to or participates in the agency decisionmaking
cannot then attack the decision in court. In contrast, an official external to the decision-
making process is akin to a private party and can. See also Mortenson v. Pyramid Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 53 Wis. 2d 81, 191 N.W.2d 730 (1971) (state savings and loan commissioner
cannot obtain judicial review of Savings and Loan Review Board decision contrary to his
recommendation).
352. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
353. 337 U.S. 426 (1949).
354. In United States v. Shep Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D.C. Colo. 1985), the court
refused to place the Army on both sides of the lawsuit. The United States brought a
Superfund action to recover $48 million in costs incurred by the Army for cleaning up
contamination allegedly caused by Shell. See 42 U.S.C. SS 9604, 9607 (1988). Shell moved
to join the Army as a defendant, arguing that it was partially responsible for the
contamination and that the United States had to seek recovery from both responsible
parties. The court correctly denied the motion, even though the Army could legitimately
be both a plaintiff and a liable party under the statute. Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1083-
84. Analogizing to comparative negligence cases, the court stated that the proper approach
was for Shell to counterclaim and for the court to apportion liability. Id.
This result was clearly correct. The United States had an undivided interest in this
litigation. It wanted to get as much money from Shell as possible to cover cleanup costs.
One might portray the government as both regulating-pursuant to its response authority
under 42 U.S.C. S 9604-and regulated-as a responsible party under 42 U.S.C. S 9607.
The closer analogy, however, is to a case like Dean v. Harrington, 668 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.
Tenn. 1987) (contract action between Department of Energy and the TVA). See supra
notes 277-80 and accompanying text. Under Superfund, anyone can clean up a contaminated
site and sue those responsible for the contamination for the costs. 42 U.S.C. 5 9607(a)(4)(B).
If the plaintiff is partially liable itself, the court will reduce its award accordingly. Id. S
9613(f). The statute places federal facilities in exactly the same position. Id. S 9620. In
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Separate agency offices can, however, represent different in-
terests and have divergent goals. For example, within the De-
partment of the Interior, both the Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) are in constant
disagreement in pursuit of their entirely distinct agendas. Their
disagreements are indistinguishable in nature from those be-
tween, for example, DOI and the Federal Power Commission in
the dam cases.eS Can the FWS and the BLM litigate against one
another even though they are part of the same agency? Two
branches of a single agency that represent different interests
and have different missions present a stronger claim for justicia-
bility. Yet in most settings, the shared boss will eliminate ad-
versity. The Secretary of the Interior controls both the FWS
and the BLM; hence, these two agencies cannot engage in a
justiciable controversy. Significantly, litigation between parts of
an agency in which the agency head did indeed run the show
has, to my knowledge, never occurred.
Not all parts of every agency, however, are directly controlled
by the agency head. Numerous examples exist of independent
bodies nominally placed within an agency. The Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission (OSHRC), for example, is nomi-
nally within the Department of Labor, but is in no respect subject
to the control of the Secretary of Labor. In enforcing the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), the Secretary of Labor
inspects work sites and issues citations. If an employer contests
the citation, the Secretary must file a complaint with the Com-
mission, which determines the validity of the citation. The Sec-
retary or "[a]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved" by the
Commission's decision may seek review thereof in the court of
appeals.m
Does the Constitution permit the Secretary of Labor to go to
court to challenge a decision of a Commission within the Depart-
ment of Labor? The short answer is clearly yes: because the
this sense the government appears wholly in its regulated capacity-in contrast, for
example, to the situation (so far hypothetical) in which EPA orders the Army to clean
up a site, see id. S 9607, and the Army refuses to do so.
In any event, the critical point is that the Army, or the United States, as the court
implicitly recognized, has only a single interest in this litigation. There simply is no
dispute within the government over which to litigate.
355. See Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345
U.S. 153 (1953).
356. 29 U.S.C. S§ 660(a), Wb) (1988).
[Vol. 32:893
UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES
Commission itself is not a party in the court of appeals,357 the
intragovernmental litigation problem does not even arise. Sup-
pose, however, as at least two courts have held35s that the
Commission can defend its action. In such a setting, the consti-
tutional objection does not arise from the fact that the two
parties have the same boss or that one is subordinate to the
other; although OSHRC is nominally within the Department of
Labor, the Secretary of Labor has no control over it whatsoever.
Rather, the objection would be that OSHRC and the Department
of Labor lack sufficiently divergent interests. In particular, they
both appear in their regulatory capacities. OSHRC is enforcing
the law in a manner that the Secretary does not like, but it is
not enforcing the law against the Secretary. Under the regulating/
regulated rule, such an action would not be justiciable. This
status has nothing to do with the fact that the two parties are
part of the same department. The same defect would exist if
they were wholly separate.
One might try to save litigation by the Secretary of Labor
against OSHRC by distinguishing two regulators squaring off in
court from an enforcer and an adjudicator squaring off. As a
party before OSHRC-indeed, the complainant-and as the per-
son charged with enforcement of the statute, the Secretary
arguably has a personal interest much like that of the Army in
United States v. ICC, for example. I would reject the distinction,
but it does point to an interesting answer to the dispute in the
circuits as to whether OSHRC can appear to defend its decision.
The courts have concluded that if OSHRC is a purely adjudicatory
body, it lacks standing to appear as a party in the courts; if it
is a policymaking body, it has standing.35 The rule should be
just the opposite. If OSHRC is a neutral adjudicator, then one
might portray the Secretary of Labor as equivalent to a private
party subject to OSHRC's regulatory authority; that difference
in capacity would save the intragovernmental suit. If, on the
357. The exact position of the Commission has been a matter of dispute. The majority
view, however, is that the Commission serves a purely adjudicative function and cannot
appear before the court of appeals to defend its decisions. "The commission, like a district
court, has no duty or interest in defending its decision on appeal. As a purely adjudicative
entity, it has no stake in the outcome of the litigation." Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers
Int'l Union v. OSHRC, 671 F.2d 643, 652 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
905 (1982).
358. Diamond Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 645, 648 n.8 (5th Cir. 1976); Brennan v.
Giles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1266-67 (4th Cir. 1974).
359. See In re Perry, 882 F.2d 534, 537 (1st Cir. 1989), and cases cited therein.
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other hand, OSHRC and the Secretary are both policymaking
entities that disagree over OSHA's implementation, then they
should not be able to fight out their disagreement in court.
VII. CONCLUSION
The question whether the United States can sue itself raises
fundamental issues as to how the government is supposed to
operate. Neither a per se bar on such litigation, based on a
misplaced abstract conception of the government as one person,
nor its complete acceptance comports with the constitutional
scheme.
One might posit a multifactor analysis, taking into account the
independence of the litigants, the presence and role of private
parties, congressional authorization of the litigation, and/or the
capacities in which the agencies appear. Almost all of these
factors come together to make the granddaddy intragovernmental
litigation case, United States v. ICC,31° appear justiciable. Of this
welter of considerations, however, the critical one is the capacity
in which the litigating agencies appear.
The conflicting interests within the government frequently
suffice to establish a case or controversy under article III. In
particular, in situations in which one part of the government
enforces or implements a statutory scheme and another part
either is regulated by or is a beneficiary of that scheme, the two
clearly are adequately adverse to support judicial resolution of
their dispute. The same is true if two agencies fight over turf.
If the two agencies disagree instead over how to regulate private
parties, the requisite adverseness is less apparent. The range of
interests and divergent agendas and constituencies of federal
agencies are sufficient, however, to preclude an article III objec-
tion to interagency litigation even in this setting.
The President's constitutional prerogative to manage the ex-
ecutive branch raises perhaps more difficult justiciability ques-
tions. Judicial resolution of the first two types of cases, however,
does not interfere with presidential article II authority. On the
other hand, to permit two agencies that disagree, as regulators,
as to the merits of a decision to bring their disagreement to the
courts is inconsistent with the proper functioning of the executive
branch.
360. 337 U.S. 426 (1949).
[Vol. 32:893
1991] UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES 991
The dispute over intragovernmental litigation recently has
been most active with regard to enforcement of the environmen-
tal laws against federal facilities and litigation by a proposed
Special Counsel against federal agencies for allegedly illegal
reprisals against whistleblowers. Because of DOJ's belief that it
would be unconstitutional, no such litigation has ever occurred.
Each, however, fits tidily into the category of justiciable intra-
governmental litigation described herein. Enforcement actions by
one part of the government against another are justiciable.
